I started out from the premise that given the prosecutor was boasting the conviction ratio that a fair trial was likely not in the cards. See GGP comment, my questions were in line with that.
As for whether or not this person is guilty, my point is that even if he is not he will likely accept a plea bargain because the alternative will be one that is unacceptable.
That means his guilt won't enter into the equation at all, it's not as if he's going to win even if not guilty in an all-out confrontation with the DOJ, which is likely exactly what will happen if he does not accept, aka being made an example out of.
Whether or not he's a 20 year old street level canabis dealer or someone guilty (partially guilty?) of a spectacular computer crime (which we all know carry penalties roughly in line with similar non-violent white collar crimes) shouldn't make any difference in principle.
The problem with plea bargains is that it puts the accused in a terrible dilemma while at the same time revealing a prosecution that somehow believes simultaneously that the accused is liable to a trivial crime and a monstrous one, which is an intellectually and ethically incoherent position to take.
How is that dilemma happening in a case where someone is being accused of stealing, for profit, millions of identities? Wouldn't the injustice of the outcome be inverted if a plea deal, secured for the purposes of burnishing the prosecution's career stats, let the accused off with a slap on the wrist?
> The problem with plea bargains is that it puts the accused in a terrible dilemma while at the same time revealing a prosecution that somehow believes simultaneously that the accused is liable to a trivial crime and a monstrous one, which is an intellectually and ethically incoherent position to take.
Agreed.
> How is that dilemma happening in a case where someone is being accused of stealing, for profit, millions of identities?
> How is that dilemma happening in a case where someone is being accused of stealing, for profit, millions of identities? Wouldn't the injustice of the outcome be inverted if a plea deal, secured for the purposes of burnishing the prosecution's career stats, let the accused off with a slap on the wrist?
First, you are comparing wildly different cases. Fidel Salinas was accused of an attempt at a nonremunerative crime. The defendant in this thread is accused of very successfully and indiscriminately defrauding millions upon millions of people.
Second: as always, the media refuses to report on the real sentencing structure used in these cases, and instead negligently repeats the fallacy that like charges in felony cases are served consecutively, which is not the case. Ken White at Popehat --- a former prosecutor and no friend to the prosecutorial status quo in the US --- explained this brilliantly here:
A conviction on all forty-four of the felony charges Salinas faced might still not have produced a custodial sentence, depending on the accelerators applied during sentence. First time offender? Minimal damage? No profit motive? Probation is a possibility. The sentencing guidelines are a Google search away, FWIW.
Once again, you haven't actually presented an argument for how plea deals have harmed the process of justice in this case.
As for whether or not this person is guilty, my point is that even if he is not he will likely accept a plea bargain because the alternative will be one that is unacceptable.
That means his guilt won't enter into the equation at all, it's not as if he's going to win even if not guilty in an all-out confrontation with the DOJ, which is likely exactly what will happen if he does not accept, aka being made an example out of.
Whether or not he's a 20 year old street level canabis dealer or someone guilty (partially guilty?) of a spectacular computer crime (which we all know carry penalties roughly in line with similar non-violent white collar crimes) shouldn't make any difference in principle.