For those who haven't seen it, Ars had a fascinating incredibly in-depth "What If" article years ago exploring what might have happened if the damage to Columbia had been noticed in time and it had been determined that reentry was non-survivable so a rescue had to be attempted, "The audacious rescue plan that might have saved space shuttle Columbia":
It would have been barely on the brink of possible, but with huge risks of its own. Going through the exercise though reveals a lot of details of the shuttle, being in orbit, and our capabilities at the time. It's been discussed a few times over the years on HN, the biggest one being 8 years ago when it was first published [0], but seems timely along with this article.
I'm very glad though going forward that entire class of failure modes is gone for good and that particular possibility for heroics will not be needed. Side mounting the shuttle was always one of the worst design choices amongst many, many bad decisions that went into the STS. Also created one of the worst launch abort profiles of any system ever. Nobody will do that again though.
"Contrary to popular belief, the heat a spacecraft faces on reentry isn't generated by simple friction but rather by ram pressure—the fast-moving shuttle compresses the air in front of it, forming a massive shock zone in which air molecules ionize and break apart."
Finally! Even Arthur C Clarke wrote in one of his novels that it was friction.
I'm also amazed that the shuttle could not be landed by remote control because of a couple switches.
In fact, the heating is produced by the gas going through a shock. This isn't heating by compression. Adiabatic compression is a reversible process; going through a shock is irreversible. Entropy is generated at the shock.
In more detail: at the shock, the conditions of the gas change over a distance on the order of a mean free path. This means that, locally, the gas is out of thermodynamic equilibrium, with fast molecules running into slow ones. The extremely high gradient of gas conditions causes extremely rapid relaxation to an equilibrium state, a process that very rapidly produces entropy.
As Mach number increases, the density jump across the shock approaches an asymptotic limit, but the heating increases without bound.
As you compress a gas, its temperature rises. The air at the leading edge of the machine is static, meaning its compressed. (This is how pitot tubes measure airspeed - they are simply pressure sensors.)
The temperature rise from the compression matches what one predicts from PV=NkT
A shock wave is unnecessary. It happens with subsonic flow, too. In fact, it's how refrigerators work.
(In ME101 Fluid Mechanics, the Prof showed how a re-entering satellite would melt even if the atmosphere was a frictionless gas.)
> The temperature rise from the compression matches what one predicts from PV=NkT
That's a null statement, since that holds for any (ideal) gas regardless of how it got into its current state.
If you mean, the temperature rise is the same as if it were adiabatically compressed to the density or pressure the gas has after the shock, then that is not true.
If you compress a gas, even an ideal frictionless gas, its temperature rises. Like I said, that's how refrigerators work. As for compression in flight, that's how pitot tubes measure airspeed. It has nothing to do with friction.
On a wing, the temperature rise is highest at the static point on the leading edge, where there is no motion of the air. The temperature declines from there back as the airflow speeds up. If friction was the source of the heat, you'd expect the temperature to be the lowest at the static point, and would increase towards the trailing edge.
BTW, how a diesel engine works is by compressing the air/fuel mixture until it heats up enough to ignite. A gas engine will sometimes "diesel" on after the ignition is turned off.
The point I am making is that gas going through a shock is a fundamentally different process than a gas being adiabatically compressed. The former causes an increase in entropy; the latter ideally does not. While a shock isn't "friction" per se, like friction there is dissipation (and at entry speeds, quite a lot of dissipation).
The paper does talk about heat from friction, but not at the stagnation point. It also talks about the heating of the surface being less than predicted by adiabatic compression, but that is the heating of the surface, not the heating of the air at the stagnation point.
I have argued with @pfdietz about this before. In the zeal to make the point the majority of leading edge heating arises from the dissipative effects of shocks, they make statements that have to be very carefully parsed to be correct.
You are right. Isentropic compression will result in a higher temperature of the compressed fluid. This is undergraduate gasdynamics. In these supersonic flowfields with high shock strength though, the shock acts as a very dissipative compression mechanism. Behind the shock is a compressed fluid that is much hotter than it would be if compressed to the same pressure isentropically. Shocks are dissipative, like friction, but shocks and friction are not the same thing.
So unless you remove heat from a perfect compressible fluid being compressed (i.e., via a non-adiabatic process), it will always be hotter post-compression. It's just that the compression and heating that shocks effect causes much greater heating than the isentropic case.
In what we call "acreage" where the forward-facing area is limited (e.g., upper surfaces of wings and vehicle bodies), other effects, including turbulent skin friction heating, can dominate the local heating rate.
That paper doesn't appear to have much to do with what we're talking about here. The transfer of heat to the vehicle from the hot shocked gas is another issue entirely.
Anyway, it's foundational supersonic fluid physics that shocks create entropy.
Reentry with blunt bodies works because most of the dissipation is occurring at the shock, at some distance away from the vehicle, allowing most of the heat (that must be produced from the kinetic energy of the vehicle as it slows) to be carried away.
Eh, this is a bit of a sophomoric “aha” and “ram pressure” really isn’t anything you’d find in modern aerodynamics describing atmospheric reentry or hypersonics in general.
“Friction” is fine. What’s actually going on is quite complicated and several things at once, not at all reflected by a “well actually it’s this not that”.
We could teach a little course on hypersonics, but meh.
> I'm also amazed that the shuttle could not be landed by remote control because of a couple switches.
A deliberate, but dubious decision. Deploying the gear before it's time is guaranteed catastrophe-- they decided it was important to not leave this under software control.
An independent "arm" switch is a reasonable solution. I'd want to be able to bring the crew back if they were incapacitated, sick, etc. Or even just bring the shuttle back so what went wrong can be determined.
I've seen many offhand accounts that repair would have been impossible or nearly so. Yet a previous shuttle survive re-entry with a missing tile in part, it seems, due to a metal bracket being in place behind the missing tile and it did a good enough job.
So given that, would it have been impossible to space walk around the shuttle, identify missing/damaged tiles and shove some spare material in gaps? Could the shuttle crew have not carried epoxies designed for this purpose? Obviously it would be a repair that might not work, but at least give you a chance.
I think about this now as well when I see Starship tests that knock tiles off of it's heat shield just from vibrations.
A tile on the flat bottom of the orbiter had a much lower thermal loading than the carbon-carbon leading surfaces of the wings. That's why they used carbon-carbon there.
I wonder about this too. Instead of a rescue mission, which would have been extremely difficult and risky, as the article well shows, could NASA have come up with a repair procedure?
Maybe it was completely impossible, but the topic is not even discussed.
I wonder about the various kinds of "improvised repair" things speculated about in the CAIB report. (Jettison cargo to lower thermal loading, packing wing with ice and metal and smoothing geometry).
Columbia made it through almost the entire time of peak heating without a repair. This doesn't mean that a repair would be successful to get all the way to the ground, but it sure seems like it could be extended significantly longer.
The account is still very hard for me to read even so many years after the events. That was one of the few events that caused me to weep as an adult. Space exploration is a combination of curiosity, scientific venture, and boldness that, to me, represent the best of humanity. That day felt like a dream being crushed and watching our heroes die.
Something I wonder: How far we are from having sensor density somewhat similar to the humans skin sensory?
Would it be possible to have an autonomous sensor on each termal tile that reports its integrity and the heat/pressure instead of relaying on inspections?
Feeling pain is obviously very useful to us, it's pretty much the primary mechanism of detecting issues, the limits and taking care of our bodies.
I suspect, maybe it can be possible to have a wireless sensors that function by RF(a nearby source that powers the sensors) or being powered by something like the heat gradient/MEMS that charges and stores energy from the movements.
If you have some time, and are interested in engineering, troubleshooting, investigation techniques, complex systems, or just general meticulous care, it’s worth reading the Columbia Accident Investigation Baord report (Volume 1). It’s a masterpiece and I have read it at least twice.
I will never forget that day. It was Saturday morning, around 8:00am CST, and my wife and I were laying in bed, I was barely awake. We were living in East Texas at the time. It was the loudest 'boom' I've ever heard, and it shook the house a bit.
As an engineer, I'm very interested in details of the fixes that went into the Apollo capsule as a direct result of the tragic Apollo 1 fire. It was about a year of re-engineering of it, and the accounts I've seen only dedicate a few sentences to it. Mainly changing the hatch design and not using 100% oxygen anymore.
IIRC they continued to use 100% oxygen in space. O2 N2 mix on the ground at above sea-level pressure, replaced with 100% at low pressure in space (5PSI). Thereby mitigating the need for N2 tanks and associated equipment, and also mitigating the fire risk on the ground when above ambient pressures were required in the spacecraft.
After Apollo they moved away from 100% O2, I think the ISS has a similar composition and pressure to terrestrial atmosphere.
The EVA suits continue to operate on only oxygen though, which makes sense given that internal suit pressure is a major challenge for manoeuvrability as was famously demonstrated by Alexei Leonov during the first spacewalk. This does mean that astronauts spacewalking from the ISS need to prebreath pure O2 to purge nitrogen for preventing the bends, a detail that was captured in the Netflix SciFi film Stowaway.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0FKxM-zNZBk adam savage talks a lot about it during this video, but yes, bending a baloon is a good example. A better one might be a fully inflated inner tube or filled camelback.
Great point. I've read a lot about Apollo over the years and outside of the changes you mention, the most detailed thing I remember was basically "every aspect of the program looked at what they were doing and made whatever improvements they deemed important to do".
One of my NASA books talks a bit about things they did.
A lot of it was to replace flammable materials with less flammable ones. I think they replaced the insulation on all the wiring from PVC to fluoropolymer. Changed the design of the connections so there was no exposed bare wire. They redesigned the flight suits which were made partly of rubber.
They changed the life support to keep the partial pressure of oxygen constant. So 21% on the ground constantly adjusted to 100% as they went up. For weight reasons the command module designed 5 psi or some such. So that's what they had to do.
Regarding using pure oxyge , NASA decided to continue use it after Apollo 1 fire. Apparently, to reduce weight: [0]. There were however other decisions to change materials used inside the capsule.
The account completely omits that people were calling, while it was still in orbit, for the NSA to point one of its telescopes to get a shot of the bottom so they could inspect it. And, it omits the refusal to allow this to be done, for reasons never revealed.
It’s really bizarre to me that the conversation devolved into arguing over whether people could lock the doors when a program and 7 people literally went up in smoke. As others have said, why or even how would this have even come up? The screening process would have weeded non-committed people out long before. And the men and women in that room were as gung ho as the people strapping the rocket on.
It’s a procedure they probably rehearsed but not one they had to execute in real life. And their colleagues just died, so tremendous stress, shock, and having to execute this exceptional checklist.
Well, I'm sure it's more than "been practiced". They lost two shuttles as I recall, one Apollo on the pad and it might have occurred during Apollo 13 until they had a handle on things. Risky business lighting candles...
Well Challenger was in 1986 and that's 17 years prior. I don't think I can recall the training materials from 5 years ago, but after 17 years things would definitely get fuzzy, especially during that kind of event.
People do weird things during a genuine crisis. I think I’m this case it was just about ensuring that everything that needed to be preserved for a complete investigation would be preserved without the possibility that data was omitted or destroyed, either intentionally or inadvertently.
I was always curious to know about the org/cultural evolution aspect of this problem at NASA, and I was also reminded of it when the 737 MAX issue happened.
As an organization starts to drift from its engineering origins and management gets populated with people who -- either because of increasing emphasis on management versus technical knowledge skills, and/or requirements to spend time on communicating versus building -- are making judgement calls far from the "detail level", is this problem bound to arise?
How does an organization incentivize its people and structure to keep on making the "right" calls?
*What I'm pointing out here is the terrible realization afterwards that the managers of the program were told about the potential damage to the orbiter, but actively denied requests from the engineering org to get help to image/diagnose/potentially repair the damage or come up with mitigations.
And, it still goes on, now about SLS. E.g., inventing a space station in a weird orbit around the moon, completely useless as a staging point to land, just because it is a place SLS would be able to get to. And, continuing development after it is obvious it will be obsoleted by Superheavy/Starship.
And even in promoting Mars colonization at SpaceX, where people insist that apparatus at Mars would plausibly have some useful role as a staging point for trips beyond Mars.
Moreso, that putting cans on Mars would make us "multiplanetary" in any meaningful sense, as if cans on Mars would help any if Earth got blasted. And, that it is actually going to happen at all, and won't go the way of self-driving Teslas, underground evacuated-tunnel trains, and that cave submarine.
What are the odds people who paid for self-driving will ever get a refund?
I'm a huge fan of Musk's engineering work, but comparing the American pioneers to early Martian settlers is naive at best.
Humans have evolved on Earth. Even the least habitable place on Earth (e.g. Antarctica) is paradise in comparison to Mars. Mars settlement using current technology is an intractable problem.
Musk is selling his vision as an aspirational goal, not something achievable in his (or any of our) lifetimes. He knows better than anyone that a planet without a magnetosphere, fertile soil or a breathable atmosphere (just to name a few) is a death trap for humanity. But he has made it his life purpose to get the ball rolling.
If we look at the goal of colonizing our solar system rationally, a far more optimal strategy is robotic colonization. Advances in AI are now making it possible to fundamentally change how manufacturing is done via robotics. Once this happens, Mars colonization becomes far more feasible. Musk knows this, hence his pivot of Tesla from cars to robotics. The idea of sending people onto a hostile planet, where they then build a colony is archaic. People will arrive once the colony is fully built and operational.
The state of robotics today is very, very far from anything that could construct a Mars colony without people there making it all happen. Even with people there, a self-sufficient Mars colony is far beyond our capacity today.
Even a self-sufficient colony in the middle of the Sahara Desert, constructed all hands-on, is out of reach.
I will believe a Mars colony could be self-sustaining if the colonists, before they leave for Mars, by themselves build all the equipment they will have on Mars, including a copy of the equipment they need to do that building.
> How does an organization incentivize its people and structure to keep on making the "right" calls?
It basically may be impossible. Sure, officially, no doubt they would say anyone can speak up, raise the alarm, etc. However there are usually overriding contradicting incentives. “You slipped on the schedule”, “Creating trouble and making our department look bad”, “So and so raised concerns and got passed up for promotions… that’s not happening to me, no way”.
Though a lot of what say is reasonable, it's of interesting note that NASA has had this issue basically since day 1. Many of these causes boil down to the same issues that caused the devastating Apollo 1 fire.
They probably didn't suffer much. The investigation after the disaster found that none of the astronauts had sealed their helmets on re-entry and some weren't wearing their gloves. They would have passed out in seconds when the shuttle lost pressure.
The launch and re-entry suits for the space shuttle crews were derived from the pressure suits the SR-71 and U-2 pilots wore. One pilot actually managed to survive the breakup of an SR-71 traveling at Mach 3 at 85,000 ft, although the suit was shredded when the pilot regained consciousness. The shuttle was traveling at Mach 18 at 200,000 ft when it broke up, so surviving the breakup would have been next to impossible anyhow.
I think being on Challenger would have probably been worse. When the crew cabin was found, some of the emergency air tanks that have to be activated manually were found activated. It's possible the shock of the explosion activated them, but it's also equally possible that at least some of the astronauts remained conscious through the breakup and didn't die until the cabin hit the water...
If they had not died from hypoxia, the accelerations as the crew compartment tumbled would have battered them to death. They were dead by the time the crew compartment itself came apart. And then the forces of the hypersonic airstream dismembered the bodies.
"Still, your face is young, as we feel our weight return..."
Incredible song. I stumbled across it when I decided to try The Long Winters after hearing John Roderick on a podcast. Even after several listens it's capable of producing chills and tears, when it lines up with my mood.
You beat me to it. A deeply moving song from the perspective of the crew. And please don't miss the lovely [Song Exploder episode](https://songexploder.net/the-long-winters) about the song with John Roderick, it's really stuck with me.
Astronauts are not just thrown in box and launched to space. The current practice is that an astronaut gets assigned to the project way before the spacecraft in question is ready and they participate in the engineering process. They are obviously consulted on aspects of operations and crew interfaces. They work together with the other engineers to write the manuals and checklists. Of course they can and do raise their own questions about subsystems too.
Their role is similar to test pilots because well that is what they are.
This will hopefully change as space flight becomes more routine. And then astronauts role will become more of what a pilot does. How do we make sure that pilots are reasonably informed? We can show them accident statistics, and through their training we explain the high level operation of the various subsystems of their craft and the role of various actors in flight safety. (Maintenance, ATC, management, the flight attendants, FFA)
If you’re an astronaut, it’s your responsibility to make sure you’re adequately informed, and you are sure to be able to do that, nobody needs to protect you.
But it is. Of course the astronaut can’t check let’s say every possible screws are properly tightened, but no single human can. So what can an astronaut do who is concerned about screws comming loose do? They go to the engineers who designed the craft and ask them. The engineers show them the various calculations and work documents showing how they sized the screws and how they calculated the appropriate torque they should be tightened to and why they think they won’t come loose. The engineers would also tell the astronauts that they specified twist wire as an additional safety mechanism on top of all of that.
And then the astronaut can head to the head mechanic who leads the assembly process and ask them how do they know that the screws are torqued right. They would show them the training the technicians receive, the tools they employ and the QA processes they have in place.
After that the astronaut can spot check a few areas.
Of course they won’t do all of this with all of the systems and processes, but they can do enough to satisfy themselves that the place has the right processes in place to their liking.
If the engineers don’t care about the screws, if the chief of technicians can’t find the calibration paper of the torque wrenches and if they find a passed out drunk technician behind a panel and rattling screws then the astronaut knows they are in trouble.
I'm glad you put the 2020 in the title, but I don't think it's necessary - this kind of story is timeless. Mark your calendar, next year will be the 20th anniversary of this tragedy.
The relevant categories are not civilians and non-civilians but public officials and ordinary people. Public officials often have powers and duties that go beyond those of ordinary people, and police officers are simply one special case of that.
Also, in jobs where people's lives are at stake, there are often situations where you may commit a crime by refusing to do your job properly. If a lockdown has been ordered, it's plausible that the situation is like that, and any official with police-like powers can reasonably stop anyone trying to leave. Especially if the person trying to leave is also a public official.
You seem to be confused about what civilian means in a federal context.
Federal civilian is still federal and is a different world from your typical civilian private sector corporation.
Yes, one or more people on the property are certain to have the power to prompt a security lock-down. They're also federal employees, not merely civilians. Someone in the chain of command can request that federal security officers secure the building/property as the scene of an ongoing crime or accident.
They also employ armed security officers that can legally kill you if you're a threat. They can definitely secure the property during a potential crime or accident.
You're dropping context. I said: if you're a threat; the implied there is obvious: if you have a gun, knife, or similar weapon and pose an imminent danger in that regard.
Lethal force wouldn't be necessary in most circumstances to protect evidence unless the fleeing party is engaging in the use of lethal force. They can use force to protect government property, yes. Although most federal security officers aren't supposed to use firearms to attempt to disable vehicles.
It's relevant as an indication of the extent of their power on federal property, which you don't seem to understand at all.
You confused their security aparatus as being akin to private civilian security guards at a convenience store in regards to their power to detain / arrest / use force. For some reason you clearly thought "civilian" was similar to the context of a private corporation and didn't understand what federal powers would exist in that situation and on that property.
Define offense. Someone suggested it has to be criminal, but does it actually say that somewhere. Does disobeying an order to secure the room constitute an offense against NASA? Depending on the meaning of that word, it could certainly be interpreted that way, in which case arrest is a real possibility.
My guess is they'd arrest anyone who tried, and apologize later if someone proved that they shouldn't have done it. And nobody would actually be punished for the incorrect arrest.
Robert Frost, Instructor and Flight Controller at NASA:
> If you are referring to the call from the Flight Director: “GC, Lock the doors” that is a command that initiates the contingency response to a significant incident, such as the loss of a vehicle. It begins a FREEZE, ISOLATE, AND PROTECT process. The Flight Director would follow up that statement with a call to the team to immediately pull out the contingency section of the Flight Control Operations Handbook to identify specific actions that are to be taken.
> Access to the facility becomes restricted. People that weren’t in the room at the time or aren’t essential to the next steps are not allowed access and the people in the room are restricted from leaving. Communication in and out of the room is restricted. Usage of all devices, both workstations and personal, is restricted. The team is hands-off. Nothing should be done that changes the configuration at the time of the incident. Those are the freeze and isolate steps. Next comes protect. All of the data that was in use must be captured, recorded, and preserved in a static state. Even the trash cans have to be preserved in their state. All of this is because any investigation into the incident will require all of this data.
> Once given permission, the occupants of the room may continue to capture their observations and actions in their console logs.
> It is important to keep the equipment, documentation, and people in a pristine state until it all has been preserved. We don’t want any form of contamination that could be caused by someone bringing in data that wasn’t in the room during the incident into the room or removing data. We don’t want the team’s observation and recording of those observations influenced by communication with people that weren’t there.
> All of the data will be collected and put into secure data containers and taken to a secure vault. Debriefing of the team may then be performed and once a response team has been formed and has begun their work, the Flight Director may release the team.
Yes, and it’s worth pointing out that there had been previous NASA experience with loss of craft and loss of life, so the contingency plan was very real.
You probably aren't actually legally prohibited from leaving. But anyone in the command room leaving after such order is literally unthinkable. This conversation is just weird to me. To earn a spot in that room you absolutely must understand the importance of your job and your place in it, if an order is to stay in and document everything....that's what you do. Whether you could be legally prevented from leaving or not is literally irelevant, outside of some purely academic discussion that is completely pointless.
Agreed--I don't see how someone who has deeply imbibed a serious culture could wonder this. To try to leave on a technicality would be hugely embarrassing and forever mark that person as untrustworthy. Everyone in that room was eager to contribute to the success of future missions and reputation of NASA by making the disaster analysis as thorough and accurate as possible.
Yes, NASA's security officers can legally physically prevent you from leaving. Congress has granted them that power.
Go on law.cornell.edu and dig through the vast provisions of federal security officer power as it pertains to arrest, detainment, use of deadly force, etc.
The first reference ("Arrest authority") clearly states that to arrest someone, a NASA security officer (like any law enforcement officer) needs to have seen them commit an offense (crime). Unless you can point to a federal law that says deserting a civilian post at NASA is a federal offense, there would be no authority to arrest someone who does so. The worst you could do is fire them. (The most credible sounding crime I can think of that might apply here could be something like "obstructing a federal investigation".)
(3) The arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States.
Therefore, if you try to leave after being ordered to stay, during a crisis situation, without a valid reason, you should expect to be arrested and further dealt with.
What federal law says that leaving Mission Control during a crisis is a felony? What law says that you must do what your boss tells you? Law enforcement officers have to enforce laws. They don't just get to decide that people should act in a particular way.
I don't suppose "leaving mission control" in contravention of an order to stay during a crisis is, in and of itself, a felony.
What you're likely to find is an issue is that the security guards at NASA can arrest, if the links above are correct, and you're likely to fund yourself in a predicament if you try to leave and they don't want you to.
I'd imagine working at NASA, and at least some other space launch companies, especially those that provided services to government and defence agencies, come with additional conditions beyond what one might expect stacking shelves at a supermarket.
Being told "you're not free to leave" is rightfully worrying to a lot of people. There are countries where hearing that would be terrifying. What makes the US different is the rule of law, due process, and individual liberties. Asking on what authority the government has to detain you should never be karmic suicide. There are many places where asking that question is truly unthinkable, and they're not places you want to live.
>>What makes the US different is the rule of law, due process, and individual liberties
That reads like complete sarcasm to me.
Anyway, like I said - to me this is on the same level as someone asking if an astronaut on the ISS is "free to leave" and how is this not a citizen's arrest and how somehow this constitutes an abuse of liberties.
This doesn't read like a serious question - more like something a very edgy 14 year old would ask and feel clever.
> Is there some special legislation for it? A citizen's arrest requires an actual crime being observed.
Being prohibited from leaving on pain of adverse employment action is not arrest, and does not require a crime. (That being said, I wouldn't be surprised if NASA did have special statutory authority for more binding orders related to spaceflight related emergency situations, not that they would be likely to need either those or even employment sanctions to secure compliance with control room staff staying put while trying to resolve an emergency incident.)
The possible crime observed was the destruction of a very expensive spacecraft and the deaths of 7 people. One of the reasons to preserve all evidence is to discover if there was any malfeasance somehow involved, however unlikely. Some of the decisions made by NASA management leading up to the Challenger disaster amounted to willful negligence. None of this happened in the control room, but it's possible some logbook documented some communication on a decision from someone that would be relevant to an investigation.
Normally you need to have an honest belief that an individual committed a specific crime in order to be able to detain them, not just that you're aware something happened and someone may be involved.
I think it is a good thing that our legal system can differentiate restraining a person for a temporary stay due to process or safety concerns and arrest. This is very different from the police arresting someone.
When it comes to leaving secure sites you can often be restrained to prevent you from smuggling out sensitive materials which is quite sane and necessary in a number of situations. There are also a plethora of public sites (i.e. government run) that non-enlisted citizens are barred from entering - though that is a bit of a different situation.
The feds have their own security officers that have the authority to detain or arrest on federal property. They have vast Congressionally granted authority to detain or arrest as necessary.
It covers things like assault, resisting, impeding, damage, theft, sabotage, forging, impersonation, destruction of vehicles or other property, communications, explosives, civil disorder and a dozen other categories with sub categories.
They'd easily get you on numerous federal charges if you attempted to flee.
They'll stand in your way. You will stop. Or, you will push past, in which case they will arrest you for interfering with police, or something along those lines.
I assume it's just an implied "if you leave here, your career in spaceflight is over, and you'll probably make the evening news (in a bad way) for doing it." The news coverage will be all about the loss AND the guy who left the secured room afterwards. I bet it was never seriously considered what would happen if anyone disobeyed because it is unthinkable.
It's actually an interesting question to wonder at the legal mechanics behind this.
Apparently it's fashionable to make it look like HN has such a collective boner for "professional integrity" that even asking this question is treated like an insult and downvoted. Repugnant.
Because the question is being asked as if they are being detained because of some wrongdoing whereas the lockdown is to preserve, capture and record everything as is for future investigation of the incident.
It's interesting though the language you choose to use to deride the commenters explaining why the lockdown happens.
Press ideates as "mask the truth" where unauthorised covers all contingencies including nutcase pizzagate conspiracy hunters, Walter Mitty types and "cleaner unplugged the data rack power" fuckups.
It isn't driven to keep the press out. If any benefit its a side benefit and I observe a metric French tonne of press is locked inside the room(s) at that point.
You always have the power to try to not do what somebody tells you to, regardless of their authority.
The actual question is “or what?” Well if you really were there and really did try to disobey that order, you’d definitely be putting your job at risk, unlikely to be breaking any laws, probably risking a physical convention with whoever kept the keys… but it comes down to why… if you really wanted to leave and had a good reason, would someone have let you? I’m guessing probably, but i really doubt you would have that reason or even tried to test the legal authority of people giving that order. Your whole job is to be in that room and something terrible happened, what circumstances would make you want to leave or test the “ you can’t make me” theory.
They're also preserving evidence for the purposes of investigating the deaths of the astronauts; there is a possibility that some controller who'd made a mistake would try to abscond with, or destroy evidence.
Yeah I get why they want to do it, just curious about the legal mechanism. Normally without police powers you can't detain someone unless you're positive they specifically committed an actual crime, not just because you think they were involved in an incident.
https://arstechnica.com/science/2016/02/the-audacious-rescue...
It would have been barely on the brink of possible, but with huge risks of its own. Going through the exercise though reveals a lot of details of the shuttle, being in orbit, and our capabilities at the time. It's been discussed a few times over the years on HN, the biggest one being 8 years ago when it was first published [0], but seems timely along with this article.
I'm very glad though going forward that entire class of failure modes is gone for good and that particular possibility for heroics will not be needed. Side mounting the shuttle was always one of the worst design choices amongst many, many bad decisions that went into the STS. Also created one of the worst launch abort profiles of any system ever. Nobody will do that again though.
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0: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7305224