1. I think we gotta talk about the word "abandoned," which to me involves letting something languish without attention, which is exactly what we didn't do. But aside from disagreeing with that word choice…
Would we not have carefully shut it down if it wasn't for the running-of-it issues… hard to say. Aside from the server problems, I described our staffing / resource problems. We didn't have enough staff to keep building Charm, adding features our users deserved. This is a probelm.
2. Not sure what the funding part has to do with willing to work on Charm. I will never, ever, ever take funding, unless it's to pull a 37signals or a Github — on completely my terms for a tiny sliver of the company — to get a personal advisor or a big "in." But that I doubt (doubt we'd ever get big enough for that to be attractive to an investor). So, assuming I wasn't against funding is too big an assumption to make.
3. Good question. If Charm were our only baby, it would have been much easier to keep going… though frankly I don't think we ever would have attempted Charm as a first product (that bit of sense we lost after the success of Freckle). The opportunity cost, as you say, was huge.
Would we not have carefully shut it down if it wasn't for the running-of-it issues… hard to say. Aside from the server problems, I described our staffing / resource problems. We didn't have enough staff to keep building Charm, adding features our users deserved. This is a probelm.
2. Not sure what the funding part has to do with willing to work on Charm. I will never, ever, ever take funding, unless it's to pull a 37signals or a Github — on completely my terms for a tiny sliver of the company — to get a personal advisor or a big "in." But that I doubt (doubt we'd ever get big enough for that to be attractive to an investor). So, assuming I wasn't against funding is too big an assumption to make.
3. Good question. If Charm were our only baby, it would have been much easier to keep going… though frankly I don't think we ever would have attempted Charm as a first product (that bit of sense we lost after the success of Freckle). The opportunity cost, as you say, was huge.