Oh? I thought he said clearly that consciousness (your hard problem i.e. the experience of qualia) is just a feeling (from the brainstem).

And then he explains that cognition takes place in the cortex, which isn't the seat of consciousness. Cognition is built on top of and relies upon the hard consciousness relayed from the brainstem for "drive".

So, with cognition, you can calculate that to satisfy your desire, you need to walk three blocks north and two blocks east to the store to buy food. The drive for this behaviour originates lower in the brainstem through the quality of hunger, which is referred from the body when a sensor in your tank registers empty.

Is not his "drive" your "hard consciousness"?

Fair question, but my problem (and I could be misunderstanding his position) is that he doesn't provide any cohesive explanation or line of reasoning why there's subjective experience effectively accompanying these "drives" at all.

The hard problem would put this in the category of easy problems[1].

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness#...

Perhaps I don't understand what the hard problem is?

Is it this thing of trying to find the little man inside of your head that is viewing the television screen that displays the images that go in through your eyes?

Could you help me to see what the hard problem is?

Consciousness is the ghost in the machine that seems to be unnecessary to the functioning and behavior of the machine.

All of your interactions with the outside world can be explained by the signals in your brain, even our discussion of consciousness can easily be explained by physical/measurable processes.

This conversation would still happen in a universe without any conscious entities . Of course you can build a machine that can recursively think about its self, and in turn speak about this self awareness. This should all be able to happen without there being a subjective experience of that self-awareness.

So why is anything experienced at all.

Do you believe that numbers exist in a calculator even though they aren't necessary for the calculator to work?

> Oh? I thought he said clearly that consciousness (your hard problem i.e. the experience of qualia) is just a feeling (from the brainstem).

Repeating the question doesn't answer it. What is this "feeling?" It's merely moving the question down from "the brain" to "the brainstem."

The brainstem is a state machine.

Happy and alive? Or Not happy and alive? Depends on the sum of the signals for hunger, respiration, and pain from the body.

That's fine, but who is experiencing the state of that machine?

The state machine isn't the interesting part. The interesting part is that it is aware of itself.

OK, thanks for clarifying.

So, the problem is figuring out where the little man is inside of your head that is viewing the television screen that displays the images that go in through your eyes? And experiencing the hunger that comes from your stomach? The problem is finding the "I" in the sentence "I feel"? Where is "I"? Is that the problem?

If that is the problem, how about the answer "nowhere"? There is no "I".

I suspect you won't like that answer. It will feel unsatisfactory, is that your reaction? I don't have the same reaction, but I'd like to understand how it is for you?

> There is no "I". I suspect you won't like that answer.

If there is no "I", who is this "I" who suspects?

> If there is no "I", who is this "I" who suspects?

Good question.

It is a transient data structure.

Or a code structure if you prefer. A function that is executing. It can reference data.

When it is finished executing, it is disposed.

Ok, well all this stuff that you're coming up with is called the Hard Problem of Consciousness, and it's a big topic with many many words written on it. And it's what the thread parent was saying wasn't satisfactorily answered by the glib "just a feeling" answer.

> Where is "I"? Is that the problem?

Roughly, although I would say it's not so much "where" as "what".

Your answer that "there is nothing doing the experiencing" strikes me as obviously unsatisfactory, given that "I" experience things all day long every day, and "I" assume "you" do too.

Not all day long.

Right at the start of the day, when I've just finished sleeping, when I'm awake, but I haven't yet figured out where I am, or what day it is, or what I've got on today, or anything.

It's a lovely, easy feeling.

Then it hits me. I'm in my house on the east side. I've got that meeting today. My girlfriend is still angry at me.

In those few moments before all that data is mounted, there is no "I".

Do you experience that some mornings?

>> "I" experience things all day long every day, and "I" assume "you" do too.

> Not all day long. Right at the start of the day, when I've just finished sleeping, when I'm awake, but I haven't yet figured out where I am, or what day it is, or what I've got on today, or anything. It's a lovely, easy feeling. ... In those few moments before all that data is mounted, there is no "I".

You have just described the "I" of awareness perfectly! That is the true, indeed only, "I", the one who is aware of all the temporary, passing phenomena, whether they be thoughts, feelings, sensations, perceptions, etc.

Sure.

The fact that you're not conscious when you're not conscious doesn't prove that consciousness doesn't exist. On the contrary: the fact that you sometimes are conscious would seem to prove that consciousness does exist.