How does that help you when any of your inputs' digest is not related to any other's, not even knowing the target length of the original message? what am i missing?
The correct password is impossible to calculate from the given data, but it seems like it should be possible to check whether a password matches the data.
The thing is you don't know the length of the password. It could be more than the number of hydrogen atoms in the universe, or 12. You still have to brute force or look up one possible solution (or collision thereof).
The whole thing just shows that a hash makes ZERO applicable inferable assertions about the message (password).
Thats the definition of evenly distributed hashing functions: change anything in the message, including length, and there will be no identifiable relation between the hashes of one messsage and the next you try,
I think for something this checking the source for the generation algorithm is fair game. here it is:
function randomInt(n) {
return Math.floor(Math.random() * n);
}
function randomPassword() {
let letters = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';
let digits = '0123456789';
let punctuation = '!"#$%&\'()\*+,-./:;<=>?@[\\]^_`{|}~';
let s = letters.repeat(7) + digits.repeat(4) + punctuation.repeat(3);
let length = 14;
let res = Array.from({length}, (() =>
s[randomInt(s.length)])).join('');
return res;
}
looks like it's 14 characters long, and each character has an independent 72.8% / 8% / 19.2% chance of being a random letter / digit / punctuation. There are 94 symbols total, so 94^14 possible solutions; roughly 92 bits of entropy. Even if you assume 10 letters, 1 digit, 3 punctuations (the "likely" distribution) it's still 75 bits of entropy. You might be able to gain an advantage through knowledge of the PRNG state, but the PRNG in v8 (xorshift128+) has a period of 2^128 - 1.
The digest is 64 characters long, so on average you should get 4 positions where your guess and the digest are the same, which would narrow it down to (1/16)*4 of the possibilities, corresponding to "peeling off" 16 bits of entropy.
Figuring out how to enumerate only those values which generate a hex digest that matches the known characters in the hash is left as an exercise for the reader.
You may be trolling, but that "exercise for the reader" does not have a known solution. Anyone who found one may wish to keep it secret to get rich on Bitcoin mining...
There are two layers of entropy in what I'm looking at, but I only got like two hours of sleep last night.
There's the entropy of the password from which the hash is generated, which is clearly what you're addressing.
But in the game I'm seeing, the hash itself is unknown but the game gives you feedback on the contents. So pinning characters of the hash cuts down on that search space. Then there's still the matter of finding a plaintext that hashes to that value, which as you've said should evade this sort of analysis.
He didn't say you could "pin" the hash. He said you could eliminate all hashes, that don't contain the positions known, and just enumerate those which contain the known positions (perhaps by bruteforce), therefore reducing the search-space. It'd still be ridiculously expensive, of course (as in, implausible to compute in this universe). Unless I'm misunderstanding something here.
> Figuring out how to enumerate only those values which generate a hex digest that matches the known characters in the hash is left as an exercise for the reader.
It's always bothered me that the standard security jargon for an oracle for some information is to call it "enumeration". Will your service confirm whether or not a particular email address is associated with a current account? User enumeration!
In my view, it's only enumeration if I can make the service give me the email address without me having to know the address independently. :/
Not necessarily. The hash could have been generated with something other than javascript.
In fact because functions like sha256 are iterative it's possible to hash a password which is longer than the RAM in a system. Technically possible to hash a password which is longer than storage in a system too, if you don't care about storing the password.
Probably not. The point of a cryptographic hash function is to be resistant to analysis.
Can we prove it has the much simpler property that toggling one bit of the input will, on average, toggle half of the bits in the output? (Probably not.)
If you calculate a billion sha256 hashes and look at the results you'll have an even enough distribution to say it's proven, but, it's not "mathematically" proven.
I mean, anything past 256 bits is going to have a collision, so that doesn't matter, but you're right that the entire point of a hash is that even if you know the hash, it's very very hard to find what the plaintext is.
There are a number of reversible hash algos. The point of hash is that the small changes in the input produce big changes in the output so even a 1-bit change to the input produces a completely different output. Some hash algos having trap door functionality is really more of a bonus.
You can only reverse your hash function, if you output is at least as long as your input.
The kind of function you describe is useful, too, of course. You can build something like them out of almost any modern encryption method:
Encryption methods have to be reversible, so you can decrypt; and they are expected not to betray anything about their inputs, so there are probably some that have this avalanche property, or can be patched to have it fairly simply.
It's true that any input length larger than 256 bits will exhibit a collision. It isn't true that it will necessarily exhibit every possible output. Maybe there's an output value that is only available for ridiculously large input.
Yes, that's possible in general. Though fairly unlikely, if the hash was 'random'.
We know the structure of SHA256, so we could actually answer that question.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preimage_attack says that pre-image attacks on hash function in general only take 2^n time (ie you don't need to look for passwords longer than 256 bits), but I don't see how they conclude that.
Who said they hashed it? The correct answer is a 256-bit value, and you're trying to guess any string that hashes to that value. Nothing requires that OP generated that value by hashing a string though...
> Not very likely, since the OP wouldn’t be able to hash it.
Not necessarily. OP might have found the answer with a mathematical short-cut.
To give a really silly example: suppose my hash function just returns the length of the input string. (That's what PHP used to do for hashing at some point.)
I could tell you what my hash of a really big number is, without needing to be able to write that number down. And no shorter number would have the same hash.
SHA256 might have a similar exploit. (Though as you say finding such a shortcut in SHA256 would be much more awesome than Passwordle.)
> It could be more than the number of hydrogen atoms in the universe, or 12.
Doesn't matter. You don't really have to look at passwords longer than 256 bits, because above that you'll have guaranteed collisions.
(The exact math is a bit more complicated, because there might be so many collisions in the first 256 bits, that there are strings longer than 256 bits that produce hashes that haven't been hit before.
But the order of magnitude of 256 bits is about right.)
function randomPassword() {
let letters = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';
let digits = '0123456789';
let punctuation = '!"#$%&\'()\*+,-./:;<=>?@[\\]^_`{|}~';
let s = letters.repeat(7) + digits.repeat(4) + punctuation.repeat(3);
let length = 14;
let res = Array.from({length}, (() => s[randomInt(s.length)])).join('');
debugger; // どうぞ
return res;
}
