* the identification of the person who called LeMessurier in 1978 and whose questions made him redo the math (whose name is not listed in the New Yorker article) as Lee DeCarolis ( https://onlineethics.org/node/41606 )
So the New Yorker article is embellished - as it recounts two conversations he had with a "young man" - when it fact it was a young woman and it was one of his associates and not LeMessurier who had those conversations.
edit:Wikipedia says that Lee DeCarolis came forward in 2022 to identify himself as the person who had spoken to LeMessurier. His story is here: https://onlineethics.org/node/41606
Great story, and LeMessurier is certainly deserving of praise. I'm curious about his initial mistake. The article mentions that he placed the pillars at the middle edges, as opposed to corners, because this is beter for resisting the quarterly winds. So he clearly knew they were a thing. Why then did he not do the calculations for how they would effect the chevon braces until the call from the student? That seems like a pretty huge lack of oversight. Was it pride? The moment of inspiration is described romantically, sprawling designs on the back of a napkin and such, and he was disappointed that the chevrons would be hidden behind the aluminum skin/facade - consoling himself with the thought "It'd be there for God to see".
The article describes the whole situation as a perfect storm of sorts (no violation of building code, industry standard of bolts instead of welding, etc), but I can't get past how he didn't crunch the numbers for something that seems like it should go without saying.
I'm not sure about the initial mistake either. But then again, this was a lesson in one of my structural classes, so you don't forget about that sort of issue.
Basically, I'm surprised that no one did the basic worst case sigma=MY/I for the side and quartering loads. The old grizzled supervising engineer generally will run through a bunch of ballpark estimates to see if the designer has actually checked all the worst case combinations.
I don't really buy the article's factor of safety discussion -- the factor of safety is for uncertainty, not blunders. I _might_ save you from a blunder, but that's not what it's for. It's for variation in material dimension, quality, and loading variation.
As for the bolts vs welding, There's definitely scope for changes at the shop drawing stage. When an engineering firm designs a building, they'll generally design a set of typical connections, but when the shop goes to build them, they have to take this column:floor beam connection and actually turn it into "cut this cope, drill here, ..." and they'll generally do the simplest, cheapest thing they can.
The engineers have to review the shop drawings, and if they don't have a good set of calcs for what the loads are in that particular bit, then they aren't going to necessarily see that this substitution of bolts won't work. (Note -- bolts can be just as good, and potentially better than welds, depending on what you're doing, how you're erecting, and the space you have available. Full Penetration welds are a pain, but they're the easiest way to specify a full strength join. But doing them on site, in the air, when you're putting the thing together is not something that you'd generally want to spec.)
There have been a significant number of historical disasters connected to shop drawing changes that the engineers didn't pick up. (e.g., the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse).
Also remember, this was done in the 70's, so they wouldn't have had Finite element models of the building where it's super easy to just run a couple more loads. Everything there would have been indeterminate elastic analysis, so it's not quick to run an accurate calculation if you're trying to find beam sizes.
LeMessurier gave a talk on this at my school when I was studying architecture and structural engineering. The narrative very much follows the lines of this story, but also appreciate the added detail in the article. His voiceover definitely emphasized the complex ethical considerations of engineering more than the technical: Balancing the interests of insurance, client brand, public sentiment and trust, government relations, and his own professional and firm. Don't get me wrong, the technical details and Delta P effect were super interesting. But the professional practice aspects were what he wanted students to take away from it.
(Sorry to be bit of a skunk at the picnic, but...)
I'm sure someone payed for the adjustments deemed necessary. And this probably wasn't the engineer's pocket money.
Zooming out, many/most/all larger projects have budget overruns. The root cause is usually that politically the plan is not viable unless it's pitched below a realistic estimate.
This is often where "clever engineering" comes into the picture, but also where risks are taken that are responsible for budget overruns (or physical disasters when undressed) are rooted. I don't know enough about this project to allege that this is what was going on here, but it kinda fits the picture:
The structural members in question were steel, not aluminium.
The original costings were done assuming welded joints. It was a contractor who cavilled that expense, and the change to bolted joints was done without notice to the lead engineer.
What you describe does happen, I've seen it in the field of software; but it's not the issue described in TFA.
This is all true, and I admit using to big a brush here. And sorry for my inaccuracies.
I meant to look as the process more holistically. Yes, I think you're precise in point out this was not a planning / engineering issue, but execution. But stepping away from the finger pointing; there is always a disconnect between the actual physical building and the model, assumptions conjured to guide the physical process toward safety. A welded joints on paper are neither safe or unsafe; it's the physical result that requires the safety.
It seems that somewhere in the process the architect/designer, engineer, supervisor, builder, hadn't paid attention. And without blaming one or the other, there are always (political) motivations for people to look away. That is, it's difficult to get a man to appreciate a problem when his salary depends on his not understanding it. :-)
I was a consultant and worked for Citicorp in that tower in the mid 90s. Someone that I worked with told me this story. I don't remember anything else about the project, but I remember him explaining how they had gone in every night to weld plates across the joints.
* the 2019 update that someone re-evaluated the risks and thinks the retrofit might not have been necessary after all ( https://www.nist.gov/publications/wind-effects-tall-building... )
* the identification of the person who called LeMessurier in 1978 and whose questions made him redo the math (whose name is not listed in the New Yorker article) as Lee DeCarolis ( https://onlineethics.org/node/41606 )
In the version of the story I read, Diane Hartley flagged the risk to the engineer by writing a whole thesis about the building (see e.g. writeup at https://www.lemessurier.com/sites/default/files/publications... and https://onlineethics.org/cases/engineers-and-scientists-beha... ).
It's interesting how, the closer you look, reality grows more complex than the stories we tell about it.