That's a very interesting observation: Clubhouse's valuation had already peaked before they finally decided to let a tsunami of Android users on in 5/2021; the 3/2021 Davison quote below pretty much says as much in coded language, that it wasn't a priority and tries to blame it on discovery/UX/engineering. In any case by then, they had walked away from Twitter's $4bn offer, and Twitter was bringing up Spaces rapidly. Also, by then the world was planning for post-Covid reentry. So, from then on the valuation was going south, and the elite userbase was inevitably going to leave. (Anyone got some numbers on Customer Lifetime Value, by segment? What happens to your valuation when the 10% of users with highest CLV leaves? How much lower is the CLV of non-US-based Android users?)
I find the OP's "25 Lessons Learned" is kind of a smokescreen that covers all earthly eventualities other than meteors and solar flares, and I can't see which of the 25 are the primary excuse for not deploying Android and scaling up the platform engineering in 5/2021 when they urgently needed to. Should have just sold out to Twitter unless they had a rock-solid plan to execute that in 2021. Consider that $4b would have been 13% of TWTR's valuation today. (How much of Twitter's bid would have been cash?)
See their trail of statements [1]: [1/2021 said “soon, but no definite timeline”. Instead, most of [Clubhouse's] statements about Android have been vague mentions of the importance of supporting the Android user base and making its app more accessible to a wider audience.... co-founder Davison explained the company’s approach to scaling to a larger market — like one where Android users participate — as an effort that requires a slower pace, when it comes to opening up access to more users. He noted that when Clubhouse grows, the discovery experience inside the app can be negatively impacted as a result. Users today are seeing more foreign language groups in their feeds, for instance, and are having a harder time finding friends and some of the best content, he said. [blaming the lack of selectivity on engineering and UX isn't credible]
I find the OP's "25 Lessons Learned" is kind of a smokescreen that covers all earthly eventualities other than meteors and solar flares, and I can't see which of the 25 are the primary excuse for not deploying Android and scaling up the platform engineering in 5/2021 when they urgently needed to. Should have just sold out to Twitter unless they had a rock-solid plan to execute that in 2021. Consider that $4b would have been 13% of TWTR's valuation today. (How much of Twitter's bid would have been cash?)
See their trail of statements [1]: [1/2021 said “soon, but no definite timeline”. Instead, most of [Clubhouse's] statements about Android have been vague mentions of the importance of supporting the Android user base and making its app more accessible to a wider audience.... co-founder Davison explained the company’s approach to scaling to a larger market — like one where Android users participate — as an effort that requires a slower pace, when it comes to opening up access to more users. He noted that when Clubhouse grows, the discovery experience inside the app can be negatively impacted as a result. Users today are seeing more foreign language groups in their feeds, for instance, and are having a harder time finding friends and some of the best content, he said. [blaming the lack of selectivity on engineering and UX isn't credible]
[1] https://techcrunch.com/2021/03/22/clubhouse-says-its-android...