I can see how that's appealing. One of the most common human behaviors is creating rules or in this case moral rules, and then doing a mental switcheroo where they forget that they made the rules and attribute them to universal principles, reality, truth, etc.
In general, the process of believing concepts are real objects - simply observations of reality - is called reification. Every society does it and the result is that human constructs feel as if they are inalienable truths about how reality works. The only problem is that it's culturally specific and as we know, each culture works differently and yet feels as if they've gotten it right - their concept of how things works happens to match reality.
One of the downsides to this is that we often project our own ideas of reality onto strangers especially from other societies. "Of course they protect the weak," we tell ourselves, when in fact, they're operating on a completely different set of moral relations. When our projects override objectivity, we deny ourselves the beauty of seeing the world in a new way. We rob ourselves of appreciating the magnificence of the diversity of human experience.
Is the powerful taking advantage of the weak part of the magnificence of the diversity of human experience?
I mean, I can see the powerful claiming such a thing. To return to my original quote, which is certainly a consistent philosophy: "strong do what they like the weak suffer what they must"
I agree, it feels absolutely true that the strong shouldn't exploit the weak.
But here's the thing, most societies have felt that way about something, and often, the "something" turns out to be radically different each time.
Romans felt it was universally true that honor must be defended with blood. Medieval Christians believed letting heretics speak freely was morally wrong. Victorians were convinced it was immoral not to civilize "savages."
They didn’t think they were rationalizing cruelty. They thought they were being good.
The discomfort comes from realizing that we're not standing outside history, just inside a different historical moral context that feels just as inevitable. The desire to protect the weak might be deeply human, but even how we define "weak" or "harm" changes more than we like to admit.
What if we recognize our certainty is also part of this context, not part of the conclusion?
i'm saying it is that way, and i also think you know it to be true, but don't want acknowledge that due to further conclusions that can be drawn from that truth
so we aren't agreeing at all, in any way: you don't want to believe in an objective morality for your own reasons, I acknowledge it despite the inconveniences it presents me
The point is that I sometimes wonder, if I were born in ancient Rome, wouldn't I have also felt, just as deeply, that defending family honor with violence was righteous? Not in a barbaric way, just in a 'this is obviously the right thing to do' kind of way?
It's not that there's no such thing as right and wrong, it's that what counts as 'moral clarity' seems to shift, and everyone thinks they're the ones seeing it clearly. That includes people we now think were totally wrong. What do we do with that?
Imagine someone 500 years from now looking back at us with horror and clarity, seeing our blind spots as clearly as we see slavery or witch-burning. Don't you ever worry, like me, that you might be the one taking a stand for what will one day be unthinkable? Not because we didn't believe that right and wrong didn't exist, but because we were so certain that we had it correct?
Pointing out the lack of precision and accidental aspects of custom in discussing morality is typically used as an excuse for immoral behavior, often personal.
Today, I don't view moral certainty as a primary or even secondary moral problem. Instead, I view it our primary moral problem as the idea that: "there are no absolute moral principles."
This is a self-contradictory statement, as a moments reflection will make apparent. Most people who advocate it either haven't thought about it or are sophists attempting to smuggle in a different absolute moral principle: "Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the law."
Say what one will about this latter absolute moral principle, but at least it's a self-consistent ethos. I can understand why the rich, powerful and debased should prefer to see it established, as they have. A (bad) part of me certainly prefers it.
> Pointing out the lack of precision and accidental aspects of custom in discussing morality is typically used as an excuse for immoral behavior.
I guess I just don't see it the same way. When I examine the most immoral acts, I see moral certainty being a necessary component.
The Spanish Inquisition: "For the good of their souls."
Stalinist purges: "To protect the revolution."
U.S. manifest destiny: "To civilize the savages."
Terrorist movements: "In the name of God."
When I examine the faults of moral relativism I see the blandness of inaction at worst - "I suppose that's what works for them."
At an individual level, I see cynicism as the defining feature of immorality - "No one else is doing good, so why should I?" or "If I don't do bad, someone else will," but these aren't based in relativism. Relativism or absolutism simply isn't part of the moral calculus.
If anything the relativistic approach is harder than then absolutist one. An absolutist may have the burden of knowing what actions are right and wrong within a moral framework, but someone who is a relativist wanting to do good doesn't even have that. They have the additional burden of having to perform meta-ethics from which to derive ethical positions. I hate to turn this into an "I have it worse," discussion, but the grass ain't always greener.
It may be surprising to learn that moral relativists even have a history of taking moral positioning and opposing atrocities. Franz Boas opposed scientific racism, eugenics, and the use of anthropology to justify colonial domination and publicly condemned anthropologists who collaborated with the U.S. military. Ruth Benedict argued that morality is culture-bound and opposed Western ethnocentrism and the moral superiority claimed by colonial powers while critiquing the racism behind Nazism in her wartime work The Races of Mankind. Finally, Margaret Mead promoted tolerance of cultural diversity and critiqued Western sexual and gender norms. She used her platform to oppose war, advocate for civil rights. My point is that one can be a relativist and take a strong moral position - one I'd be surprised either of us would be opposed to.
you can dance around The Choice with as many words as you like
“We see then that the two cities were created by two kinds of love: the earthly city was created by self-love reaching the point of contempt of God, the Heavenly City by the love of God carried as far contempt of self."
