I'd take issue with the idea that there was no/minimal coordination with the reactor operators.
In fact, the issue that made the turbine spindown test such a disaster for Chernobyl was the extended amount of time and number of power excursions that that reactor (not non-nuclear) operators had spent trying to setup for the initial conditions of the turbine test.
The test had been intended for the afternoon shift, and required reactor power and steam output to be set within a prescribed band before the test. The operators duly setup these initial conditions, but then the regional electrical control center unexpectedly asked Chernobyl-4 to remain online (instead of shutting down as planned) to service electrical demands.
The reactor operators then resumed power operations and tried to re-establish test conditions at the end of their shift when they received permission to shutdown. But this shift from power operations to low power back to power operations and back again to low power induced xenon transients, and an extremely unusual and dangerous control rod configuration, all in an effort to establish the nuclear parameters to run the non-nuclear test.
And then they turned over to the evening shift as if they were handing over a set of car keys for a company sedan, an evening shift that had not been expecting the test (though by this point the conditions were such that either shift would have caused the reactor accident IMHO, assuming no one made the brave call to abort the test completely).
I'm willing to grant that professional nuclear testing groups were not actually involved in the design and implementation of the test, but it's simply not true that this was the result of a bunch of steam plant engineers running a test that was felt to be non-nuclear in nature. The nuclear reactor operators were deeply involved in setup and spent almost the entirety of a shift setting up for this test, and had plenty of opportunity throughout to evaluate the possible reactor plant response to their actions.
In fact had the test simply been to take a reactor operating at power and to spontaneously trip the steam supply valve to the turbines the accident would never have happened, even without coordinating with the reactor operators first. In the actual event the closure of the steam valve was simply the non-nuclear nudge that finally tipped off a disaster laboriously arranged during a full shift by nuclear reactor operators, operators who should have known better just from first nuclear principles.
In fact, the issue that made the turbine spindown test such a disaster for Chernobyl was the extended amount of time and number of power excursions that that reactor (not non-nuclear) operators had spent trying to setup for the initial conditions of the turbine test.
The test had been intended for the afternoon shift, and required reactor power and steam output to be set within a prescribed band before the test. The operators duly setup these initial conditions, but then the regional electrical control center unexpectedly asked Chernobyl-4 to remain online (instead of shutting down as planned) to service electrical demands.
The reactor operators then resumed power operations and tried to re-establish test conditions at the end of their shift when they received permission to shutdown. But this shift from power operations to low power back to power operations and back again to low power induced xenon transients, and an extremely unusual and dangerous control rod configuration, all in an effort to establish the nuclear parameters to run the non-nuclear test.
And then they turned over to the evening shift as if they were handing over a set of car keys for a company sedan, an evening shift that had not been expecting the test (though by this point the conditions were such that either shift would have caused the reactor accident IMHO, assuming no one made the brave call to abort the test completely).
I'm willing to grant that professional nuclear testing groups were not actually involved in the design and implementation of the test, but it's simply not true that this was the result of a bunch of steam plant engineers running a test that was felt to be non-nuclear in nature. The nuclear reactor operators were deeply involved in setup and spent almost the entirety of a shift setting up for this test, and had plenty of opportunity throughout to evaluate the possible reactor plant response to their actions.
In fact had the test simply been to take a reactor operating at power and to spontaneously trip the steam supply valve to the turbines the accident would never have happened, even without coordinating with the reactor operators first. In the actual event the closure of the steam valve was simply the non-nuclear nudge that finally tipped off a disaster laboriously arranged during a full shift by nuclear reactor operators, operators who should have known better just from first nuclear principles.