> Yes, but just because it can be mitigated doesn't mean that it is mitigated.

Sure, but I just want to point to the fact that this is a solvable problem. A lot of people talk as if it is some sort of insurmountable obstacle, whereas I think responsible programmers can solve it and move on.

You're arguing for a theoretical world, we're arguing from a practical one. I've spent enough time down in the trenches finding attacks in extremely well-reviewed code, that adding a massive new attack surface is not a thrilling proposition.

Well, I guess you're just slightly more pessimistic and I'm slightly more optimistic. I respect your viewpoint, though. :-)

I'm a really optimistic type, really. Optimistic to the annoyance of some people. But in the case of security and cryptology there does not exist a choice between optimism and pessimism, but a choice between sharp eyed paranoia and wilful ignorance.

A defence is always only as strong as the weakest link, and an attacker usually has all the time in the world to find and exploit it.

Optimism has no place here.

The smiley face in that comment is doing a lot of work.