There was something like this with bonds pre 2008 but it didn’t work out like you suggest.
Rating agencies were, and are, paid by bond issuers are rated a bunch of synthetic real estate backed bonds as very safe. But then on top of that, certain of these bonds were insured—-notably by AIG. However, AIG just rubber stamped the ratings and ended up going bankrupt when the crisis hit.
The real mismatch of incentives is one layer deeper than your comment suggests. An insurance company CEO can do very well for himself underpricing insurance. The business grows as premiums roll in and he collects a bunch of bonuses. When the SHTF he could just resign and collect his golden parachute.
Rating agencies were, and are, paid by bond issuers are rated a bunch of synthetic real estate backed bonds as very safe. But then on top of that, certain of these bonds were insured—-notably by AIG. However, AIG just rubber stamped the ratings and ended up going bankrupt when the crisis hit.
The real mismatch of incentives is one layer deeper than your comment suggests. An insurance company CEO can do very well for himself underpricing insurance. The business grows as premiums roll in and he collects a bunch of bonuses. When the SHTF he could just resign and collect his golden parachute.