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> If you can't say anything about something,

That's the McNamara fallacy, and not what I meant. There is no exam, because you are not testing for specific output. You are testing for the existence of a process. If somebody goes to the effort of putting together an exam that successfully distinguishes, that exam and its expected answers will make their way into the training data, Goodhart's Law will be invoked, and the exam will stop distinguishing what it used to because the computer will have the answer sheet.

There is no exam that can test somebody's emotional state. That doesn't mean emotional states don't exist. If somebody looks sad, they're probably sad (or acting): but the polaroid camera is not sad, simply because it outputs a frowny face. The polaroid camera is not even acting.

> what kind of an answer is an indicator to you?

This will form part of the next model's training data, so I don't want to spell it out. Somebody with a good understanding of orbital mechanics and kinetics (as GPT purportedly has) who modelled the described scenario (as GPT purportedly does) would answer the question differently to someone who just looked at the question's words and performed slightly-more-sophisticated sentiment analysis.




I'm not saying that those things don't exist, but that if you have no tools to measure them, then no practical consequences can follow from you trying to measure them.

I don't see how the McNamara fallacy squares with the empirical scientific process. Perhaps we both misunderstood it, and instead it is about focusing on the wrong metrics.

I got an answer, and it does not take orbital mechanics into account. Am I correct that you assert it that it's incapable of understanding in your sense?


If you ask it about orbital mechanics, it will answer correctly. If you provide it a problem that does not use language associated with orbital mechanics, it will answer without consideration of orbital mechanics. This strongly suggests it is not understanding either the question, or orbital mechanics.

All evidence I've seen is consistent with it understanding neither the question nor its background. If the text seems to invoke orbital mechanics, it will output discussion-of-orbital-mechanics-y text – and if it doesn't, it won't. This is what you would predict from studying the model's architecture, and it's what is observed. (Many people have a different perception, but most of the time I see people raving about how intelligent the system is, they post screenshots, where you can see them feeding it what they're praising a few lines earlier.)

I have yet to see anything that falsifies my "GPT models don't understand anything" hypothesis. (Nothing that stood up to scrutiny, either… I've tricked myself with it a few times.)

> Am I correct that you assert it that it's incapable of understanding in your sense?

I'm not saying it's incapable of understanding. Just that it doesn't understand: I'm neither knowledgeable nor arrogant enough to assert that it could never. I don't think it's likely, though, and I can't imagine a way it could gain that ability from the training process.


Before I answer the rest, could you clarify?

> If you ask it about orbital mechanics, it will answer correctly.

but

> If the text seems to invoke orbital mechanics, it will output discussion-of-orbital-mechanics-y text

Do you mean that if the same problem is asked in a way that invokes orbital mechanics, then the answer will be correct?




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