The main point this paper makes and demonstrates is that if you can cause corruption of a full block (i.e., completely garble contents of a chosen block), then you can elevate privileges (with some assumptions, like using ext3).
That's an entirely unsurprising fact, especially if you've ever played around with cracking/patching. A single-bit change in the right place is sufficient to turn an "are you root/registered/privileged/etc.?" check into its negation. This isn't anything novel or unexpected to anyone who knows how software works.
This is not about having control over the changes (flipping a bit in a file, say), but rather about random corruption.
Also this is not a journal paper, this is a workshop (Usenix "Workshop on Offensive Technologies") which is meant as a kind of get together of academics and practical/industry guys. So just demonstrating an "theoretically obvious" exploit would be fine content for that venue, especially if it's not been academically documented before.
That's an entirely unsurprising fact, especially if you've ever played around with cracking/patching. A single-bit change in the right place is sufficient to turn an "are you root/registered/privileged/etc.?" check into its negation. This isn't anything novel or unexpected to anyone who knows how software works.