I wish the authors had focused on the design of DUAL_EC_DRBG, since that's a more objective and compelling response. Mathematical features of the standard make very little sense without a backdoor, and the original article provided essentially no justification. Rather, it attempted a distraction by pointing to alternative configurations and standards.
The authors might also have focused on the NSA's consistent refusal to deny that it backdoored DUAL_EC_DRBG. It is difficult to see what intelligence harm could come from such an acknowledgement. After the Heartbleed issue went public, for example, the NSA quickly denied that it had previous knowledge.
Unfortunately, the authors focus on NSA skullduggery and misconduct, citing primarily to non-expert (and semi-sensationalist) reporting. That's not very surprising, since Bruce Schneier is an activist critic. (As is Green, I'm not familiar with Heilman.) I think it undermines their case, though.
>Mathematical features of the standard make very little sense without a backdoor, and the original article provided essentially no justification. Rather, it attempted a distraction by pointing to alternative configurations and standards.
I agree and would happily sign a letter which made this case. The argument for a DUAL_EC_DRBG backdoor is overwhelming.
>Unfortunately, the authors focus on NSA skullduggery and misconduct, citing primarily to non-expert (and semi-sensationalist) reporting.
My primary objection, I can't speak for the other signers, was Wertheimer’s misleading claims that the NSA does have a history of such skullduggery when there is also very strong evidence to the contrary.
We cited:
1. propublica.org, as a source for a direct quotes from NSA documents.
2. reuters, who are the primary source for the claim that the NSA paid RSA 10 million to make DUAL_EC_DRNG the default.
3. blog.cryptographyengineering.com, Matthew Green's writing on this subject. Matthew Green has published an academic research paper at a top venue on DUAL_EC_DRBG [0] and is a Cryptography Professor at Johns Hopkins.
4. Mollin's An Introduction to Cryptography, a Cryptography textbook. Richard A. Mollin was a Cryptography expert [1].
5. Johnson's "American Cryptology during the Cold War: Book III" a History of the NSA written by the NSA.
Three of the five are experts within their areas. Two are from well established news organisations.
The authors might also have focused on the NSA's consistent refusal to deny that it backdoored DUAL_EC_DRBG. It is difficult to see what intelligence harm could come from such an acknowledgement. After the Heartbleed issue went public, for example, the NSA quickly denied that it had previous knowledge.
Unfortunately, the authors focus on NSA skullduggery and misconduct, citing primarily to non-expert (and semi-sensationalist) reporting. That's not very surprising, since Bruce Schneier is an activist critic. (As is Green, I'm not familiar with Heilman.) I think it undermines their case, though.