No – the problem here is really the reverse: they limit the number of devices which can gate access to your account, on the theory that you'll handle a breach by contacting them. That's theoretically more secure but slower.
(Non-root MFA can be reset by another admin or root so this is most of a concern for the root account)
If you haven't dealt with this before, it's not calling support and social-engineering someone into hitting the reset button. The last time I knew someone who had to reset an AWS root account password (broken Yubikey), it required multiple phone calls AWS initiated to the billing & technical contacts (which can only be set by root so an attacker can't easily change them) to confirm intention and then they had to sign a form in front of a notary who checked photo ID.
I classed that as more secure since you can't do it remotely and the in-person portion further increases the difficulty.
You do not have to even talk to AWS to remove the MFA from the root account. You simply need access to the phone number on the account (though there are ways around the phone number, see below) and the email address for the root account.
It's been a little over a year since I've done it but as I recall this is how it goes. You receive an email with a link that takes you to a site that starts a verification process via the phone. You get a number from the site that you are prompted to enter when they call you on the phone. Once that's done you can log into the account with the MFA device and then even remove the MFA device entirely.
The email address I believe can only be changed by AWS (and at least the last time this was an issue for me can't ever be reused for a new AWS account).
The phone number can be changed by anyone with aws-portal:ModifyAccount, which probably means someone with admin access. It is NOT restricted to being modified by the root account.
So if you have a working access to an account with that permission and access to the email you can change the phone number to one you have access to and go through the whole process. Meaning if you have the above permission you really only need access to the email.
Ok, that's not trivial to hack, but it's in no way more secure than accepting a few more backup tokens.
Both email and phone numbers have widely known and exploited vulnerabilities that won't ever be fixed (worse if the phone part is only SMS). Requiring both at the same time is OKish, but not any exemplary security.
It's possible that even though we are not using GovCloud they had additional precautions enabled for us (this was a few years back). My coworker vividly remembers having to wait for the notary to show up.
(Non-root MFA can be reset by another admin or root so this is most of a concern for the root account)