That's very wrong. ASN.1 is complicated because it's quite complete by comparison to other syntaxes, but it's absolutely not inefficient unless you mean BER/DER/CER, but those are just _some_ of the encoding rules available for use with ASN.1.

To give just one example of "complicated", ASN.1 lets you specify default values for optional members (fields) of SEQUENCEs and SETs (structures), whereas Protocol Buffers and XDR (to give some examples) only let you specify optional fields but not default values.

Another example of "complicated" is that ASN.1 has extensibility rules because the whole "oh TLV encodings are inherently extensible" thing turned out to be a Bad Idea (tm) when people decided that TLV encodings were unnecessarily inefficient (true!) so they designed efficient, non-TLV encodings. Well guess what: Protocol Buffers suffers from extensibility issues that ASN.1 does not, and that is a serious problem.

Basically, with a subset of ASN.1 you can do everything that you can do with MSFT RPC's IDL, with XDR, with Protocol Buffers, etc. But if you stick to a simple subset of ASN.1, or to any of those other IDLs, then you end up having to write _normative_ natural language text (typically English) in specifications to cover all the things not stated in the IDL part of the spec. The problem with that is that it's easy to miss things or get them wrong, or to be ambiguous. ASN.1 in its full flower of "complexity" (all of X.680 plus all of X.681, X.682, and X.683) lets you express much more of your protocols in a _formal_ language.

I maintain an ASN.1 compiler. I've implemented parts of X.681, X.682, and X.683 so that I could have the compiler generate code for the sorts of typed holes you see in PKI -all the extensions, all the SANs, and so on- so that the programmer can do much less of the work of having to invoke a codec for each of those extensions.

A lot of the complexity in ASN.1 is optional, but it's very much worth at least knowing about it. Certainly it's worth not repeating mistakes of the past. Protocol Buffers is infuriating. Not only is PB a TLV encoding (why? probably because "extensibility is easy with TLV!!1!, but that's not quite true), but the IDL requires manual assignment of tag values, which makes uses of the PB IDL very ugly. ASN.1 originally also had the manual assignment of tags problem, but eventually ASN.1 was extended to not require that anymore.

Cavalier attitudes like "ASN.1 is too complicated" lead to bad results.

So, it's quite complicated. Yes, what I have been saying from the start. If you start the conversation by "you can define a small subset of this terrible piece of technology which is bearable", it's going to be hard convincing people it's a good idea.

> Cavalier attitudes like "ASN.1 is too complicated" lead to bad results.

I merely say quite complicated not too complicated.

Still, ASN.1 is a telco protocol through and through. It shows everywhere: syntax, tooling. Honestly, I don't see any point in using it unless it's required by law or by contract (I had to, I will never again).

> but it's absolutely not inefficient unless you mean BER/DER/CER, but those are just _some_ of the encoding rules available for use with ASN.1.

Sorry, I'm glade to learn you can make ASN.1 efficient if you are a specialist and now what you are doing with the myriad available encodings. It's only inefficient in the way everyone use it.

Subsets of ASN.1 that match the functionality of Protocol Buffers are not "quite complicated" -- they are no more complicated than PB.

> Still, ASN.1 is a telco protocol through and through.

Not really. The ITU-T developed it, so it gets used a lot in telco protocols, but the IETF also makes a lot of use of it. It's just a syntax and set of encoding rules.

And so what if it were "a telco protocol through and through" anyways? Where's the problem?

> It shows everywhere: syntax, tooling.

The syntax is very much a 1980s syntax. It is ugly syntax, and it is hard to write a parser for using LALR(1) because there are cases where the same definition means different things depending on what kinds of things are used in the definition. But this can be fixed by using an alternate syntax, or by not using LALR(1), or by hacking it.

The tooling? There's open source tooling that generates code like any XDR tooling and like PB tooling and like MSFT RPC tooling.

> Sorry, I'm glade to learn you can make ASN.1 efficient if you are a specialist and now what you are doing with the myriad available encodings. It's only inefficient in the way everyone use it.

No, you don't have to be a specialist. The complaint about inefficiency is about the choice of encoding rules made by whatever protocol spec you're targeting. E.g., PKI uses DER, so a TLV encoding, thus it's inefficient. Ditto Kerberos. These choices are hard to change ex-post, so they don't change.

"[T]he way everyone use it" is the way the application protocol specs say you have to. But that's not ASN.1 -- that's the application protocol.

There is no open source tooling that combines really used scheme understanding - in 5G this includes parameterized specifications by X.683 - and decoder able to show partially decoded message before an error, with per-bit explanation of rules led to its encoding.

> E.g., PKI uses DER, so a TLV encoding, thus it's inefficient.

When it is used, ~5% space economy is never worth people efforts to diagnose any problem. I strictly vote for this "inefficiency".