I clicked the link, understood it and have no idea what its relevance is to HTTPS.
OTPs is not going to prevent governments, internet service providers, cafe owners etc from being able to intercept traffic and determine exactly what a user is posting. Which is not something anyone should want from a social network.
The RFC seems to presuppose that there has been an initial trust setup (since it says the the client has a pass-phrase already). How do you setup that that initial pass-phrase without TOFU?
You cannot solve this unless you send a pigeon or trust some higher power.
Certificates are a scam.
My solution which is convoluted and relatively insecure if you have a persistent MITM is to require a password change that you can encrypt with the old password, then the MITM has to remember the old password to know the secret.
But you are right that OTP only are safe after the secret has been shared. Just like all crypto including HTTPS and SSH.
For HTTPS we have setup a infrastructure to solve that. Without similar steps for your OTP solution it will never catch on. Why not advocate for something like DANE if you do not like the current PKI setup?
OTPs is not going to prevent governments, internet service providers, cafe owners etc from being able to intercept traffic and determine exactly what a user is posting. Which is not something anyone should want from a social network.