You don't doxx yourself by creating a Free account. In most cases, no human verification method is required or it's captcha only. As explained above, an additional email address would be required only in cases when our system detects something suspicious about your network. It takes a while for the Bitcoin transaction to come through, which is why we the process is the way it is. The same process applies to users who wish to pay with cash or bank transfer.

Uh huh.

And what suspicious thing about the network would you be detecting for Tor Browser users arriving on the .onion? Their network is uniform as far as you can tell, and you are blocking them from opening either a free account without an invasive verification method (non-disposable email or phone) if it works at all, or a paid account without an invasive payment method.

For Tor users arriving on proton.me, what sense is there in saying "There's a surprise in every 100th exit node! If you cycle through enough of them maybe you too will be allowed to open an account anonymously!" Not treating them as equivalent to .onion visitors is a you problem.

> It takes a while for the Bitcoin transaction to come through, which is why we the process is the way it is.

By not allowing this payment option at all in the signup flow? Removing what would be the only way for Tor users to sign up to your service anonymously without beating lottery odds. Just use any normal off-the-shelf checkout page that waits for however many transaction confirmations you want! (Let's not even get into the lack of privacy coin support, e.g. Monero. For a privacy focused service, Bitcoin L1 only is substandard in 2023.)

Meanwhile, whenever people are concerned about user data being handed over to the authorities again, you counter by pointing out the supposed Tor support: https://web.archive.org/web/20210906132309/https://protonmai...

I'm not saying you are a honeypot. I'm saying you've cultivated such a careless indifference to data minimization that you've become indistinguishable from one.

Regarding TOR, it's based largely on volumes. Spikes on a TOR IP for example would trigger additional anti-abuse measures.

So fix your backend to exempt Tor visitors from those measures, if it's really all due to hallucinating clusters of abuse from a network where abuse categorically does not appear in clusters of the kind that your backend is attempting to detect.

To add an exemption for proton.me: The list of Tor exit IPs is public. For the .onion: That's loopback traffic from the tor daemon running on your own load balancer or wherever you've put it.

Thank you for your feedback, we've passed it on to our anti-abuse team.