> Has the “violation of law” been established yet? There’s a pretty wide gulf between “I believe a violation of the law has occurred” and having the matter adjudicated.

Didn't SFFA clearly establish that? The Supreme Court outright reversed the bench trial ruling, which had found that Harvard and UNC's programs comported with Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause.

You have a point that I should've said "was found to have violated" rather than "is in violation." Whether Harvard is still violating the law is debatable. But I'm not sure Title VI withholding can't be predicated on a recent violation.

Regardless, as you know, the government routinely uses the threat of legal action for suspected violations to coerce compliance. Virtually every FDA/SEC/CFTC/etc. enforcement action starts with a letter along the lines of: "you're in violation of the law, do X, Y, and Z, or else we'll take action."

It’s not reasonable to characterize SFFA as a finding of wrongdoing on Harvard’s part.

At the time, universities were adhering to existing law (Bakke and Grutter cases). The Court then overturned its own precedent and decided that what was once acceptable under its own law was no longer so. The text of the Equal Protection clause didn’t change; the only thing that changed was the Court’s interpretation of it.

So it’s not like Harvard was operating in bad faith or being malicious, which is the characterization suggested by your “violation” language. (Not to mention that every university in America that considered race in their admissions process, despite not being a named party to the suit, was similarly situated—probably most universities in the country.) And there’s no evidence to suggest that Harvard didn’t respond appropriately and in a timely fashion to the new law.

> It’s not reasonable to characterize SFFA as a finding of wrongdoing on Harvard’s part

As I understand it, that’s the legal effect of SFFA. SFFA sued Harvard seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment that Harvard’s admissions policies violate Title VI. The district court ruled, after bench trial, that Harvard didn’t violate Title VI. The Supreme Court didn’t remand for further proceedings, it outright reversed. Meaning that it found that Harvard’s procedures did violate Title VI.

Bad faith or malice aren’t elements of a Title VI violation. And I don’t see any legal reason why an administration couldn’t hold Harvard’s discrimination against students—which happened, even if the Supreme Court changed its mind about whether it was permissible—against Harvard in allocating federal funding.

Moreover, Harvard’s defiant response to SFFA provides a reasonable basis for the administration to believe it has continued to engage in discrimination: https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2023/06/harvard-unite...

Of course, now that Harvard has decided to fight it, the administration will have to prove its belief: https://www.axios.com/2025/04/28/harvard-law-review-trump-ad.... That’s how these enforcement letters always pan out. Many targets fold to avoid litigation. Sometimes, a defendant fights it and the government has to initiate a formal enforcement action.

The DOJ, FDA, FTC, and SEC do stuff like this all the time. These agencies all lean very heavily on the threat of an enforcement action to enforce changes in private behavior without having to actually take entities to court.

> Meaning that it found that Harvard’s procedures did violate Title VI

Declaratory judgments aren't findings of wrongdoing. They're simply words (hence "declaratory") that describe a relationship between the parties of a case. Cases that end in declaratory judgements are also always civil in nature, so I don't believe they can be used to penalize the party later as if they had conducted a criminal act.

> I don’t see any legal reason why an administration couldn’t hold Harvard’s discrimination against students—which happened, even if the Supreme Court changed its mind about whether it was permissible—against Harvard in allocating federal funding.

That would actually be an interesting case. I find it difficult to believe that the Court would allow such an ex post facto application. The problem with this is that anyone who engaged in behavior that was lawful at the time, then subsequently deemed unlawful, could be subject to abrogation of benefits or other penalties. That said, in light of how the Court's makeup has changed in the past 20 years, I suppose I shouldn't be surprised if I turn out to be wrong. I would be very sad, though, because it would mean that nobody can be assured that their current conduct, even if lawful at the time, won't be held against them in the future if the law changes later.

> Harvard’s defiant response to SFFA provides a reasonable basis for the administration to believe it has continued to engage in discrimination

I don't think it does. I think Harvard is saying "we will continue to lawfully promote diversity however we can." There's no unlawful action being contemplated, described, or advocated in its response. Costco and Disney, BTW, do the same.

> now that Harvard has decided to fight [Trump’s investigation of Harvard Law Review’s publication policy], the administration will have to prove its belief

You're mixing up two different plot lines. We're discussing NSF and other Federal grant withdrawal resulting from Harvard's failure to implement discretionary measures Trump wants them to take relating to hiring, policy, and curriculum. This other story is about investigating Harvard Law Review, which was announced weeks after the grant rug pull. It seems pretty obvious that Trump is trying to find any angle he can to prevail in his war against the institution.

It seems like Harvard and those other universities might have been pushing the boundaries. Was the discrimination required or just allowed? The court for Grutter seemed to say it was "required" and for Bakke a "compelling state interest", but I might not understand the meaning of that properly. There are universities that don't discriminate (UC?) and they somehow get away with it. If you were running Harvard and trying your best to comply with the law, would you feel it's legally safer to discriminate or to not discriminate? The answer to that points to whether they were operating in bad faith or not.

Title VI seems to clearly say "don't discriminate" but again I might not understand how exceptions are allowed.

It's important to understand the context in which these laws and Constitutional amendments were written. They were designed and enacted after the Civil War (in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment) and the 1960s (Civil Rights Act, once we determined the Fourteenth Amendment was insufficient) to prevent Black people from being discriminated against. At the time, nobody, including the authors, considered these laws to be a shield to protect white and Asian people from discrimination. (At that time, there were hardly any Asians in the US anyway.)

So, from the 1960s until recently, the Court allowed universities to consider race in university admissions because it advanced a public policy that sought to improve the lot of Black people: the more Blacks could enter the ranks of the educated elite, the better off they would be in the long run, both socially and economically.

Over time, though, people whose admissions were rejected started to fight back: they felt that academic merit trumped all other considerations. After all, if they got better grades and aptitude test scores, weren't they more deserving of admission? The fights began, and over time, the Court chipped away at the acceptable use of race in admissions. Finally, in SFAA, the Court did away with them altogether.

As far as "pushing the boundaries" is concerned, actors will generally try to do whatever's in their best interest provided it's not illegal. There's no reward for maintaining a wide margin from legal boundaries when there's competition.

Is that how the law works? Because the Civil Rights Act was written with black people in mind, it only applies to black people even though the wording doesn't specify that? Surely it's quite an obvious omission that they would have written down if that's what they'd wanted. Is it a kind of trick law written to make people think other races are protected but due to how laws are interpreted, it was always known not to apply to them?

It is a fair criticism (some would say a defect) of our legal system that legislation is not always as explicit as we would like it to be. Take California's Penal Code 187(a) which defines murder as:

"(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought."

It turns out that "malice aforethought" is a term of art that requires no actual malice and not much forethought.

Anyway, if you look at the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act (and courts frequently look to legislative history when interpreting statutes), you'll see that its backers in Congress were concerned about racial segregation, which at the time according to practice separated white people from everyone else (mostly Blacks).

If you’re not a textualist, there is a coherent reading that it only applies to American descendants of slaves. But that would mean that it doesn’t protect asians, hispanics, etc!

A logical and factual error made by proponents of affirmative action is to start with the premise that the civil rights laws were intended to help american descendants of slaves, but then extend them to other non-whites by categorizing them as “functionally black.” This is utterly incoherent, because black descendants of slaves and native americans are sociologically and economically distinct from other non-whites. Hispanics are just time-shifted Italians and Irish: low skill immigrants that economically assimilate within a few generations. By contrast, the gaps between black descendants of slaves and native Americans and other americans are not shrinking over time. They remain as large today as in 1965.

There’s a coherent version of affirmative action that gives a preference to descendants of slaves and native Americans but nobody else. But that bears no resemblance to the “diversity” based system that actually exists, which irrationally privileges Cubans over Bangladeshis because Indians are richer than Mexicans.

I’ve told you this time and time again that Bengalis who emigrated to this country before 1965 assimilated into the black community, but you completely refuse to listen to me.

I respect your argument, and in my research, I found articles in support of your opinion.

Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court adjudicated the question in United Steelworks v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), this is what they said:

"""Our conclusion is further reinforced by examination of the language and legislative history of 703 (j) of Title VII. Opponents of Title VII raised two related arguments against the bill. First, they argued that the Act would be interpreted to require employers with racially imbalanced work forces to grant preferential treatment to racial minorities in order to integrate. Second, they argued that employers with racially imbalanced work forces would grant preferential treatment to racial minorities, even if not required to do so by the Act. See 110 Cong. Rec. 8618-8619 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Sparkman). Had Congress meant to prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action; as respondent urges, it easily could have answered both objections by providing that Title VII would not require or permit racially preferential integration efforts. But Congress did not choose such a course. Rather, Congress added 703 (j) which addresses only the first objection. The section provides that nothing contained in Title VII "shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment . . . to any group because of the race . . . of such . . . group on account of" a de facto racial imbalance in the employer's work force. The section does not state that "nothing in Title VII shall be interpreted to permit" voluntary affirmative efforts to correct racial imbalances. The natural inference is that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action.

The reasons for this choice are evident from the legislative record. Title VII could not have been enacted into law without substantial support from legislators in both Houses who traditionally resisted federal regulation of private business. Those legislators demanded as a price for their support that "management prerogatives, and union freedoms . . . be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible." H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 29 (1963). Section 703 (j) was proposed by Senator Dirksen to allay any fears that the Act might be interpreted in such a way as to upset this compromise. The section was designed to prevent 703 of Title VII from being interpreted in such a way as to lead to undue "Federal Government interference with private businesses because of some Federal employee's ideas about racial balance or racial imbalance." 110 Cong. Rec. 14314 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Miller). 6 See also id., at 9881 (remarks of Sen. Allott); id., at 10520 (remarks of Sen. Carlson) id., at 11471 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id., at 12817 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen). Clearly, a prohibition against all voluntary, race-conscious, affirmative action efforts would disserve these ends. Such a prohibition would augment the powers of the Federal Government and diminish traditional management prerogatives while at the same time impeding attainment of the ultimate statutory goals. In view of this legislative history and in view of Congress' desire to avoid undue federal regulation of private businesses, use of the word "require" rather than the phrase "require or permit" in 703 (j) fortifies the conclusion that Congress did not intend to limit traditional business freedom to such a degree as to prohibit all voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action. """

So it seems clear that nobody interprets title VII to mean discrimination is required (at best, allowed). Yet courts did seem to interpret title VI to mean just that and universities did discriminate. I wonder why? I feel like they were skirting the law to serve their own interests rather than trying to follow the law.