They lied, they listen to our phone calls and read our emails.
In the Guardian story[0] it explained it like this: "Retain and make use of "inadvertently acquired" domestic communications if they contain usable intelligence, information on criminal activity, threat of harm to people or property, are encrypted, or are believed to contain any information relevant to cybersecurity;"
How can they know if it contains usable intelligence, criminal activity, etc. if they aren't examining the contents of the communication?
I think the most outrageous in that list is "make use of ... information on criminal activity". Do NSA spooks get to singlehandedly determine that you're committing a crime? Do they have AI algorithms that sift through millions of records flagging potential criminal activity? If someone is heard saying, for example, that they smoked weed are they added to a federal database of weed smokers? Why is a military program supposedly concerned with terrorism interested in domestic criminal activity?
I'm not sure: did they lie? I'm not sure how the revealed procedures fit in, or fail to fit in, with the exceptions permitted under FISA http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg178... and the FISA Amendments Act http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr6304/text , which of course were public knowledge already. (IANAL, and FISA + FAA is an ugly tangle of legal spaghetti.) One thing that certainly is countenanced in FISA is sharing information about criminal activity with US law enforcement (though it's far from obvious to me that the procedures for this laid out in the documents fully comply with FISA 101). And I mean, imagine if it were otherwise? If in the course of accidentally overhearing some US domestic communications the NSA comes across information about, say, a huge massacre planned on US soil, wouldn't it be pretty perverse and unreasonable if the law prohibited them from letting US law enforcement know anything about it?
It's not that encrypted information is itself suspicious. If a communication is encrypted, the NSA simply can't tell if it's a legitimate foreign target intercept or some inadvertently picked up communication until the NSA is finally able to decrypt it. Were it not so, foreign targets could evade the NSA by encrypting their traffic and making it appear that it might be domestic material (for example, routing it though domestic email accounts), forcing the NSA to discard it.
Just as security researchers look for every possible loophole when creating attack scenarios, so the authors of NSA regulations seek to close any possible loophole a target could use to evade intercept. The NSA has to assume that its internal rules will eventually be leaked (as has just occurred) and used against it by a foreign enemy.
"I'm sorry. I couldn't read your mail to figure out whether I am allowed to read your mail. Therefore, I am keeping your mail until I figure out whether or not I am allowed to keep it."
Yes, they try to make the rules to close all possible loopholes. No, they shouldn't be the ones making their own rules, since they have a very vested interest in one-sided rules.
It seems like Snowden is purposefully leaking documents a little at a time in order to keep the story in the press. He may be trying to combat the short term memory of popular stories. It may be a viable strategy for getting enough attention to achieve real progress. I wonder if news will simply stop covering it as front page material as audiences get bored with it. Maybe leaking the least interesting stuff earlier, and ratcheting up interest by saving the best for last may aid such an effort.
That, too, but the best part is that it gives the government the opportunity to stumble on its own lies.
"We don't collect data without (general) 'warrants'".
One week later, after another leak - "Oh, we were just being the most truthful, or "least untruthful" as we could when we said that."
It completely destroys the credibility of the government, and it should, because they're lying about it at every turn, or at the very least twisting words to appear that they say one thing, but they mean another.
People who are trusting the government without declassified proof that they aren't lying, are being really naive at this point. I wouldn't trust anything the government says now without showing the declassified documents.
What I'm shocked about is that newspapers haven't outright printed in the front page headline "such and such a person lies to congress and the american people about NSA wiretapping". Every time a public servant lies to the citizens they are supposed to serve, it should be the headline on the front page.
UK newspapers have been issued a D-Notice. It's official 'advice' to stop reporting. That's why few news outlets in the UK are following up on the Guardian stories.
I was under the impression that the D-Notice was very specific. Don't print information that exposes national security secrets, such as the actual documents and excerpts from the documents that are being leaked. I do no think it covers the outright dishonesty by public officials.
"Recently leaked documents show that such and such a politicion/official has outright lied/deceived the citizens of this country. Such and such a person said XXX, but the facts contradict his/her statement. The BBC has been served a D-Notice by Some Government Agency that prohibits us from publishing the leaked documents and excerpts thereof because the documents contain information regarding programs of national security. Concerned citizens are encouraged to seek out the leaked documents from foreign news publications who are at liberty to publish the leaked documents."
I think it is also reasonable to believe that the D-Notice in question is specifically referring to the G20 Summit story and the recent GCHQ story. As such it's reasonable to believe that it does not cover stories in the interest of US national security. The BBC should publish our dirt and we can publish theirs.
It also helps catch the government in their misleading statements if they release a document, wait for them to make statements and hold hearings, then release another document that shows those statements and hearings were full of lies.
Agreed. So far, it's working quite well, and is quite clever. I think I would have probably published the documents in this order as well.
It's telling that yesterday's document showing Eric Holder signing off on warrantless surveillance came days after Barack Obama reassured us it wasn't happening.
This is my understanding. Greenwald has also been letting politicians say one thing for just long enough before he publishes documents to the contrary. Or, in the case of the most recent leak, confirming what politicians have said about storing data for 5 years, but including more information about how analysts choose targets, which has not been officially disclosed.
A DA-notice is only advice, so Greenwald can choose to ignore it if he wishes. IIRC, it falls somewhere between "We'd rather you didn't publish this, as we feel it may harm national interests" and "this story may be illegal under the Official Secrets Act (or similar)", rather than being a straight block on publication.
Lets say there are 10 really earth shattering revelations in these leaks. Which is better?
All 10 released at once, and 8 of them getting lost in the discussion, or releasing 1 bombshell at a time and people like us get to discuss the implications of each?
A few of the recently leaked items, including a new one today, are UK centric. I'm sure that is aimed at trying to get the story to blow up again on the other side of the ocean.
They are UK centric only on outside appearance. Notice how we have given intelligence agencies unlimited powers under the very simple condition that they can not spy domestically? It works the same way in the UK.
So the way this works is that the NSA will spy on Britons, the GCHQ spies on Americans, and everyone comes together to exchange notes.
That's a great point. Whether that's his intent or not, it seems to be how it's progressing. An alternative explanation: he's obviously been following the news about the whole thing very closely, and so he knows what questions the media and/or general public are asking. He can just release whichever documents answer those questions as the questions arise, and thus avoid leaking any more info than he feels is necessary (since that seems to be a goal of his).
In his notorious guide to ruling, Machiavelli advised Princes with bad news to deliver it all at once, noting that no matter how bad it is, people will adjust and move on if they feel that's the end of it. Good news, on the other hand, should be judiciously doled out, in small amounts, to maximize the value it brings the person delivering it.
Conversely, if a Prince has good news, and delivers it all at once but with no follow up, people will stop being grateful for what they've gotten, and will start demanding more, which can bankrupt any ruler who tries to comply. Likewise, if there's a steady drip of bad news, minds race ahead, anticipating worse to come and making advance preparations which undermine the stability of the Prince.
This basic psychology works the other way as well. If you have bad news about your adversary, and drop it all at once, they can take the hit and move on. But if you can supply a steady drip of negative stories it becomes impossible to get past the growing sense of distrust, especially when people start imagine the worst, and demand to see proof that their darkest fears are unfounded. This may mean having to prove a negative, which is the epitome of an impossible situation. Reaching this point only accelerates the downward spiral.
Of course, following this strategy means being able to place yourself beyond the reach of retaliatory efforts. It's what Sun Tzu would refer to as selecting the field of battle to play to your strengths while offsetting your weaknesses. If your chosen position also has the inverse effect on your opponent, neutralizing their strengths while amplifying their weaknesses, then it's a double win.
So far, Snowden's strategy has been textbook-perfect.
My impression is that he revealed the most inflammatory documents first: the ones that implicated companies and services we use every day as complicit in a mass spying program. It made for great headlines that the average joe could digest. That might have created false implications, or at least an incomplete picture, but it also might lead to people paying attention to revelations that are actually in fact more damaging.
It's usually how much money they can make from something, which means viewership staying on channel. They don't put news on the front page because it's important -- it just happens a lot of news people want to see is important - lots is just entertainment though.
Am I crazy, or have (many) American news sources stopped reporting on this altogether? Nobody is talking about it on my Facebook either. There's a whole lot of silence about this, and that's the scariest thing of all.
The most interesting part to me was that they said the NSA did internal audits of analyst queries. I hope someone leaks the results of those.
The rest of it seemed in line with the initial PRISM release, and also (kinda) what they've been saying all along: they nab everything, but only read it if they "reasonably" think you're foreign, and if they're wrong, they keep any "interesting" bits anyway.
I don't get it. If they're doing it all from a "para-legal" angle, why would they even bother to document that they're doing it that way? Isn't it more of a organizational culture thing?
I suspect it's out of an honest attempt at doing the right thing. NSA spooks aren't evil trolls out to crush the free world under their boots. They're regular people, with typical moral compasses. And they have a difficult job. Unfettered access to information pretty clearly makes their job easier, so it's something they push for.
But they likewise understand that this kind of thing is controversial, and so (either out of an attempt to limit the impact or deflect blame) they want to make sure that everyone internally knows what they're doing and that it's not quite kosher.
Lots of folks here are programmers: occasionally you need to commit some horrible design affront in the name of expedience, right? Do you hide it or do you call it out in comments and commit messages with a big "HACK HERE" message? I know I do. It's the same impulse.
>I suspect it's out of an honest attempt at doing the right thing.
no. It is to cover their asses. Like in the case of torture - if they just go and torture it would be one thing, instead they have been doing it according to the rules reviewed and approved by government lawyers, who declared the torture is legal. Thus people have been tortured, yet nobody can be punished for performing it. Nor people who only wrote the [illegal] rules, nor people who only followed the [illegal] rules. Using such responsibility deflection schema government can do anything as long as it follows "the rules" [which it wrote itself] and even the people with moral compass can look in the mirror easy because they only doing their job and follow the rules.
(another example - recent public outcry about drone killing of Americans was easily put down by switching attention to the alleged fact of existence of the "strict designation and targeting rules" the government follows without even publishing the rules, just a mere statement of their existence)
Seriously. Let's be honest. We used to torture people in extreme cases, but the person doing it knew that (a) it was illegal, and (b) if they were exposed they would be disavowed. (Of course, they might get away with it if they had some really good dirt on their boss, but that requires "using" a "card").
So the person doing the torturing had to be really fucking sure that this person was "guilty" and further that torturing would actually work (which is "not often"). The kind of operative doing this work was strongly personally committed to our country and extremely aware of their own personal investment.
Instead, we now have state-sponsored, legalized torture, and so any and all sociopaths can happily try their hand at torture just for the jolies, at no personal risk.
Spying must be illegal. A nation still needs to do it, but the brave few who do it, are braver still for doing it at personal risk.
> (another example - recent public outcry about drone killing of Americans was easily put down by switching attention to the alleged fact of existence of the "strict designation and targeting rules" the government follows without even publishing the rules, just a mere statement of their existence)
As a technical U.S. citizen, Anwar_al-Awlaki had due process rights. Therefore, the relevant inquiry was: what process is "due" (M-W: "owed," "capable of satisfying [an]... obligation," "required or expected...")? It's a foundational principle of Constitutional law that "due process" does not necessarily require a jury trial. So the legality of al-Awlaki's targeted killing depends entirely on the issues you dismiss out of hand. The fundamental question is whether the designation and targeting rules are sufficient "process" (meaning "legal procedure") in context.
Far from being a "responsibility deflection schema" it is a good faith attempt to stay within the bounds of the law while still following through with an important governmental objective: bringing to justice an enemy of the United States. It's no different than when any person or company asks their lawyer "can we do this?"
Because here is the thing: not everybody agrees with you (you, VladRussian2 personally). Lots of people think your ideals are stupid and dangerous.[1] Outside the echo-chamber of this website, lots of people have no problem with torture in the course of war, lots of people think supposed "Americans" who take up arms against the U.S. can't claim the protection of their Constitution. Is the government just supposed to go by principles? If so, why your principles instead of other people's principles? It's not a workable system. That's why we instead follow rules, rules we all agreed to. In the course of following those rules, we often have to make judgment calls about exactly what those rules do and do not allow us to do. And sometimes, we're on the edge of that boundary and make good faith attempts to stay on the right side.
[1] I remember as an undergraduate in Atlanta in the lead-up to the Iraq war, lots of people seriously suggested turning the middle east into a "glass parking lot" as a solution to the problems in the region. You may not like those people (and I personally found those comments tasteless), but they are as much a part of our body politic as you, and their principles carry just as much weight as yours.
Their moral compass may not be in line with the rest of the country. Some people when afforded the power to eavesdrop on anyone can and will focus on what they percieve to be existential threats. Existential is the key word. When Hoover focused on Martin Luther King Jr. and Rosa Parks, he viewed them as existential threats to the United States. We today viewed that as extremely misguided, but at the time he and many others in power agreed that we should monitor and debase those "existential threads". The industrial food lobby considers animal rights activists existential threats. The administration views journalists as existential threats to their ability to defend against existential threats. Defense spending proponents think people that are anti-defense spending to be existential threats. The fact that the NSA is heavily Mormon, means that many people in the NSA may hold the same opinions about existential threats as the Mormon church. Many fundamentalist churchgoing folk consider gay marriage to be an existential threat. It is precisely because every individual has different views on what are and are not existential threats to the United States that we created a Bill of Rights that protect against the prosecution of existential threats that are merely the opinion of one individual and not the collectively opinion of the citizens of the United States.
The entire system of checks and balances was created because of this distrust of the "moral compass" of any single individual or signle in-group. When an individual or in-group can unilaterally monitor the communications of other individuals or in-groups with out due process, it all starts to fall apart.
There should be no secret court. There should be due process. There should be court appointed warrants not rubber stamps. This is all more important than what any one individual thinks is necessary for them to do what they think is their job. Their job isn't to catch terrorists. Their job is to catch terrorists without violating that principles of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. If they are doing the former at the cost of the latter they are failing at their job.
The NSA is heavily Mormon? Where did you get that information? I've been looking around online, and the only thing I'm coming across is conspiracy theory websites about the new Utah compound they're building.
Marines and Mormons, two groups that the military and paramilitary agencies of the US love as potential recruits because of unusually high levels of patriotism and acceptance of hierarchy.
Mormonism is the only major (ish) religion that's homegrown and culturally they're mostly WASPs or close to it. Above average chance of getting clearance and of wanting a career in a TLA. The NSA is not special in this way. The DEA, FBI etc. will show the same pattern. Difficult to prove seeing as I doubt US agencies keep records on employees' religion though.
Ever leak invalidates the information the NSA tells the public. Now I have to ask do they even know what documents Snowden left with? Each new revelation seems to be catching them flat footed
In the Guardian story[0] it explained it like this: "Retain and make use of "inadvertently acquired" domestic communications if they contain usable intelligence, information on criminal activity, threat of harm to people or property, are encrypted, or are believed to contain any information relevant to cybersecurity;"
How can they know if it contains usable intelligence, criminal activity, etc. if they aren't examining the contents of the communication?
I think the most outrageous in that list is "make use of ... information on criminal activity". Do NSA spooks get to singlehandedly determine that you're committing a crime? Do they have AI algorithms that sift through millions of records flagging potential criminal activity? If someone is heard saying, for example, that they smoked weed are they added to a federal database of weed smokers? Why is a military program supposedly concerned with terrorism interested in domestic criminal activity?
[0] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-w...