I don't think this is really down to people understanding what a computer is, but more down to how humans interact with nonhumans. We anthropomorphize animals and objects all the time. A computer program is ultimately a (complicated) object, that we often give all sorts of human trappings, like a human voice that expresses things in human languages.
If you can take pity on the final, dented avocado at the shops because it looks "sad", you will for sure end up calling Alexa 'she'. Avocados can't be sad, but they can look sad /to humans/, and a machine can't really have a gender or be polite in the human sense, but it can definitely sound like a polite lady.
I think humans will just fundamentally relate to anything they perceive socially as another human, even if we know full well they aren't human. Probably it's a lot less work for a human brain, than it is to try to engage with the true essence of being an avocado or an Alexa.
I agree, but I'm not sure why you don't think that is at least relevant if not partially responsible for people seeing humanity in a language model.
If we anthropomorphic animals and even vegetables regularly, what happens when something appears to talk back to us intelligently? I don't think these mechanisms are nearly as distinct as you make them out to be.
Perhaps I misinterpreted your original post, but I do think there's a difference between not intellectually 'getting' that a computer isn't thinking in the same way a human is thinking, and this anthropomorphizing that we do to all sorts of things. I'll try to be clearer:
Obviously making an object mimick human traits makes it a lot easier to anthropomorphize. Like if you put a little cowboy hat on a pear. But you wouldn't say that somebody doesn't "understand that fruits aren't human" if they assign human traits to them. Making a machine that talks back at us in a seemingly intelligent way is a much more intensely human trait for it to have. It's not down to our intellectual understanding of the thing, but how our brains decode our (social) world.
So the anthropomorphizing happens regardless of the level of technical understanding. We both know it's just a pear, but it's also a cowboy now.
Of course there's a level of playfulness involved with all of this too. It's kinda fun to backsass your GPS instructions, or tell Alexa she's being nosy, or ask your dog what he thinks of the presidential debate. But that's not the same as foolishly overestimating the political acumen of the dog, or the nature of Alexa's intelligence.
I think it's irrelevant what people "know", if that's not how they act. It doesn't matter that people know a fruit isn't human if they act like it is in ways, because how people interact with the world is the only thing that actually matters. If you always act like the bear with a hat has some level of feelings even if you don't believe it, that's functionally identical to actually believing it, so any difference is irrelevant. No matter how much they express they know it has no feelings, if they feel bad or feel bad for it if it's destroyed, what's more true, what they said or how they actually responded?
Most people don't act like things have feeling all the time, or to the same level as a living being might have feelings, but many people do it to a degree. Given that much of how we feel is immediate (and thus not reasoned), subconscious, and sometimes Pavlovian, I don't think it's a stretch to think that even acting like an inanimate object has feelings or human traits regularly might lead towards subconscious feelings about it that are not entirely rational or immediately understood by the person.
For a slightly different argument, consider why it's generally considered good advice not to name the animals meant for slaughter. Or how people treat cars or large pieces of equipment that aren't always reliable (are "temperamental"), or that are tightly linked to safety and livelihood, such as boats.
We are social animals. We bond to others easily by our nature, because it's beneficial for survival. I think we do it so easily that it extends towards animals, often to good effect, but sometimes even to inanimate objects that have a lot of significance. In the past this seems to even have been extended to weapons and armor, given the number of named items in history.
If you can take pity on the final, dented avocado at the shops because it looks "sad", you will for sure end up calling Alexa 'she'. Avocados can't be sad, but they can look sad /to humans/, and a machine can't really have a gender or be polite in the human sense, but it can definitely sound like a polite lady.
I think humans will just fundamentally relate to anything they perceive socially as another human, even if we know full well they aren't human. Probably it's a lot less work for a human brain, than it is to try to engage with the true essence of being an avocado or an Alexa.