So it seems like successfully handling the situation hinges on how much the pilots have abstracted the training vs applying it by rote. This abstract vs rote distinction is a common theme in Westerners looking down on other cultures, so I guess it lines up with the “third world” comments on the situation.
Except in the second crash, as I recall it, the problem was correctly IDed, but manually adjusting the trim was impossible without adding nose down (to unload the control surface). This led the co-pilot to re-enable auto-trim, which re-enabled MCAS, which then drove the plane into the ground.
There may have been a path to saving the aircraft, but it definitely didn't seem at all intuitive. And figuring it out while the plane is actively trying to crash itself is a pretty big ask.
If a successful resolution of the problem depended on pilots making the right abstractions from their training for prior versions, then that would, in itself, establish that it was a serious error to withhold information about how MCAS operated.
