Thanks for doing the good work! I don't see such fearmongering in my bubble (another big issue is how the society is split into layers, and I have no idea what information most people are exposed to).
>On that note, if you have your own estimate of the current numbers for military civilian fatalities, that would be of interest also.
Ukraine doesn't publish these numbers for opsec reasons, so it's a wild guess.
About a million people have been mobilized. There's an immense amount of casualties, but Ukraine has been fighting hard to bring the wounded back, so many wounded return to service after recovery.
2022 has seen a huge number of civilian fatalities, particularly in cities like Mariupol, where the estimates range up to 100,000. Evidence of massacres and mass graves have been found in areas reclaimed from Russia, e.g. Bucha and Izyum.
But the war has enetered a different phase as of fall 2022. The civilian casualties are remarkably low. This is both because Ukraine is pretty good in evacuating civilians from places where the fighting is going on, and because both sides have zero interest in wiping out the civilians. Cynically, people are still a resource for either side.
On the level of people actually involved in combat, it's not an ethnic conflict, so they have no incentive to inflict civilian casualties. Mariupol's high casualty figures are more due to Russia's disregard for human life rather than deliberate goal of inflicting such damage. They weren't treating their own much better (they have since started caring about that more, but given that they're using NK soldiers, it looks like it was a bit too late).
Russia still resorts to occasional terrorism, like the strike on Okhmatdyt children's hospital. But the entire point of terrorism is inflicting minimal damage with minimal resources and causing maximum amount of fear and outrage. Russia's terrorism fails in the latter aspects; so far, it only strengthened the resolve, while costing Russia expensive rockets that are in limited supply.
Other than that, Russia doesn't have the reach to do much damage to Ukrainian civilians. Air defenses keep the bombers away, and drones on either side don't allow artillery to get anywhere close to the cities.
We're back to WW1-esque situation where the fighting is happening 100km away in the trenches, and you're sitting there sipping tea like nothing is going on, while the number of crosses at the cemeteries and people without limbs is growing, and the number of men of fighting age you can spot in the streets is shrinking.
From talking to soldiers, it's also impossible to gauge the losses. Assault units that storm the trenches have high casualty and loss rates. Bad commanders can send units into an area without recon, condemning them all. Hell is hell, and war is worse. But there's simply no data.
It's safe to say that combat casualties and deaths are much higher than reported. It's also safe to say that it's not nearly as high as the fearmongering you cited suggests: Ukraine is struggling with mobilization, and needs those 1M mobilized to hold the line (Zaluzhny's article in the Economist talks about the need to mobilize 500K a year ago - a task which is still ongoing).
So fatalities in the "hundreds of thousands" range would simply mean a frontline collapse. Meanwhile, we see the opposite happening: Ukraine's incursion into Kursk demonstrates that Ukraine has enough manpower for offensive operations, while holding up against Russian advances in the East (more or less).
On the other hand, Russia is advancing in the East; slowly, but advancing. That means that so far, their manpower losses have been sustainable. Whether they're sustainable because Russia has North Korea as a resource or another reason is beside the point - they can find people to do combat tasks somewhere, and that's all that matters.
As far as Ukraine's ability to have capable armed forces, manpower shortage due to fatalities would be very low on the list of issues.
The #1 issue would be losing experienced veterans, and not being able to train mobilized people effectively. The situation is improving, but is still dire. The numbers alone won't tell the story.
Losses alone don't demoralize the civilians (or would-be recruits) either. The fear of being thrown into combat with an AK and three clips, with training amounting to "point in the direction of enemy" does it. The fear of having a commander without any regard for human life or common sense does it.
I'd say that the fate of Ukraine hinges on whether Ukraine will be able to solve these problems and alleviate fears (the fears will be there in any case). Ukraine has enough resources, both manpower and economic/military, to fight this war (including foreign help - but both Russia and Ukraine rely on it, the world has gone global a while ago).
It's the ability to utilize the resources that is lackluster. Not an F level, but B- to C-. Enough to get by (so far). Occasional glimpses of brilliance (like the Kursk incursion, most recently). All riddled with careless mistakes that are systemic enough that resolving them is a very hard task.
>On that note, if you have your own estimate of the current numbers for military civilian fatalities, that would be of interest also.
Ukraine doesn't publish these numbers for opsec reasons, so it's a wild guess.
About a million people have been mobilized. There's an immense amount of casualties, but Ukraine has been fighting hard to bring the wounded back, so many wounded return to service after recovery.
2022 has seen a huge number of civilian fatalities, particularly in cities like Mariupol, where the estimates range up to 100,000. Evidence of massacres and mass graves have been found in areas reclaimed from Russia, e.g. Bucha and Izyum.
But the war has enetered a different phase as of fall 2022. The civilian casualties are remarkably low. This is both because Ukraine is pretty good in evacuating civilians from places where the fighting is going on, and because both sides have zero interest in wiping out the civilians. Cynically, people are still a resource for either side.
On the level of people actually involved in combat, it's not an ethnic conflict, so they have no incentive to inflict civilian casualties. Mariupol's high casualty figures are more due to Russia's disregard for human life rather than deliberate goal of inflicting such damage. They weren't treating their own much better (they have since started caring about that more, but given that they're using NK soldiers, it looks like it was a bit too late).
Russia still resorts to occasional terrorism, like the strike on Okhmatdyt children's hospital. But the entire point of terrorism is inflicting minimal damage with minimal resources and causing maximum amount of fear and outrage. Russia's terrorism fails in the latter aspects; so far, it only strengthened the resolve, while costing Russia expensive rockets that are in limited supply.
Other than that, Russia doesn't have the reach to do much damage to Ukrainian civilians. Air defenses keep the bombers away, and drones on either side don't allow artillery to get anywhere close to the cities.
We're back to WW1-esque situation where the fighting is happening 100km away in the trenches, and you're sitting there sipping tea like nothing is going on, while the number of crosses at the cemeteries and people without limbs is growing, and the number of men of fighting age you can spot in the streets is shrinking.
From talking to soldiers, it's also impossible to gauge the losses. Assault units that storm the trenches have high casualty and loss rates. Bad commanders can send units into an area without recon, condemning them all. Hell is hell, and war is worse. But there's simply no data.
It's safe to say that combat casualties and deaths are much higher than reported. It's also safe to say that it's not nearly as high as the fearmongering you cited suggests: Ukraine is struggling with mobilization, and needs those 1M mobilized to hold the line (Zaluzhny's article in the Economist talks about the need to mobilize 500K a year ago - a task which is still ongoing).
So fatalities in the "hundreds of thousands" range would simply mean a frontline collapse. Meanwhile, we see the opposite happening: Ukraine's incursion into Kursk demonstrates that Ukraine has enough manpower for offensive operations, while holding up against Russian advances in the East (more or less).
On the other hand, Russia is advancing in the East; slowly, but advancing. That means that so far, their manpower losses have been sustainable. Whether they're sustainable because Russia has North Korea as a resource or another reason is beside the point - they can find people to do combat tasks somewhere, and that's all that matters.
As far as Ukraine's ability to have capable armed forces, manpower shortage due to fatalities would be very low on the list of issues.
The #1 issue would be losing experienced veterans, and not being able to train mobilized people effectively. The situation is improving, but is still dire. The numbers alone won't tell the story.
Losses alone don't demoralize the civilians (or would-be recruits) either. The fear of being thrown into combat with an AK and three clips, with training amounting to "point in the direction of enemy" does it. The fear of having a commander without any regard for human life or common sense does it.
I'd say that the fate of Ukraine hinges on whether Ukraine will be able to solve these problems and alleviate fears (the fears will be there in any case). Ukraine has enough resources, both manpower and economic/military, to fight this war (including foreign help - but both Russia and Ukraine rely on it, the world has gone global a while ago).
It's the ability to utilize the resources that is lackluster. Not an F level, but B- to C-. Enough to get by (so far). Occasional glimpses of brilliance (like the Kursk incursion, most recently). All riddled with careless mistakes that are systemic enough that resolving them is a very hard task.