That "official channels" bit has been the case, and a major failing of news organisations for over a century. Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz pointed this out in a 1920 New Republic article, "A Test of the News", commenting in large part on the New York Times's coverage (and failings) of the Russian Revolution. In particular was the issue of ideologically-tinged coverage, here anti-Communist principally. (Later the bias would run the other direction, particularly in the 1930s during the Holodomor.)
Lippmann and Merz note:
The analysis shows how seriously misled was the Times by its reliance upon the official purveyors of information. It indicates that statements of fact emanating from governments and the circles around governments as well as from the leaders of political movements cannot be taken as judgements of fact by an independent press. They indicate opinion, they are controlled by special purpose, and they are not trustworthy news. If, for example, the Russian Minister of War says that the armies of Russia were never stronger, that cannot be accepted by a newspaper as news that the armies of Russia are stronger than ever. The only news in the statement is that the Minister says they are stronger.
They continue to note the especially insidious nature of the anonymous source. The whole article is interesting reading, and bears strong parallels to events occurring today.
As do the practices Lippmann and criticise. Over a century later, news organisations still rely overwhelmingly on official (and unofficial) government spokespersons, and in the majority of cases treat such pronouncements as statements of fact, even where severe credibility issues are well known. Much of this is a result of availability heuristics (government mouthpieces are easy to find, and generally want to talk), reputation, and relationships established between journalists and sources. It is much more work to find truly independent, credible, and unmotivated witnesses.
And so, when things go pear-shaped, the official sources tend to become scarce.
Related to the disaster / comms failure dynamic I mentioned above: one rough proxy for determining how bad a widespread disaster in fact is is to look at where casualty reports have not yet been received. Again: capital and major cities typically preserve some communications capacity. Outlying regions are far more likely to be cut off, and by looking at the relative size and significance of locations that are making reports, as well as patterns of communications cessation, it's possible to make some inferences about total magnitude. Note that offical tallies of morbidity and mortality are based on received, credible, verified reports, which is to say, official statistics will almost always understate actual impacts, possibly for hours, days, or weeks, depending on overall severity. The 2004 Boxing Day Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami comes to mind, with full official counts taking months or years to finally settle.
That "official channels" bit has been the case, and a major failing of news organisations for over a century. Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz pointed this out in a 1920 New Republic article, "A Test of the News", commenting in large part on the New York Times's coverage (and failings) of the Russian Revolution. In particular was the issue of ideologically-tinged coverage, here anti-Communist principally. (Later the bias would run the other direction, particularly in the 1930s during the Holodomor.)
Lippmann and Merz note:
The analysis shows how seriously misled was the Times by its reliance upon the official purveyors of information. It indicates that statements of fact emanating from governments and the circles around governments as well as from the leaders of political movements cannot be taken as judgements of fact by an independent press. They indicate opinion, they are controlled by special purpose, and they are not trustworthy news. If, for example, the Russian Minister of War says that the armies of Russia were never stronger, that cannot be accepted by a newspaper as news that the armies of Russia are stronger than ever. The only news in the statement is that the Minister says they are stronger.
<https://archive.org/details/LippmannMerzATestoftheNews/page/...>
They continue to note the especially insidious nature of the anonymous source. The whole article is interesting reading, and bears strong parallels to events occurring today.
As do the practices Lippmann and criticise. Over a century later, news organisations still rely overwhelmingly on official (and unofficial) government spokespersons, and in the majority of cases treat such pronouncements as statements of fact, even where severe credibility issues are well known. Much of this is a result of availability heuristics (government mouthpieces are easy to find, and generally want to talk), reputation, and relationships established between journalists and sources. It is much more work to find truly independent, credible, and unmotivated witnesses.
And so, when things go pear-shaped, the official sources tend to become scarce.
Related to the disaster / comms failure dynamic I mentioned above: one rough proxy for determining how bad a widespread disaster in fact is is to look at where casualty reports have not yet been received. Again: capital and major cities typically preserve some communications capacity. Outlying regions are far more likely to be cut off, and by looking at the relative size and significance of locations that are making reports, as well as patterns of communications cessation, it's possible to make some inferences about total magnitude. Note that offical tallies of morbidity and mortality are based on received, credible, verified reports, which is to say, official statistics will almost always understate actual impacts, possibly for hours, days, or weeks, depending on overall severity. The 2004 Boxing Day Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami comes to mind, with full official counts taking months or years to finally settle.