They've missed one very important point; one that Hobbes, Hume, and others realized long ago. The utterance "free will" is literally meaningless. What would that even mean and why would you even want that?
That's a big surprise for me. I've defended that freedom and determinism are not mutually exclusive in many discussions for a very long time... and been told that I'm alone in that. I had no idea that it's a position hold by classic philosophers like those. Could you cite some concrete works from them?
Their thesis is that if Humans have free will so do elementary particles (in a defined respect).
Anyone know much more on this? -- Does this relate to the theory that everything was predefined at the big bang - e.g. a big random number was generated and everything since then has simply been cause and effect? Or is it on another tack?
Although I'm not a particle physicist, if I remember well what I read about it, this very demonstration proves that there is no predetermined hidden variable revealed by observation.
"More precisely, if the experimenter
can freely choose the directions in which to orient his apparatus in a certain measurement,
then the particle’s response (to be pedantic – the universe’s response near the particle) is not
determined by the entire previous history of the universe."
Based on this article, there isn't enough information to answer your question. The authors are clearly aware of quantum theory and you'd have to dig in deeper.
It is generally accepted that quantum events are "truly random", so the random number generation is ongoing. The standard proof of this is Bell's theorem (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell's_Theorem ), but I feel a deeper understanding of the theorem shows rather that it constrains what hidden variables could exist and that the conventional understanding is impossible, not that hidden variables in all senses are completely impossible. (Still, the hidden variables people were "hoping" for are impossible; if there are hidden variables they will be undeniably "quantum".)
"I feel a deeper understanding of the theorem shows rather that it constrains what hidden variables could exist and that the conventional understanding is impossible, not that hidden variables in all senses are completely impossible."
That was my conclusion too: I've been meaning to write about it, but time constraints keep getting in the way.
The thing I like about the Free Will theorem is that it highlights the importance of the experimenter's choice, as opposed to in Bell's theorem, where demonstrations mostly take this as given. There's room for 'hidden variables' of a certain type in the decision making process of the experimenter and the state and process of the measurement apparatus. Having blind faith that important state is located there is perhaps unwise, and certainly it is hard to demonstrate, but assuming that the experimenters are entirely un-entangled and uninfluenced causally, that there's no interesting modified state in the experimenters or measurement apparatus at all, would, to my mind, also be a mistake.
Well there was nothing and there became something.
If we take the cause and effect theory which clearly conforms to the evolutionary theory then logicaly we are able to so rewind the cause and effect to a point where there was nothing. Hence, if there is no choice but only predetermined causes, what predetermined something from nothing?
I do not know. You may be right. That's metaphysics. In practise you can't even tell whether the universe is like a movie or a computer game.
I.e. a movie on a film reel consists of frames that are created once and when you watch it looks like a coherent story --- but when you paint over some frames at the beginning, it has no effect on any other frame.
Whereas when you manipulate the state in a computer game --- say, give Super Mario that mushroom --- you change everything that comes later.
And for that straw man theory of causality: You can just exchange it for a theory that postulates a cause for everything _but_ the Big Bang.
(By the way, I do not believe in causality. At least not the kind of mono-causality exhibited in human storystelling, esp. stock market commentators on TV. Strangely I still manage to believe in determinism.)
When the floor was opened for questions, one member of the
audience questioned Dr Conway's use of the term "Free
Will". She asked whether Dr Conway was "confusing
randomness and free will".
In a passionate reply, Dr Conway said that what he
had shown, with mathematical precision, that if a
given property was exhibited by an experimenter than
that same property was exhibited by particles. He had
been careful when constructing his theorem to use the same
term "free will" in the antecedent and consequent of his
theorem. He said he did not really care what people chose
to call it. Some people choose to call it "free will" only
when there is some judgment involved. He said he felt that
"free will" was freer if it was unhampered by judgment -
that it was almost a whim. "If you don't like the term Free
Will, call it Free Whim - this is the Free Whim Theorem".
They have packaged their arguments in an airtight mathematical theorem that rests on what they say are three unassailable axioms which happen to rhyme -- spin, fin and twin.
Aside from most discussions of "free will" arising from semantic confusion, I think pretty clearly points toward this being a bit of a joke...
Knowing Conway as I do, this is not only par for the course, it is actively to be expected. If there weren't comments like this then it would be a spoof.
And there is no semantic confusion about "Free Will". The naming of the theorem is stated in those terms, but the work itself is independent of the precise meaning. That's why this is such an interesting result. The care taken to make it independent of the semantics attached to that term is, again, entirely to be expected, and makes the result compelling.
If they prove we don't have free will and somebody gets upset, they can always say "Hey, it wasn't like we choice in what we studied. It just happened that way."
It might have been predetermined, but there's still an act of choosing, a weighing of possibilities, a judgment between them, and action. And those judging them later will too be able to judge their judgment, their character, and make decisions based on that.
The existence of free will in a strong sense, has, as far as I can tell, no logically valid implications in practical terms, though it does do something profound to our psychologies: it certainly injects fatalism.
"It might have been predetermined, but there's still an act of choosing, a weighing of possibilities, a judgment between them, and action. And those judging them later will too be able to judge their judgment, their character, and make decisions based on that."
And that would all be predetermined too.
Someone came up with this before me: you should believe in free will because if it exists you're right and if not you couldn't have done otherwise anyway. It's like Pascal's Wager, except not stupid and wrong.
I could imagine a race of egghead hyper-rationalists who would feel depressed at the thought of the absence of determinism. They would be horrified at the thought of living in an unpredictable, chaotic universe.
I agree. Actually I find the idea (if not the proof) kind of obvious: our thoughts are as deterministic as the processes that effect them. Whether they are deterministic is another story.
Their lack of (supposed: I don't know how well read either mathematician is in philosophy) philosophical credentials might justifiably invite scepticism.
But surely we can only dismiss this if their argument has a flaw. And the burden of disproof is on us, not them.
They seem to think free will is a part of physics, not philosophy, and reductionist physics at that. They didn't address any actual problems in the field. They missed the point. That is a flaw in their non-argument.
The burden is on them to say what is a problem in the field they want to address, to know something about the history of the problem, other candidate solutions to it, and how their solution differs, and then say what the answer is. They simply haven't done that.
What they've done is define a property, tack the name "free will" onto it because it resembles some people's definitions of free will, and prove some things about it. If their math is sound, then good for them. Whether this is applicable to anything is certainly up for discussion, of course.
