> What is the mortality rate of the flu versus ebola? When I assess risks related to ebola, I tend to favor a more cautious approach, because the mortality rate is so high.
I think that raises a several good points. A few considerations:
1) The 'proper' way to evaluate risk, as I understand it, is (likelihood * cost). A 10% chance you'll lose $100 costs you $10 each time you take that risk, over time.
2) I agree that some costs are so high that the math works poorly even with low likelihoods. A 1% chance of death is far too high a risk to take, unless there is some high payoff such as saving someone else's life -- a risk the infected doctor and nurse took.
3) The cost of Ebola is that high, but the likelihood is so infinitesimally low that it's still not worth worrying about. You'll add more life years exercising or simply reducing other risks with the same time spent thinking about Ebola. It's a complete waste of time (I realize the irony of writing that! :) ).
4) There are many more equally deadly and far more likely risks for healthy middle-aged people: Lightening strikes, natural gas explosions, being shot in the head, carbon monoxide poisoning, food poisoning (of certain kinds), other contagious and non-contagious diseases, etc.
5)
> When an individual spends time with ebola patients, they should be advised to avoid situations where they would expose a large number of people to the pathogen ... This seems like an unreasonble amount of risk to me.
Generally I agree that we should minimize risks, but again I'm not sure there is one here:
* It's very possible that it's very safe. Nobody in the United States (in fairness, that we yet know of) has contracted Ebola in this manner from the infected 3, though two of them spent much time around others. Also, wouldn't Ebola be rampant in the hospital where the infected nurse worked, if this was a risk? Wouldn't it be rampant among medical staff in W. Africa, given the prevalence in their environment (higher than flu in those facilities)?
* HIV spreads via bodily fluids but we don't quarantine the infected or their caregivers. However when HIV first become known, people were afraid to be near the infected (resulting in a lot of discrimination). I think we should not repeat that mistake.
* I would guess that hospital workers encounter many contagious, deadly diseases, yet nobody worries about those spreading.
People want to treat Ebola differently despite many similar and much greater risks. That's why I believe it's fear and not real risk that drives it.
Anyway, I'm approaching redundancy. Good talking to you!
That's why I believe it's fear and not real risk that drives it.
What other BSL-4 pathogen are you referencing here? Or are you suggesting BSL-4 is an unappropriate classification? Maybe you think the scientific and biosafety community erred when they created the BSL-4 designation?
There is plenty of research out there that documents the objectibe risk.
There is very little research that documents supports a strategy of "see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil".
People don't need to panic.
But that's entirely seperate from lack of comprehension of the actual risks involved. After all, you can't solve problems you don't admit to having.
Trying to deal with a BSL-4 pathogen with BSL-2 safety gear is a fools errand. We might not havy any better options, especially in backcountry settings, but lets not pretend its "not risky".
In densely populated urban areas those risks are simply not tolerable. They are not tolerable for two reasons: (1) we can do better; and (2) the technology that allows for (1) makes the risks of not doing (1) more problematic.
Technology allows us to isolate patients; but it also allows non-isolated patients to spread the pathogen further/faster. People with hemoraggic fever don't walk 1000Ks or cross continents on their own power. They only do so by using technology.
It makes sense that the appropriate technology be dedicated to helping contain these bio-hazards and to compassionately care for the afflicted.
But seriously, what do we have to gain by sticking our heads in the sand? It seems this is a cynical strategy by people who don't want to "get their hands dirty"? Mayb we can continue to provide false confidence to 'volunteers' to go to africa and do our dirty work for us?
Why do we need to play this charade? Lets just give these people the tools they need (including time, money , and gear) and properly de-brief them and the public about the risks and what is at stake from either mistakes or inaction.
I think that raises a several good points. A few considerations:
1) The 'proper' way to evaluate risk, as I understand it, is (likelihood * cost). A 10% chance you'll lose $100 costs you $10 each time you take that risk, over time.
2) I agree that some costs are so high that the math works poorly even with low likelihoods. A 1% chance of death is far too high a risk to take, unless there is some high payoff such as saving someone else's life -- a risk the infected doctor and nurse took.
3) The cost of Ebola is that high, but the likelihood is so infinitesimally low that it's still not worth worrying about. You'll add more life years exercising or simply reducing other risks with the same time spent thinking about Ebola. It's a complete waste of time (I realize the irony of writing that! :) ).
4) There are many more equally deadly and far more likely risks for healthy middle-aged people: Lightening strikes, natural gas explosions, being shot in the head, carbon monoxide poisoning, food poisoning (of certain kinds), other contagious and non-contagious diseases, etc.
5) > When an individual spends time with ebola patients, they should be advised to avoid situations where they would expose a large number of people to the pathogen ... This seems like an unreasonble amount of risk to me.
Generally I agree that we should minimize risks, but again I'm not sure there is one here:
* It's very possible that it's very safe. Nobody in the United States (in fairness, that we yet know of) has contracted Ebola in this manner from the infected 3, though two of them spent much time around others. Also, wouldn't Ebola be rampant in the hospital where the infected nurse worked, if this was a risk? Wouldn't it be rampant among medical staff in W. Africa, given the prevalence in their environment (higher than flu in those facilities)? * HIV spreads via bodily fluids but we don't quarantine the infected or their caregivers. However when HIV first become known, people were afraid to be near the infected (resulting in a lot of discrimination). I think we should not repeat that mistake. * I would guess that hospital workers encounter many contagious, deadly diseases, yet nobody worries about those spreading.
People want to treat Ebola differently despite many similar and much greater risks. That's why I believe it's fear and not real risk that drives it.
Anyway, I'm approaching redundancy. Good talking to you!