> Except it costs many times more to make an anti-ballistic-missile interceptor then the original ballistic missile.
That doesn't sound correct to me. They're both rockets, one is much larger than the other and has a payload (in the case where we're looking at a failure of deterrence) made out outrageously expensive material. I mean, you can construct an argument that one is already built and paid for, or that 70's/80's technology was cheaper inherently, etc...
But from first principles, no. An ICBM is more expensive than an ABM.
Using one principle (nukes are expensive) isn't the same thing as deducing something from first principles. In particular, it's not enough, especially given hypersonic missile technology, to just take an ICBM, reprogram it, and voila you have an ABM. Because the cost of even a single warhead off an MIRV ICBM getting through is so devastating, the cost of a ABM system includes a huge number of missiles to increase the chance of catching the incoming attack. And then, once the ABM missile reaches the incoming ICBM. How does it neutralize the threat? What technology do we have that causes a lot of destruction? Oh that's right, nukes. If the ABM system uses nukes to neutralize the incoming threat, then it's very much not clear that the singular principle (nukes are expensive) doesn't also apply to the ABM system.
Some subjects, like computer science, which is still a very young area of study are very open to learnings from first principles. Others, like the geopolitics of nuclear deterrence, are deeper than any one person can even begin to understand.
Current interceptors do not use nuclear warheads. This makes it both cheaper and more expensive. It requires a more complicated hit to kill system than merely getting the nuclear warhead close enough. However, the system as a whole ends up cheaper. You don't need to get National Command Authority to authorize a launch anymore, because you're not using nukes. You can get that delegated down to whichever officer is in charge of the system that day.
The objective of National Missile Defense isn't to stop all the warheads, it's to make the attacker's job harder. There's a bunch of ways it does that. One is that the defender gets to choose what it stops. So they can stop all the warheads going to one target. But the attacker doesn't know ahead of time, so they need to launch enough warheads at each target to destroy it regardless of whether it's actually defended or not. So 1550 warheads no longer hit 750 targets, but rather they hit 75 targets. It really sucks to be one of those 75 targets, because most of them get absolutely destroyed, but the other 90% of potential targets are much better off, because they didn't get hit at all.
Another way is that ballistic missile accuracy depends on how far away from the target it gets separated from the missile bus that has the guidance system. If they separate too late, the interceptor will hit the bus before separation. Which kills all the warheads. So they have to move it back, which makes it less accurate, which means it's more likely the warhead will miss the target.
A third way is that they may decide they need to carry penetration aids. But there's a bunch of really fancy tricks radars and IR sensors can do to see which is a real thing, and which isn't, which amount to: the penetration aid which is best at mimicking a warhead ends up being the same size and shape as a real warhead. So they might as well just use a real warhead.
The launching missile can carry dozens of penetration aids, each one needing an interceptor warhead.
Plus, the physical structure and fuel are by far the cheapest parts, it's everything else, guidance systems, maneuvering systems, etc., that make up the majority of the cost. Which each interceptor warhead needs but which dumb penetration aids don't.
Control systems are one per penetrator, aren't they? Same with nukes, if we're talking about them.
I'd say that it's exactly the fuel, the engine, and the whole chassis of an anti-ballistic missile what's so expensive. An ABM has very little time to do its job. It has to launch instantly, and accelerates at 100g or so, and then must also maneuver at this circumstances. It should also pack enough punch to destroy a warhead which is a relatively small metal needle, built to withstand the mechanical and thermal loads of an orbital reentry.
As a contrast, an ICBM can start with much more soft acceleration, can spend 10-20 seconds preparing for launch without loss of efficiency, and does not have to maneuver much during ascent and the orbital part.
No, penetration aids don't need any control system, they're literally just dumb pieces of metal. Of course they won't explode or be accurate at all, but that's irrelevant to soaking up interceptors which need to be a launched well before impact.
It's literally sending up some of the most sophisticated vehicles ever made by mankind to defeat mostly chunks of metal. Hence why even the US can't afford it in any meaningful quantities.
Everything on an interceptor is much more expensive because of the much higher performance requirements. But the fuel and structure will still be a lot cheaper compared to the rest of system.
Satellites in LEO and MEO can be destroyed with reasonably affordable conventional missiles nowadays, and it's impossible to hide or maneuver satellites in the few minutes it takes a missile to get up, so it doesn't really make sense to expect that any such system will survive long enough to do anything in a hot war scenario.
Hence why nobody really wants to weaponize space, spending money on military systems that have no survivability isn't very attractive.
Maybe you could cite a reference on the costs of these things instead? I'm just saying I don't buy it. They're both extremely expensive, but ICBMs, even accounted per warhead, are more so.
THAAD interceptors look to be ~$100M each from a google search. I remember seeing a leaked document that suggested up to 3 interceptors would be fired at each target to guarantee a kill, but I can't find the document now, sorry.
A Trident-D5 missile is $30M, and can carry up to 14 (small) warheads (which would likely be a mix of larger warheads and penetration aids). Trident is still in production, but note that it's an economical US missile.
So given this very approximate math, ~$2M on offense could soak up ~$300M on defense. The cost comparison would look worse for the defense if you don't assume the (high) cost of a US offensive missile for parity.
Wiki says that $800M gives you a battery of 6 launchers (each equipped with 8 missiles), 2 tactical centers and 1 radar. So the upper bound for one missile is 16M. Still very expensive of course, but not 100M expensive.
Pretty sure that price for D-5 doesn't include the cost of the W-88 warhead. I would assume at a minimum those would be $10M a piece. Still doesn't make it more expensive than THAAD however.
This is hilariously cherry-picked. THAAD is extremely expensive if that's the case. Wikipedia says you can get a Patriot for just $4M. Also SLBM's as actually deployed aren't using maximum MIRV counts, both for treaty and role reasons. Wikipedia says 4 RV's on average for Trident, FWIW. But the big whopper is that you're forgetting to account for the $4B SUBMARINE (just $200M per missile though) required to deploy those missiles in their cost!
Good job though. Honestly the numbers are closer than I'd have expected. But ICBMs remain more expensive.
I chose Trident because I wanted a fair(er) comparison of costs due to purchasing power. If you want to use North Korean ICBM pricing, it's $30M[1]. THAAD is very expensive, that you're right about...but it's also the only interceptor that has a chance of success against an ICBM. Please note as well, trident is typically deployed with far fewer warheads likely among other reasons because it doesn't need to be an interceptor sponge, per its role. If you're North Korea with a small arsenal, every one needs to count against an opponent with THAAD.
Let's go back to first principles. I launch 3 mortor rounds at you. What would you need to do, to be able to detect, intercept and disable said rounds before they reach you? I don't think anybody would say the cost to intercept and disable (whether by blowing up etc) those mortor rounds is even in the order of magnitude the cost of the 3 rounds and the mortor combined.
Developing the capability to make nuclear weapons _at all_ is outrageously expensive, but once you can make one of them you can make hundreds for not significantly more cost, relatively speaking.
No need to mass produce the nukes, dummy payloads will do just fine. A single ICBM could deploy dozens-hundreds of credible looking warheads. These are inherently cheap relative to building independent missile interceptors.
You don't have to fire more ICBMs, you can put more RVs on the same ICBM. (And you don't have to put warheads on all of them).
And remember that acceleration is what costs, not speed. To shoot down an ICBM you need to hit it with a similar mass at a similar speed, and you need to do it in less time (because the ICBM launched first), so your interceptor needs to accelerate harder.
To intercept a missile you need to intercept it - that's it. You don't need to be traveling the same speed, or have the same mass, you just need to be physically where it is at the time it's there.
ICBMs aren't armored - and they can't be. They're spacecraft of a sort, and doing almost any amount of intentional damage will prevent them from functioning. Nuclear warheads are hard to detonate - the behavior if disrupted is the weapon likely goes inert because you've ruined the implosion mirror or timing circuitry.
The problem is that interception is hard because your engagement times are very short, and you're off-trajectory. Initial deviations in your aiming create larger and larger errors at the target, and any sort of maneuverability on the warhead's part means you're unlikely to be able to correct in time - hence the focus on trying to hit missiles in the boost phase, when they're by necessity more predictable.
There's no ICBM by the time any realistic interception scenario takes place. There's a slightly diverging cloud of warheads, chaff, jammers, light (inflatable metallized film) and heavy (small thingies that produce plasma in the higher atmosphere) decoys. The interception of a single target is hard because of what you said, the interception of any realistic salvo is impossible due to the sheer volume of incoming stuff.
Nope, the MIRVing/decoy deployment is done right after the boost phase, that way you need the least fuel to achieve the same target spread. That's some 5 minutes into the flight and mere hundreds of miles from the launch site. If it's Russia you're talking about, the missiles (or rather what's left of them) are still over their territory, some 200km up.
That doesn't sound correct to me. They're both rockets, one is much larger than the other and has a payload (in the case where we're looking at a failure of deterrence) made out outrageously expensive material. I mean, you can construct an argument that one is already built and paid for, or that 70's/80's technology was cheaper inherently, etc...
But from first principles, no. An ICBM is more expensive than an ABM.