I disagree with a lot of these (especially "no conclusion section", which runs parallel to the ubiquitous "results" section at the end of journal articles) and it needs a "for certain kinds of technical writing" disclaimer, but knowing these are notes, they're incredibly helpful and interesting. Thanks for sharing!

I particularly liked the brave decision to define "idea", not to mention the philosophical comments on deduction vs. induction. Again, I wouldn't take them as, like, objective scientific findings, but they're solid and defensible choices IMO. It does, sadly, force me to quote this super long Kant quote because it's just too relevant and I'm something of an evangelist for his view of "Idea", so apologies! I would just link the book but it's like 500 pages long, so that seems even more rude.

   Despite the great wealth of words which European languages possess, the thinker finds himself often at a loss for an expression exactly suited to his conception, for want of which he is unable to make himself intelligible either to others or to himself... For this reason, when it happens that there exists only a single word to express a certain conception, and this word, in its usual acceptation, is thoroughly adequate to the conception, the accurate distinction of which from related conceptions is of great importance, we ought not to employ the expression improvidently, or, for the sake of variety and elegance of style, use it as a synonym for other cognate words. It is our duty, on the contrary, carefully to preserve its peculiar signification, as otherwise it easily happens that when the attention of the reader is no longer particularly attracted to the expression, and it is lost amid the multitude of other words of very different import, the thought which it conveyed, and which it alone conveyed, is lost with it. 
  ...  I beg those who really have philosophy at heart—and their number is but small—if they shall find themselves convinced by the considerations following as well as by those above, to exert themselves to preserve to the expression "idea" its original signification, and to take care that it be not lost among those other expressions by which all sorts of representations are loosely designated—that the interests of science may not thereby suffer. We are in no want of words to denominate adequately every mode of representation, without the necessity of encroaching upon terms which are proper to others.
  The following is a graduated list of them. The genus is representation in general (representatio). Under it stands representation with consciousness (perceptio). A perception which relates solely to the subject as a modification of its state, is a sensation (sensatio), an objective perception is a cognition (cognitio). A cognition is either an intuition or a conception (intuitus vel conceptus). The former has an immediate relation to the object and is singular and individual; the latter has but a mediate relation, by means of a characteristic mark which may be common to several things. A conception is either empirical or pure. A pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in the understanding alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image, is called notio. **A conception formed from notions, which transcends the possibility of experience, is an idea, or a conception of reason.** To one who has accustomed himself to these distinctions, it must be quite intolerable to hear the representation of the colour red called an idea. It ought not even to be called a notion or conception of understanding. 

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4280/4280-h/4280-h.htm

TL;DR: Ideas are representations of logical concepts that transcend sensible experience altogether, e.g. through induction or problematics. The base word is "representation", or if we're just talking logic, "concept"!

Impressively, the definition given here is actually a close match to the above; I wonder if the author was a Platonist or Kantian, or if they just have a good intuitive sense for these things...