I would make the case that it's fundamentally the same thing.
In both cases, there were people who cared primarily about the technical truth, and those people were overruled by people who cared primarily about their own lifestyle (social status, reputation, career, opportunities, loyalties, personal obligations, etc.) In Allan McDonald's book "Truth, Lies, and O-Rings" he outlines how Morton Thiokol was having a contract renewal held over their head while NASA Marshall tried to maneuver the Solid Rocket Booster production contract to a second source, which would have seriously affect MT's bottom line and profit margins. There's a strong implication that Morton Thiokol was not able to adhere to proper technical rationale and push back on their customer (NASA) because if they had they would have given too much ammunition to NASA to argue for a second-source for the SRB contracts. (In short: "you guys delayed launches over issues in your hardware, so we're only going to buy 30 SRB flight sets from you over the next 5 years instead of 60 as we initially promised."
I have worked as a NASA contractor on similar issues, although much less directly impacting the crews than the SRBs. You are not free to pursue the smartest, most technically accurate, quickest method for fixing problems; if you introduce delays that your NASA contacts and managers don't like, they will likely ding your contract and redirect some of your company's work to your direct competitors, who you're often working with on your projects.
What’s the alternative? Being able to shift to a competitor when a producer is letting you down is the entire point of private contracts; without that, you might as well remove the whole assemblage of profit and just nationalize the whole thing.
Strictly speaking, you're correct, so I don't disagree with your comment. However, assuming MvDonald's recollections are correct and his explanation of the story is accurate, Morton Thiokol was doing an excellent job. The O-Ring seal issue was on track to be solved as they switched to a lighter-weight filament-wound case. According to McDonald, Morton Thiokol was receiving high marks on their contract evaluations, and Marshall was trying to move the contract to a company that had a lot of ex-Marshall employees.
I think it can be thought from this angle: if the customer is corrupt and the contractor ethical, the project can be unsafe. If the customer is ethical and the contractor corrupt, the project also can be unsafe.
Okay so it sounds like you're saying that they are fundamentally the same, but only because the Challenger wasn't in the "informed risk assessment" category after all.
Yeah, that's what I think. In both cases the technical decisions were made by people who were not technical experts and were completely ignoring the input of the technical experts because of social pressures. Based on McDonald's retelling, the decision to launch the Challenger was anything but an informed risk decision; none of the managers said "we acknowledge Morton Thiokol's concerns about O-Ring temperatures and are committing to launch anyway, with the following rationale: ..." They just didn't bring up the temperature issue at the flight director level and recommended a launch, backed by no data.
In Chernobyl, they scheduled a safety test to satisfy schedules imposed by central command. The plant engineers either weren't informed or couldn't push back because to go against management meant consequences for your career and family, administered by the Soviet authorities or the KGB.
Both scenarios had engineers who were not empowered to disclose or escalate issues to the highest level because of implied threats against them by non-technical authorities.
In both cases, there were people who cared primarily about the technical truth, and those people were overruled by people who cared primarily about their own lifestyle (social status, reputation, career, opportunities, loyalties, personal obligations, etc.) In Allan McDonald's book "Truth, Lies, and O-Rings" he outlines how Morton Thiokol was having a contract renewal held over their head while NASA Marshall tried to maneuver the Solid Rocket Booster production contract to a second source, which would have seriously affect MT's bottom line and profit margins. There's a strong implication that Morton Thiokol was not able to adhere to proper technical rationale and push back on their customer (NASA) because if they had they would have given too much ammunition to NASA to argue for a second-source for the SRB contracts. (In short: "you guys delayed launches over issues in your hardware, so we're only going to buy 30 SRB flight sets from you over the next 5 years instead of 60 as we initially promised."
I have worked as a NASA contractor on similar issues, although much less directly impacting the crews than the SRBs. You are not free to pursue the smartest, most technically accurate, quickest method for fixing problems; if you introduce delays that your NASA contacts and managers don't like, they will likely ding your contract and redirect some of your company's work to your direct competitors, who you're often working with on your projects.