It happened multiple times. It is not a lie, no matter how much the US state department tries to double down on the amnesia.
>The former idea about “closer to the Soviet borders” is written down not in treaties but in multiple memoranda of conversation between the Soviets and the highest-level Western interlocutors (Genscher, Kohl, Baker, Gates, Bush, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Major, Woerner, and others) offering assurances throughout 1990 and into 1991 about protecting Soviet security interests and including the USSR in new European security structures. The two issues were related but not the same. Subsequent analysis sometimes conflated the two and argued that the discussion did not involve all of Europe. The documents published below show clearly that it did.
Russia has publicly expressed regret that it did not get the wording in a treaty though it holds to the idea that assurances made outside of a legal framework are not worthless, whereas to an American legalistic mind it appears, they are.
Probably it would have made no difference anyway. There's no independent court of international law to adjudicate. Treaties and memoranda arent all that different in the end.
It could be partly cultural. I've noticed when dealing with Americans the idea that you cant expect people to keep their word if it's not explicitly written into a contract is quite common. It's also idiosyncratically American - I havent noticed this word-is-worthless/contracts-sacrosanct "if we take you for a ride it's your fault" attitude elsewhere.
> Russia has publicly expressed regret that it did not get the wording in a treaty though it holds to the idea that assurances made outside of a legal framework are not worthless, whereas to an American legalistic mind it appears, they are.
Russia isn't even holding to an actual legal treaty about respecting the sovereign territorial integrity of Ukraine and you're exclusively pissed at Americans for assurances outside of a legal framework?
The expansion of NATO came first in 97- at a point when Russia was militarily at its weakest, and a drunk American puppet was in charge.
Crimea would likely still belong to Ukraine if NATO hadnt done that - eastern europe being a buffer being the presumption built into the negotiations. There was some trust before. There is none now.
As it was, the pushback on NATO against the vulnerable, much invaded western border once Russia recovered economic and military strength was inevitable.
As inevitable as the NATO invasion and occupation of Afghanistan when in 2001 the Taliban dared to request evidence and a trial while Americans bayed for blood.
> Russia has publicly expressed regret that it did not get the wording in a treaty
At the time in question, Russia wasn't a sovereign subject of international law, but a subordinate entity within the USSR. Mikhail Gorbachev, who was a somewhat important figure in the USSR government at the time, and likely to know, has explicitly stated that such assurances we're not given, nor was the matter negotiated [0] (it is true that the possibility or it being an item on the table seems to have been raised as an inducement to the USSR to participate in resolution of German reunification, but an offer that an issue can be in the table to get someone to the table is not a commitment, even informal, on the anything besides allowing discussion should it be raised.)
>Gorbachev: “I do think that they could have done more. Much of what has since happened has been directly related to the collapse of the Soviet Union. We cannot blame anyone for the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, many people in the West were secretly rubbing their hands and felt something like a flush of victory – including those who had promised us: ‘We will not move one centimetre further East.’”
Brookings is about as useful for proving a point on Russia as RT. Might as well quote Trump on who won the last election.
>The former idea about “closer to the Soviet borders” is written down not in treaties but in multiple memoranda of conversation between the Soviets and the highest-level Western interlocutors (Genscher, Kohl, Baker, Gates, Bush, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Major, Woerner, and others) offering assurances throughout 1990 and into 1991 about protecting Soviet security interests and including the USSR in new European security structures. The two issues were related but not the same. Subsequent analysis sometimes conflated the two and argued that the discussion did not involve all of Europe. The documents published below show clearly that it did.
https://mltoday.com/new-document-us-promised-not-to-expand-n...
Russia has publicly expressed regret that it did not get the wording in a treaty though it holds to the idea that assurances made outside of a legal framework are not worthless, whereas to an American legalistic mind it appears, they are.
Probably it would have made no difference anyway. There's no independent court of international law to adjudicate. Treaties and memoranda arent all that different in the end.
It could be partly cultural. I've noticed when dealing with Americans the idea that you cant expect people to keep their word if it's not explicitly written into a contract is quite common. It's also idiosyncratically American - I havent noticed this word-is-worthless/contracts-sacrosanct "if we take you for a ride it's your fault" attitude elsewhere.