The majority’s response to that is far more compelling than the dissent’s Seal Team Six hypothetical:
> The dissents’ positions in the end boil down to ignoring the Constitution’s separation of powers and the Court’s precedent and instead fear mongering on the basis of extreme hypotheticals about a future where the President “feels empowered to violate federal criminal law.” Post, at 18 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.); see post, at 26, 29–30; post, at 8–9, 10, 12, 16, 20–21 (opinion of JACKSON, J.). The dissents overlook the more likely prospect of an Executive Branch that cannibalizes itself, with each successive President free to prosecute his predecessors, yet unable to boldly and fearlessly carry out his duties for fear that he may be next. For instance, Section 371—which has been charged in this case—is a broadly worded criminal statute that can cover “‘any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government.’” United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169, 172 (1966) (quoting Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, 479 (1910)). Virtually every President is criticized for insufficiently enforcing some aspect of federal law (such as drug, gun, immigration, or environmental laws).
Look at section 371! If President didn’t have immunity for official acts, Trump could easily have relied on that broad statute to prosecute him for opening the border and thus “impairing” the function of ICE. Our criminal laws are breathtakingly broad in their wording, and a contrary ruling from the Supreme Court would’ve meant that the Presidency would become subordinate to prosecutors.
> If President didn’t have immunity for official acts, Trump could easily have relied on that broad statute to prosecute him for opening the border and thus “impairing” the function of ICE
Trump still wants to do this and the court will let him because you have to be incredibly naive or willingly ignorant to think that that this Supreme Court will apply the laws equally without regard to political party.
> t would’ve meant that the Presidency would become subordinate to prosecutors
Oh no, the President would have to follow the same laws as everyone else, how horrible!/s
> Oh no, the President would have to follow the same laws as everyone else, how horrible
“Laws” aren’t magic. If you could just have “laws” and trust prosecutors to enforce them fairly and neutrally, then the entire constitutional structure, with three branches and checks and balances, is pointless. You would just have prosecutors as basically the government’s “microkernel” and then the other three branches on top.
The framers didn’t create that system because they understood that you can’t trust prosecutors either—they’re political too! Our system is designed like a game of rock-paper-scissors, where the checks on each branch come from the other branches, not prosecutors enforcing “the law.”
Prosecutors enforce the laws by prosecuting. That's the function of the executive branch. It's in the name - EXECUTIVE branch.
The check on prosecutorial power lies both with the Judicial branch and, in cases of a jury trial, the People. Prosecutors are not judge, jury, and executioner.
The Legislative branch gets a say by writing, passing, repealing, or amending laws.
So the three branches check each other, no need to "just trust me, bro" with prosecutors.
If the President cannot faithfully execute the laws without BREAKING them then that either means the Judicial branch should strike down the laws that are preventing that or the Legislative branch should pass laws that contain a carve out for the President. The President is not above the law, so the half-measure of the Supreme Court deciding that they are in official acts is both ahistoric and enabling despotism.
> Prosecutors are not judge, jury, and executioner.
In practice they are. Criminal laws are written extremely broadly. And as they say, prosecutors can indict a ham sandwich. Then all it takes is putting the case in front of a favorable jury: trying a republican in new york city or a democrat in rural iowa. In that way, a handful of people can undo the will of the electorate.
The framers would have easily understood this. At the time, the states were trying to kill the federal government. You think they envisioned say a Virginia prosecutor trying the federal president before a Virginia judge and jury?
> The dissents’ positions in the end boil down to ignoring the Constitution’s separation of powers and the Court’s precedent and instead fear mongering on the basis of extreme hypotheticals about a future where the President “feels empowered to violate federal criminal law.” Post, at 18 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.); see post, at 26, 29–30; post, at 8–9, 10, 12, 16, 20–21 (opinion of JACKSON, J.). The dissents overlook the more likely prospect of an Executive Branch that cannibalizes itself, with each successive President free to prosecute his predecessors, yet unable to boldly and fearlessly carry out his duties for fear that he may be next. For instance, Section 371—which has been charged in this case—is a broadly worded criminal statute that can cover “‘any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government.’” United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169, 172 (1966) (quoting Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, 479 (1910)). Virtually every President is criticized for insufficiently enforcing some aspect of federal law (such as drug, gun, immigration, or environmental laws).
Look at section 371! If President didn’t have immunity for official acts, Trump could easily have relied on that broad statute to prosecute him for opening the border and thus “impairing” the function of ICE. Our criminal laws are breathtakingly broad in their wording, and a contrary ruling from the Supreme Court would’ve meant that the Presidency would become subordinate to prosecutors.