Steve believed at his core that locking down devices was the best way to extract business value from users. That's why you can't install any apps without telling Apple or get your location without sending it to Apple. He also believed very strongly in good marketing, and he jumped on privacy marketing very quickly after the Facebook - Google privacy spat that coincided with the failure of iTunes Ping.
The company shift to privacy was more about getting pulled in front of Congress over the location data being accessible via USB as part of iTunes backup:
Source: people who were at Apple during that time period.
I think people underestimate how traumatic it was culturally to Apple and how Apple generally experiences comparatively little turnover vs their other major tech peers, so the responses to those traumas linger. Same with the brouhaha over the CSAM tech that they attempted to bundle into the iPhone that ostensibly was trying to preserve your privacy and they instantly got smacked down over it.
> He also believed very strongly in good marketing, and he jumped on privacy marketing very quickly after the Facebook - Google privacy spat that coincided with the failure of iTunes Ping.
I have two thoughts about this.
One, if you tell yourself a story strongly enough, it becomes real. Especially when you can structure the company to force it to become real.
Two, "marketing" is usually used disparagingly to mean something like "advertising that brainwashes customers into wanting something", but it's more like "knowing what people are going to want by the time it's ready to ship". It doesn't necessarily even include advertising. So in this case people do want privacy.
Same function at Apple. There isn't a separate "product" division and there aren't "PMs" with power (though there are some job site postings for them… in the marketing division.) That doesn't make sense at a functionally organized company where the execs and designers decide everything - Jobs and Ive were the "product" people.
IIRC the advertising people are called Marcom or "marketing communications".
The first iPhone didn't have an app store and the idea was to just use websites and later install webapps. On that there is no control whatsoever, so no I don't think the original idea was to lock down the devices for business value.
The two examples I gave are where locking a device down to extract value from customers conflict with privacy for those same customers. The former won years ago, and there has been no change since.
The iPhone had to add an app store because there were some apps that users couldn't build on the web at the time. They since allowed apps, but those apps are restricted to a proper subset of the APIs that first party apps get.
I'm not sure it's so much about extracting value exactly but Jobs long believed in making sealed appliances that people couldn't and wouldn't have to tinker with as opposed to more easily modify able computers sold by competitors
> Expandability, or the lack thereof, was far and away the most controversial aspect of the original Macintosh hardware design. Apple co-founder Steve Wozniak was a strong believer in hardware expandability, and he endowed the Apple II with luxurious expandability in the form of seven built-in slots for peripheral cards
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>This flexibility allowed the Apple II to be adapted to a wider range of applications, and quickly spawned a thriving third-party hardware industry.
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> Apple's other co-founder, Steve Jobs, didn't agree with Jef about many things, but they both felt the same way about hardware expandability: it was a bug instead of a feature. Steve was reportedly against having slots in the Apple II back in the days of yore, and felt even stronger about slots for the Mac. He decreed that the Macintosh would remain perpetually bereft of slots, enclosed in a tightly sealed case, with only the limited expandability of the two serial ports.
> Mac hardware designer Burrell Smith and his assistant Brian Howard understood Steve's rationale, but they felt differently about the proper course of action. Burrell had already watched the Macintosh's hopelessly optimistic schedule start to slip indefinitely, and he was unable to predict when the Mac's pioneering software would be finished, if ever. He was afraid that Moore's Law would make his delayed hardware obsolete before it ever came to market. He thought it was prudent to build in as much flexibility as possible, as long as it didn't cost too much.
> Burrell decided to add a single, simple slot to his Macintosh design, which made the processor's bus accessible to peripherals, that wouldn't cost very much, especially if it wasn't used. He worked out the details and proposed it at the weekly staff meeting, but Steve immediately nixed his proposal, stating that there was no way that the Mac would even have a single slot.
> But Burrell was not that easily thwarted. He realized that the Mac was never going to have something called a slot, but perhaps the same functionality could be called something else. After talking it over with Brian, they decided to start calling it the "diagnostic port" instead of a slot, arguing that it would save money during manufacturing if testing devices could access the processor bus to diagnose manufacturing errors. They didn't mention that the same port would also provide the functionality of a slot.
>This was received positively at first, but after a couple weeks, engineering manager Rod Holt caught on to what was happening, probably aided by occasional giggles when the diagnostic port was mentioned. "That things really a slot, right? You're trying to sneak in a slot!", Rod finally accused us at the next engineering meeting. "Well, that's not going to happen!"
> Even though the diagnostic port was scuttled, it wasn't the last attempt at surreptitious hardware expandability. When the Mac digital board was redesigned for the last time in August 1982, the next generation of RAM chips was already on the horizon. The Mac used 16 64Kbit RAM chips, giving it 128K of memory. The next generation chip was 256Kbits, giving us 512K bytes instead, which made a huge difference.
> Burrell was afraid the 128Kbyte Mac would seem inadequate soon after launch, and there were no slots for the user to add RAM. He realized that he could support 256Kbit RAM chips simply by routing a few extra lines on the PC board, allowing adventurous people who knew how to wield a soldering gun to replace their RAM chips with the newer generation. The extra lines would only cost pennies to add.
> But once again, Steve Jobs objected, because he didn't like the idea of customers mucking with the innards of their computer. He would also rather have them buy a new 512K Mac instead of them buying more RAM from a third-party. But this time Burrell prevailed, because the change was so minimal. He just left it in there and no one bothered to mention it to Steve, much to the eventual benefit of customers, who didn't have to buy a whole new Mac to expand their memory.
> Jobs long believed in making sealed appliances that people couldn't and wouldn't have to tinker with as opposed to more easily modify able computers sold by competitors
But at the same time he was also very proud of the PowerMac G3/G4 case which could be opened at any time (even when it was on) with the side being hinged with a prominent, friendly finger loop.
