Hardy's "A course of Pure Mathematics" has been highly regarded since it was first published in 1908 because it was an innovative text: rigorous, modern, well-written. Its intended readership was always first year "honours" mathematics students. This book inspired innovation in subsequent generations of textbook writers.
However, in the 21st century, this book really can no longer be recommended for its original teaching purpose. As a textbook it is outdated (a term I hate, but it is true). It is now an historical curiosity - although one which I am pleased to own, and the exercises in the book are still worth a look.
Calculus teaching has progressed considerably since 1908. The construction of the real number system in Hardy's book, using the Dedekind Cut method is overly complicated - the use of the of Least Upper Bound is much simpler and clearer. Hardy defines the concept of integral solely as the anti-derivative; there is no discussion of Riemann sums, or Darboux sums, etc. I am sure I would not want to take Hardy's approach today.
I think we are better off recommending books are more modern.
I will start by recommending "Calculus" by Michael Spivak.
a helpful review and extension of my slipshod math education (remember how Feynman once critiqued some math books, esp. calling out one for using made-up associations of colors and star temperatures? guess which one the school system I attended was using...).
Next step is I need to work with conic sections and after that Bézier curves/surfaces --- could you suggest texts on those subjects?
Hopefully someone can make recommendations for books (or other references) which address the next two aspects of math I'll need, conic sections and Bézier curves/surfaces.
and I'm reading through _METAFONT: The Program_ but if someone could provide a list of math texts which build from the Make: <foo> series (the coverage of conic sections in them was sparser than I was hoping for) I'd be glad of it. Links to helpful Github repositories would be welcome as well (for reviewing once I've digested the books).
> The construction of the real number system in Hardy's book, using the Dedekind Cut method is overly complicated - the use of the of Least Upper Bound is much simpler and clearer.
A Dedekind cut is a partition of the rational numbers into two sets, A and B, where every number that belongs to A is less than every number that belongs to B.
The cut represents a rational number if B has a least element, and an irrational number if it doesn't. (In full generality, it's a rational number if either (1) A has a greatest element, or (2) B has a least element, but in the case where A has a greatest element, we transfer that element into B, where it's the least element.)
The real number represented by a Dedekind cut is always the least upper bound of A (and the greatest lower bound of B). How does "the use of the Least Upper Bound" differ from Dedekind cuts? They aren't just the same thing in some arcane abstract sense where they both map onto the real numbers - they're the same thing in the most direct sense possible.
(For comparison, my analysis class defined real numbers as Cauchy sequences of rationals. The limit of such a sequence is a real number, but that real number need not be an upper or lower bound to anything.)
Really wished modern mathematics textbook cover geometric algebra not only complex algebra, what a shame and a lost of great opportunity [1]. It seems the contents of pure math textbooks do not changed and improved much after more than a century and when I did my pure math A level many years ago the contents are not much different than Hardy's textbook contents.
Apparently and ironically when the textbook was written when Hardy was the Savilian Chair of Geometry at Oxford University. If he had introduced GA into the contents back then it will be a game changing and I'd probably had studied GA in my pure math class back then.
What do you think of Hardy's book in number theory? I have never done number theory but having to study it a bit while I work on sets of traps that are approximable by algebraic numbers and it is really a nice read.
I recently looked at the syllabus of a course by my alma matar targeted at the same audience of ambitious first-year mathematics students with an emphasis on rigor. It is quite different from Hardy's book and the changes are, I think, for the better. Mostly, it introduces a lot more discrete mathematics, with a little bit of even graph theory and a little bit of enumerative combinatorics (generating functions and the like). In contrast this book is mostly focused on calculus and analysis, which are already separate courses. Freshman students should be exposed to a wider variety of topics in college-level mathematics and not just harder versions of what they already studied in high school.
Probably what Abbott in Understanding Analysis calls the axiom of completeness: every set that is bounded above has a least upper bound.
Making this stipulation distinguishes the reals from the rationals, as e.g. the set of numbers whose square is less than 2 is bounded above by any number whose square is greater than or equal to two, but among the rationals there is no least upper bound: given any rational number whose square is greater than or equal to two we can always find a smaller such rational.
Assuming the axiom of completeness, we define the square root of two as the least upper bound of the set of numbers whose square is less than two
But that is an axiom, not a construction! The point of Dedekind cuts is that they give a construction of the real numbers, and one can prove that this satisfies the Axiom of Least Upper Bounds.
You don't need a construction for a calculus class. If you do need one Cauchy sequence completion is more generalizable and somewhat easier to work with.
I don’t really know what a “calculus” class is since here (the UK) that term isn’t really used for university-level mathematics; we’d usually say “analysis” instead, but I know that “analysis” is a class in the US too, so I don’t know if calculus is closer to what we would do just prior to university (a bit of limits, differentiation, Riemann integrals, a bit of vector calculus).
Virtually every first year UK undergraduate analysis course will start with a construction of the reals via Dedekind cuts, and this is about the level that this book is pitched at.
The original commenter suggested that “least upper bounds” is a simpler approach, and that Hardy’s book is outdated by using Dedekind cuts; it may be that constructing the reals is not something that would be done at “calculus”-level in the US, but clearly the book isn’t aimed at that level.
Dedekind cuts (or Cauchy sequences) are totally standard, and I don’t think it’s fair to criticise their use at all.
In the U.S., there is typically a separation between calculus and real analysis. Though, the amount of difference between the two depends on the university.
In calculus, there is more emphasis on learning how to mechanically manipulate derivatives and integrals and their use in science and engineering. While this includes some instruction on proving results necessary for formally defining derivatives and integrals, it is generally not the primary focus. Meaning, things like limits will be explained and then used to construct derivatives and integrals, but the construction of the reals is less common in this course. Commonly, calculus 1 focuses more on derivatives, 2 on integrals, and 3 on multivariable. However, to be clear, there is a huge variety in what is taught in calculus and how proof based it is. It depends on the department.
Real analysis focuses purely on proving the results used in calculus classes and would include a discussion on the construction of the reals. A typical book for this would be something like Principles of Mathematical Analysis by Rudin.
I'm not writing this because I don't think you don't know what these topics are, but to help explain some of the differences between the U.S. and elsewhere. I've worked at universities both in the U.S. and in Europe and it's always a bit different. As to why or what's better, no idea. But, now you know.
Side note, the U.S. also has a separate degree for math education, which I've not seen elsewhere. No idea why, but it also surprised me when I found out.
There's a POV that learning math and learning how to teach math effectively are two orthogonal things.
If one only took the method of teaching that is most common in US university lecture halls, and applied it to a small class of pre-teens or teenagers, it probably wouldn't be very effective.
I went to a University of California school which had 3 calculus tracks - one for life/social sciences students (eg biology, econ), one for physical sciences (chemistry, physics, math, ...), and an honors track.
High school went up through what we call Algebra II. Calculus is an Advanced Placement (AP) course that most students don't take.
I took physical sciences calc + multivariate calc (1 year including summer), an intro to proofs and set theory course, and then finally a rigorous construction of reals was taught in our upper division real analysis course. So somewhere in my second year as a math major. Though I had already researched the constructions myself out of curiosity.
Apart from the material being extraneous for anyone outside the major, I think they were in a sense trying to be more rigorous by first requiring set theory which included constructions of the integer and rational number systems.
Where we define the real numbers as the least upper bounds of special sets. There is a bijection between these sets and the set of real numbers which we commonly think of and that bijection is the least upper bound of such sets.
I haven't looked at Hardy's but the presentation in Spivak is also Dedekind cuts. Perhaps Hardy uses a different approach and OP misnamed it? Rudin's chapter 1 annex also use Dedekind's cuts.
It looks like Hardy used Dedekind cuts from starting with the second edition (1914), but not in the first edition (1908).
What's the advantage of Dedekind cuts over say equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences of rational numbers? Particularly if you start out by introducing the integers and rational numbers as equivalence classes as well.
The equivalence class of Cauchy sequences is vastly larger and misleading compared to those of integers and rational numbers. You can take any finite sequence and prepend it to a Cauchy sequence and it will represent the same real number. For example, a sequence of 0,0,0,...,0 where the number of dots is the count of all the atoms in the universe and then followed by the decimal approximations of pi: 3, 3.1, 3.14, 3.141, ... The key component is the error clause of getting close, but that can vary greatly from sequence to sequence as to when that happens. The cute idea of being able to look at a sequence and see roughly where it is converging just is not captured well in the reality of the equivalence classes.
More or less, one can think of a Cauchy sequence of generating intervals that contain the real number, but it can be arbitrarily long before the sequence gets to "small" intervals. So comparing two Cauchy sequences could be quite difficult. Contrast that with the rational numbers where a/b ~ c/d if and only if ad = bc. This is a relatively simple thing to check if a, b, c, and d are comfortably within the realm of human computation.
Dedekind cuts avoid this as there is just one object and it is assumed to be completed. This is unrealistic in general though the n-roots are wonderful examples to think it is all okay and explicit. But if one considers e, it becomes clear that one has to do an approximation to get bounds on what is in the lower cut. The (lower) Dedekind cut can be thought of as being the set of lower endpoints of intervals that contain the real number.
My preference is to define real numbers as the set of inclusive rational intervals that contain the real number. That is a bit circular, of course, so one has to come up with properties that say when a set of intervals satisfies being a real number. The key property is based on the idea behind the intermediate value theorem, namely, given an interval containing the real number, any number in the interval divides the interval in two pieces, one which is in the set and the other is not (if the number chosen "is" the real number, then both pieces are in the set).
There is a version of this idea which is theoretically complete and uses Dedekind cuts to establish its correctness[1] and there is a version of this idea which uses what I call oracles that gets into the practical messiness of not being able to fully present a real number in practice[2].
> The equivalence class of Cauchy sequences is vastly larger and misleading compared to those of integers and rational numbers. You can take any finite sequence and prepend it to a Cauchy sequence and it will represent the same real number.
What's the misleading part of this supposed to be?
The equivalence classes of integers: pairs of naturals with (a, b) ~ (c, d) := (a + d) = (b + c).
The equivalence classes of rationals: pairs of integers with (a, b) ~ (c, d) := ad = bc.
It’s “easy” to tell whether two integers/rationals are equivalent, because the equivalence rule only requires you to determine whether one pair is a translation/multiple resp. of the other (proof is left to the reader).
Cauchy sequences, on the other hand, require you to consider the limit of an infinite sequence; as the GP points out, two sequences with the same limit may differ by an arbitrarily large prefix, which makes them “hard” to compare.
We can formalise this notion by pointing out that equality of integers and rationals is decidable, whereas equality of Cauchy reals is not. On the other hand, equality of Dedekind reals isn’t decidable either, so it’s not that Cauchy reals are necessarily easier than Dedekind reals, but more that they might lull one into a false sense of security because one might naively believe that it’s easy to tell if two sequences have the same limit.
The important point for me is that the equivalence for Cauchy sequences are part of the definition of real numbers as Cauchy sequences. This ought to imply that one has to be able to decide equivalence of two sequences for the definition to make sense. For Dedekind cuts, the crucial aspect is being able to define the set and that is something that can be called into question. But if that is done, it is just a computational question in comparing two Dedekind cuts, not a definitional one.
It is easy if you know the limits; if you don't, it's still true that two sequences {r_n}, {s_n} have the same limit if and only if the limit of the difference sequence {r_n - s_n} is zero, which conveniently enough is an integer and can't mess up our attempt to define the reals without invoking the reals.
That won't help you much if you don't know what you're working with, but the same is true of rationals.
I'm missing something as to this:
> equality of Dedekind reals isn’t decidable either
Two Dedekind reals (A, B) and (A', B') are equal if and only if they have identical representations. [Which is to say, A = A' and B = B'.] This is about as simple as equality gets, and is the normal rule of equality for ordered pairs. Can you elaborate on how you're thinking about decidability?
> Two Dedekind reals (A, B) and (A', B') are equal if and only if they have identical representations. […] Can you elaborate on how you're thinking about decidability?
Direct:
Make one of the sets uncomputable, at which point the equality of the sets cannot be decided. This happens when the real defined by the Dedekind cut is itself uncomputable. BB(764) is an integer (!) that I know is uncomputable off the top of my head. The same idea (defining an object in terms of some halting property) is used in the next proof.
Via undecidability of Cauchy reals:
Equality of Cauchy reals is also undecidable. The proof is by negation: consider a procedure that decides whether a real is equal to zero; consider a
sequence (a_n) with a_n = 1 if Turing machine A halts within n steps on all inputs, 0 otherwise; this is clearly Cauchy, but if we can decide whether it’s equal to 0, then we can decide HALT.
Cauchy reals and Dedekind reals are isomorphic, so equality of Dedekinds must also be undecidable.
Hopefully those two sketches show what I mean by decidable; caveat that I’m not infallible and haven’t been in academia for a while, so some/all of this may be wrong!
> BB(764) is an integer (!) that I know is uncomputable
I meant BB(748) apparently.
To elaborate on this point a bit, I specifically mean uncomputable in ZFC. There may be other foundations in which it is computable, but we can just find another n for which BB(n) is uncomputable in that framework since BB is an uncomputable function.
Your method for deciding whether two rationals are or aren't equal relies on having representations of those rationals. If you don't have those, it doesn't matter that there's an efficient test of equality when you do.
But you're arguing that equality of Dedekind reals is undecidable based on a problem that occurs when you define a particular "Dedekind real" only by reference to some property that it has. If you had a representation of the values as Dedekind reals, it would be trivial to determine whether they were or weren't equal. You're holding them to a different standard than you're using for the integers and rationals. Why?
Let's decide a question about the integers. Is BB(800) equal to BB(801)?
The intuition of a sequence is that the terms get closer to the convergence point. Looking at the first trillion elements of a sequence feels like it ought to give one some kind of information about the number. But without the convergence information, those first trillion elements of the sequence can be wholly useless and simply randomly chosen rational numbers. This is an "of course", but when talking about defining a real number with these sequences, as opposed to approximating them, this gives me a great deal of unease.
In particular, it is quite possible to prove a theorem that a sequence is Cauchy, but that there is no way to explicitly figure out N for a given epsilon. The sequence is effectively useless. This presumably is possible, and common, with using the Axiom of Choice. One can even imagine an algorithm for such a sequence that produces numbers and eventually converges, but the convergence is not knowable. Again, if this is just approximating something, then we can simply say it is a useless approximation scheme. But defining real numbers as the equivalence class of Cauchy sequences suggests taking such a sequence seriously in some sense and is the answer.
In contrast, consider integer and rational number versions, it is quite immediate how to reduce them to their canonical form, assuming unlimited finite arithmetic ability. For example, 200/300 ~ 2/3 and one recognizes that 200/300 and 2/3 are different forms of what we take to be the same object for most of our purposes. There is no canonical Cauchy sequence to reduce to and concluding two sequences are equivalent could take a potentially infinite number of computations /comparisons. While that is somewhat inherent to the complexity of real numbers, it feels particularly acute when it is something that must be done in defining the object.
Dedekind cuts have the opposite problem. There is only one of them for an irrational number, but it is not entirely clear what we would be computing out as an approximation, particularly if the lower cut viewpoint is adopted.
Intervals, on the other hand, inherently contain the approximation information. By dividing them and picking out the next subinterval, one also has a method to computing out a sequence of ever better approximations. I suppose one could prove the existence of the family of containment intervals without explicitly being able to produce them, but at least the emptiness of the statement would be quite clear (nothing is produced) in contrast to the sequences that could produce essentially meaningless numbers for an arbitrarily large number of terms.
> The equivalence class of Cauchy sequences is vastly larger and misleading compared to those of integers and rational numbers. You can take any finite sequence and prepend it to a Cauchy sequence and it will represent the same real number. ...
This can be addressed practically enough by introducing the notion of a 'modulus of convergence'.
I read this book as a first-year undergrad. His style inspired me to go after rigour and proof and was a good start to serious mathematics. I always loved Hardy's work and Hardy and Wright's number theory text was also very nice through my PhD in algebra/number theory. I found Hardy's book much nicer than the contemporary calculus texts with irrelevant pictures and modern-day examples. Just straight math! Not for everyone, but it has classical, austere appeal for those who enjoy such things.
Classical and austere, but not stilted. For instance...
>>> We can state this more precisely as follows: if we take any segment BC on Λ, we can find as many rational points as we please on BC.
reads as a normal English sentence.
As a student, I also preferred straight math. Proofs were what made math come alive for me. For applications of math, I had plenty of other sources such as physics, electronics, and programming, where the examples weren't forced.
> As a student, I also preferred straight math. Proofs were what made math come alive for me. For applications of math, I had plenty of other sources such as physics, electronics, and programming, where the examples weren't forced.
I guess the difference between us then is that I didn't care about applications.
That's fair. Hardy himself was a zealot and in fact despised applications, writing that he hoped his work would never be put to extrinsic use, for then its value would become contingent on a particular stage of technological development.
Math can be an end unto itself. This can come as a bit of a surprise in our prevailing culture, which needs to justify the usefulness of everything. Also, it's possible for someone to study math as a liberal art, and develop the ability to do useful things with it on their own. My observation is that the people who grudgingly learned math as a means to an end, tend to forget most of it soon after graduating. This explains the widespread but paradoxical aversion to math among engineers.
I doubt you have pure research doctors. Medicine is a field that is so dependent on treatment outcomes. There will be doctors more focused on research. However, I doubt they will stop seeing patients.
I know for a fact that pediatric oncology and hematology is entirely driven out of a research hospital or university. But doctors there publish but also treat.
I read somewhere that this was Turing's preparation for the Cambridge entrance exam; so I read through it in sixth form before sitting the STEP exams (modern equivalent for mathematics or CS with, and perhaps other programmes depending on college). I failed them, but that's a review of my naïveté, not the work!
Absolutely - Hardy and Wright's An introduction to the theory of numbers is excellent but definitely doesn't need to be restricted to postgrads - its also fine for undergraduate level number theory (indeed it was a recommended textbook when I was an undergrad).
It is quite dense but at least personally I find that style of textbook much more useful than the American style enormous textbooks which takes a chapter to explain what could be said in a paragraph. You just need to know to expect it will take you quite a while to read each page.
The preface left a deep impression on me because Hardy says only exceptionally talented and intelligent students will be able to finish and understand this book. It was a revelation because I grew up in schools that claimed anyone can learn maths to any level so long as they had enough interest and support. It was healthy as a young man to know I was beginning to approach my limits as a mathematician, and this book ultimately led me to focus more on computer science and programming.
With exceptional interest and support, certainly anyone can absorb all these concepts.
Of course if we take the case of someone about to die in 24h max due to brain cancer, then sure we just don't have the knowledge and resources to successfully make someone acquire that kind of knowledge.
But in the general case, people not learning advanced math notions is everywhere in the intersection between individual having no interest and society not pushing them in that direction through resource allocations.
Also since it's about Hardy we can not withdraw the case of Ramanujan. Yes, there are people whose brain is wired in very uncommon way that push them toward exploring uncharted territories where few have interest and even less have the ability to go through and survive. That said, once the path is paved and everything is in place to accommodate the accessibility of the place, there is no longer the same level of struggle to be expected.
More often, we lake the great teaching resources, rather than the sufficiently apt learners.
"Exceptionally talented and intelligent" has a very different meaning to "with exceptional interest and support". When people say talent, they invariably mean a natural endowment or inherent skill. Something distinct from what id possible with support and interest.
It's arguable that no such thing as talent exists. That when we say "talent" we are really using a short-hand for a kind of knowledge and experience. I suspect that Hardy would strongly reject such a claim, based on reading his Apology.
In A Mathematician's Apology (1940), Hardy has lots of fun musings on math.
I don't have the quote handy, but he argues that pure math is closer to reality than applied math since it deals with actual mathematical objects rather than mathematical models of physical objects.
"There is another remark which suggests itself here and which physicists may find paradoxical, though the paradox will probably seem a good deal less than it did eighteen years ago. I will express it in much the same words which I used in 1922 in an address to Section A of the British Association. [...] I began by saying that there is probably less difference between the positions of a mathematician and of a physicist than is generally supposed, and that the most important seems to me to be this, that the mathematician is in much more direct contact with reality. This may seem a paradox [...] but a very little reflection is enough to show that the physicist's reality, whatever it may be, has few or none of the attributes which common sense ascribes instinctively to reality. A chair may be a collection of whirling electrons, or an idea in the mind of God; each of these accounts of it may have its merits, but neither conforms at all closely to the suggestions of common sense. [...] A mathematician, on the other hand, is working with his own mathematical reality. Of this reality, as I explained in section 22, I take a 'realistic' and not an 'idealistic' view. At any rate (and this was my main point) this realistic view is much more plausible of mathematical than of physical reality, because mathematical objects are so much more what they seem. A chair or star is not in the least like what it seems to be; the more we think of it, the fuzzier its outlines become in the haze of sensation which surrounds it; but '2' or '317' has nothing to do with sensation, and its properties stand out the more clearly the more closely we scrutinize it. It may be that modern physics fits best into some framework of idealistic philosophy -- I do not believe it, but there are eminent physicists who say so. Pure mathematics, on the other hand, seems to me a rock on which all idealism founders: 317 is a prime, not because we think so, or because our minds are shaped in one way rather than another, but because it is so, because mathematical reality is built that way."
That's not quite the argument you describe -- his point is more that mathematical objects as understood by the mathematician are more like mathematical objects as we encounter them casually, than physical objects as understood by the physicist are like physical objects as we encounter them casually -- the physicist will insist that the chair you're sitting on is really a sort of configuration of fluctuations in quantum fields, but if you count up to 23 then the mathematician will agree that what you just did really does reflect the underlying nature of the number 23.
(If you build all mathematics on top of set theory, then you will most likely treat the number 23 as some much more complicated thing. But you'll see that as an "implementation detail" that could be done in lots of different ways, rather than saying that really, deep down 23 is this complicated thing with lots of weird internal structure.)
For the number 23, I wonder there must at least 2 schools :
( … there are many …
One can think that there is really a number 23! It was discovered and somehow we human has accessed to it. I am not sure.
Or one can think about it. This is the mapping of empty set to 0, set of empty set to 1, set of empty set of empty set to 2 …
…)
one can think of 23-ish item is a set with all 23 elements whose combination of any 2 elements does not reduce. You need a thousand page to prove 1 + 1 = 2, with the reason that the first 1 is not the same as the second 1 to avoid this operation collapse back to 1. Our counting always assume different object, but to be rigorous there is nothing in the first 1 is explicitly said in that equation is not the same as the second one, as pointed out by a previous Hn refer to latest article .
…
Or my beloved : there is no 23. Only 0 and an operation +1 exist. You can say 23 as the result of a marker after 23 +1 operation on 0. It is 0 +1 -> 1 … 1 +1 -> 0 +1 +1 -> 2, Qed. If you have 23 stones/… with you, you do a counting by doing a mapping to this 0 obj +1 ops in your head-compute somehow.
Mentioned in a footnote in that book is the following, which I have always rather liked: "A science is said to be useful if its development tends to accentuate the existing inequalities in the distribution of wealth, or more directly promotes the destruction of human life."
(He mentions it in a footnote mostly to clarify that he doesn't really quite believe it -- it was a "conscious rhetorical flourish" in something he wrote in 1915, and in the main body of the text he gives a less cynical account of what it means for something to be useful.)
Maybe that cynicism was one of the reasons he appeared to be against applications, in as much as they would be a form of monetisation or exploitation of his work. edit: Just read some more about him and it seems this may be well documented already heh.
You might be thinking of: "One rather curious conclusion emerges, that pure mathematics is on the whole distinctly more useful than applied." I wonder what he would think if he could see the ways in which number theory, once often regarded as the purest of the branches of math, is now used in things like cryptography.
"Apology" is definitely worth reading. Some of his opinions can seem rather elitist:
"Statesmen, despise publicits, painters despise art-critics, and physiologists, physicists, or mathematicians usually have similar feelings; there is no scorn more profound, or on the whole more justifiable, than that of the men who make for the men who explain. Exposition, criticism, appreciation is work for second-rate minds."
At the same time, he is very honest about himself - in fact, he seems to have been suffering from depression over what he perceived as a decline in his ability to do math at the level he was accustomed to:
"If then I find myself writing, not mathematics but 'about' mathematics, it is a confession of weakness, for which I may rightly be scorned or pitied by younger and more vigorous mathematicians. I write about mathematics because, like any other mathematician who has passed sixty, I have no longer the freshness of mind, the energy, or the patience to carry on effectively with my proper job."
Or:
"A mathematician may still be competent enough at sixty, but it is useless to expect him to have original ideas."
Or more sadly, but with some serenity:
"It is plain now that my life, for what it is worth, is finished, and that nothing I can do can perceptibly increase or diminish its value. It is very diffciult to be dispassionate, but I count it a 'success'; I have had more reward and not less than was due to a man of my particular grade of ability."
"If I had been offered a life neither better nor worse when I was twenty, I would have accepted without hesitation."
The personal reflections bookend a central portion where he illustrates with several examples (e.g. Euclid's proof of the infinitude of the primes) his feelings about the "importance" of math, its "usefulness", and the distinction between pure and applied math.
It's interesting to compare "Apology" to "Littlewood's Miscellany" (I recommend the Cambridge University Press version, which contains the essay "The Mathematician's Art of Work" - ISBN 0-521-33702-X). There is more math than in "Apology" and many anecdotes. J. E. Littlewood was Hardy's long-time collaborator.
> I wonder what he would think if he could see the ways in which number theory, once often regarded as the purest of the branches of math, is now used in things like cryptography.
I would say number theory proves his statement, although perhaps not his point.
Applied math is useful for the applications that are known at the time of its creation, and it is likely that it will remain with that level of applicability in the future, although if the real world applications that it is used for fall out of favor we might find that the applied math decreases in importance, given its importance is in its applicability, and the applicability of things has an importance contingent on the importance of the thing that they are applied to.
This is of course not 100% sure, as there can also arise new applications of things in the future.
Pure math on the other hand, being not tethered to any particular application on the time of its creation, may find all sorts of applications in the future, pure math has as such infinite potential applicability waiting to be discovered and thus infinite potential usefulness, whereas applied math has limited known applicability and thus limited known usefulness.
Nice book. For another old but excellent math book I recommend Geometry and the Imagination by David Hilbert. No gutenberg remake I'm afraid, maybe because of the numerous (and incredibly high quality) illustrations.
One of my favourite texts. One of those that I found influential early in academics as well as when re-reading later in my career. Even for younger students I think it can be great introduction to more formal approaches, as well as a taste for the austere.
Ive been nerd sniped by point 158 on page 353. I cant believe I slipped through so many calc classes without understanding Leibniz's rule for taking the derivative of a definite integral. I didn't actually follow through with the calculation in Hardy's book but I bet it haunts me until I do :(.
I remember having a hard time understanding limsup/liminf and only actually understood the concept after reading this book. I am sure it is not for everyone due to its age, but I think this book is a much better introduction than baby Rudin.
M.A. was the highest degree available in the UK at the time [1]. The closest equivalent to a PhD program might be the Prize Fellowship that Hardy had from 1900 to 1906, though it's certainly not one to one. Don't get the impression that Hardy was done with his education when he got his masters degree.
Simon Peyton Jones is a relatively recent example of someone who went from BSc in Cambridge, to a lectureship and eventually a professorship, without a PhD:
One of my Cambridge professors was Mr. Phil Woodland, an international authority on automatic speech recognition. When I asked him why he had no Ph.D., he shrugged and said he was too busy with his research work, so he "never found the time". Meanwhile, he got promoted to Professor [1].
Another noteworthy fact about Oxford and Cambridge that people from elsewhere may not realize is that they award an M.A. "for free" to Bachelor students after 5 years have passed, so you effectively get two degrees for the price of one.
You don't now either.... I'm an academic scientist and more than a few times I have looked up the CVs of well respected researchers whose work I really admired, and was shocked to discover they had no PhD, yet were still in a permanent PI position leading a well funded research effort of some type.
There are a small number of people in academia that are so good that they are effectively exempted from the requirement for traditional credentials- because everyone in the field knows who they are and will make a custom position for them anywhere that bypasses traditional requirements and recruitment.
Yeah... he hated the Ph.D. system, called it evil. He also said a great advantage of the Institute for Advanced Study was that he could work with postdocs - recent products of that same evil system.
However, in the 21st century, this book really can no longer be recommended for its original teaching purpose. As a textbook it is outdated (a term I hate, but it is true). It is now an historical curiosity - although one which I am pleased to own, and the exercises in the book are still worth a look.
Calculus teaching has progressed considerably since 1908. The construction of the real number system in Hardy's book, using the Dedekind Cut method is overly complicated - the use of the of Least Upper Bound is much simpler and clearer. Hardy defines the concept of integral solely as the anti-derivative; there is no discussion of Riemann sums, or Darboux sums, etc. I am sure I would not want to take Hardy's approach today.
I think we are better off recommending books are more modern.
I will start by recommending "Calculus" by Michael Spivak.
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