> Yes Skype was never exactly mil-spec but was generally regarded as safer than email or regular phones as far as routine interception was concerned.
And wrongly so. You still logged in through Skype servers (username/password is centrally managed) who would direct you to a supernode near you, and could equally direct you to an intercepting supernode.
You have just made the fallacious argument of security through obscurity.
> Once the end points of a call had been discovered the voice traffic was direct caller-caller.
Do you know that, or just assume that? Do you know that this hasn't changed with different versions?
> Assuming that Skype hasn't been a front for the illuminati all along,
Blackberry insisted that they can't decrypt end-user communication ... right until the Indian government threatened to make it illegal to use Blackberry in India, and magically it became possible to eavesdrop on BB comm.
Corrupt governments are enough, don't need to invoke the illuminati.
> then the big change of having all the supernodes under one roof is that all the call endpoints can be routinely monitored and so if there was a future requirement to tap all the voice data it would be easier to pick which links to monitor.
It's not any different. The voice links were (mostly) P2P, and I guess they still are. The supernodes (discovery/comm links) were centrally managed, and still are. The only difference is now they are both centrally managed and centrally owned - that's a very little difference.
And wrongly so. You still logged in through Skype servers (username/password is centrally managed) who would direct you to a supernode near you, and could equally direct you to an intercepting supernode.
You have just made the fallacious argument of security through obscurity.
> Once the end points of a call had been discovered the voice traffic was direct caller-caller.
Do you know that, or just assume that? Do you know that this hasn't changed with different versions?
> Assuming that Skype hasn't been a front for the illuminati all along,
Blackberry insisted that they can't decrypt end-user communication ... right until the Indian government threatened to make it illegal to use Blackberry in India, and magically it became possible to eavesdrop on BB comm.
Corrupt governments are enough, don't need to invoke the illuminati.
> then the big change of having all the supernodes under one roof is that all the call endpoints can be routinely monitored and so if there was a future requirement to tap all the voice data it would be easier to pick which links to monitor.
It's not any different. The voice links were (mostly) P2P, and I guess they still are. The supernodes (discovery/comm links) were centrally managed, and still are. The only difference is now they are both centrally managed and centrally owned - that's a very little difference.