The book covers both. I think you were too hasty to get this criticism posted to HN that you made an assumption about the book by its cover. The author is in the UK and this was published by Oxford, which are common law jurisdictions.
For example, I turned to a random part about copyright:
"In the continental European tradition, the focus has been on the author and the
work. This understanding of ‘authors’ law’ built on the Age of Romanticism of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, where the singularity of creative im-
agination of an individual author took precedence over the mundane business
interests of a publisher. The idea was that ‘authors’ law’ is part of ‘natural law’
rather than being ‘posited’ by a legislator (positive law). The ‘authors’ right’,
in that line of thinking, is constituted by the original act of creation of the
author and should not be tied to formalities (such as registration), while the
‘work’ that is created belongs to the ‘author’s domain’. This is a matter of per-
sonality rights (droit moral or moral right), rather than a matter of ownership
(as Locke would have it).
In the common law that inspired the United Kingdom and the United States,
the focus was not on the author and their work, but on the original and the
copy. This was less a matter of personality and romantic imagination than a
matter of pragmatism. Copyright was simply a choice made by a legislator
(positive law), rather than a natural right inherent in the author’s act of cre-
ation. This led to the requirement of registration and an emphasis on copy-
right as an economic, not a moral right. Here, copyright law is about the
domain of the ‘work’ rather than the domain of the ‘author’, and such work is
considered original in the sense of not being copied, rather than original in
the sense of being creative or novel"
For example, I turned to a random part about copyright:
"In the continental European tradition, the focus has been on the author and the work. This understanding of ‘authors’ law’ built on the Age of Romanticism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, where the singularity of creative im- agination of an individual author took precedence over the mundane business interests of a publisher. The idea was that ‘authors’ law’ is part of ‘natural law’ rather than being ‘posited’ by a legislator (positive law). The ‘authors’ right’, in that line of thinking, is constituted by the original act of creation of the author and should not be tied to formalities (such as registration), while the ‘work’ that is created belongs to the ‘author’s domain’. This is a matter of per- sonality rights (droit moral or moral right), rather than a matter of ownership (as Locke would have it).
In the common law that inspired the United Kingdom and the United States, the focus was not on the author and their work, but on the original and the copy. This was less a matter of personality and romantic imagination than a matter of pragmatism. Copyright was simply a choice made by a legislator (positive law), rather than a natural right inherent in the author’s act of cre- ation. This led to the requirement of registration and an emphasis on copy- right as an economic, not a moral right. Here, copyright law is about the domain of the ‘work’ rather than the domain of the ‘author’, and such work is considered original in the sense of not being copied, rather than original in the sense of being creative or novel"