> Hailed as a victory for consumer privacy and security, the
development dismayed law enforcement officials, who said it
threatens what they describe as a centuries-old social compact
in which the government, with a warrant based on probable
cause, may seize evidence relevant to criminal investigations.
This is an interesting perspective. I tend to view this the
opposite way. Until spring 2013, we tended to believe that the
state doesn't rummage around in the private lives of individual
citizens, except for warranted investigations of a few tax
cheats, drug dealers, racketeers, and the like. Snowden's
disclosures were a massive trust-loss event, and both companies
and individuals will be loath to offer any concession to law
enforcement without a clear demonstration of good faith and
limited access to private data.
I'm also glad to see this perspective from the top cybersecurity
advisor at NIST:
> “The basic question is, is it possible to design a completely
secure system” to hold a master key available to the
U.S. government but not adversaries, said Donna Dodson, chief
cybersecurity adviser at the Commerce Department’s National
Institute of Standards and Technologies. “There’s no way to do
this where you don’t have unintentional vulnerabilities.”
Personally, I'm hoping the United States eventually realizes
Dodson is right and that preserving both individual security and
law-enforcement access is futile. Hopefully the United States
will give up on these key escrow / split key schemes and let
meatspace force break encryption on a warranted, rare basis as
investigations require.
> Hailed as a victory for consumer privacy and security, the development dismayed law enforcement officials, who said it threatens what they describe as a centuries-old social compact in which the government, with a warrant based on probable cause, may seize evidence relevant to criminal investigations.
This is an interesting perspective. I tend to view this the opposite way. Until spring 2013, we tended to believe that the state doesn't rummage around in the private lives of individual citizens, except for warranted investigations of a few tax cheats, drug dealers, racketeers, and the like. Snowden's disclosures were a massive trust-loss event, and both companies and individuals will be loath to offer any concession to law enforcement without a clear demonstration of good faith and limited access to private data.
I'm also glad to see this perspective from the top cybersecurity advisor at NIST:
> “The basic question is, is it possible to design a completely secure system” to hold a master key available to the U.S. government but not adversaries, said Donna Dodson, chief cybersecurity adviser at the Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technologies. “There’s no way to do this where you don’t have unintentional vulnerabilities.”
Personally, I'm hoping the United States eventually realizes Dodson is right and that preserving both individual security and law-enforcement access is futile. Hopefully the United States will give up on these key escrow / split key schemes and let meatspace force break encryption on a warranted, rare basis as investigations require.