At any given time, only about 3-4 SSBNs are out on patrol. The rest are in port or undergoing refits. Step one is to hit the ports, so you only have to worry about the 3-4 that are out. The subs patrol in defined patrol boxes which are roughly known to everyone.
Then you knock out the E-6s, E-4s, and all fixed VLF transmitters to remove VLF comms capability. Then you knock out, at minimum, the AEHF and Milstar satellites, but I've heard the SSBNs now can send up an Iridium buoy, which is good, that is a lot of satellites to take out. I don't know the feasibility of that. This buys some amount of time before a launch message can be received by the sub.
Now we would presume that before such a strike, the locations of the patrolling SSBNs are known. There are a number of new types of sensors such as green lasers, enhanced sonars, satellite wake detection, even antineutrino detection, about which some has come out in the open literature. There is also the emerging possibility of swarms of sonar equipped underwater drones that could aid in detection.
As for destroying the submarines, that could be any combination of attack submarines, underwater drones, aircraft with torpedoes, or aircraft with nuclear depth bombs.
It's also instructive to think about how a potential pause due to comms unavailability could affect deterrence as well, since an adversary could launch a first strike limited to military targets, and if the SSBNs were alive but out of communication, an adversary could threaten a follow up attack on cities if the remaining SSBNs did not surrender, and this would be an extremely difficult ultimatum to refuse.
> Then you knock out the E-6s, E-4s, and all fixed VLF transmitters to remove VLF comms capability
Okay, so... explain to me how Russia and/or China plans to to destroy an E-6 stationed in Nebraska before a second-strike is launched by the USA.
It takes something like 20 minutes for a missile traveling at Mach 20, launched in Russia, before it reaches Nebraska. And the whole world will know that an ICBM was launched because those things aren't exactly subtle.
And once you figure out how to kill the one in Nebraska, then you have to tell me how you kill the one in Kentucky. I guess you launch both missiles simultaneously, but... I'm sure you can see where this is going. You're gonna have to launch hundreds of ICBMs simultaneously, and then wait 20 minutes, and then hope the entirety of the USA's defense is caught sleeping on their job for 20 minutes.
With a quadcopter drone, a rifle from a helicopter, whatever. These planes are very fragile. You take out the windshield and it doesn't fly. They are much better protected up at 35,000 feet.
The other possibility is depressed trajectory SLBMs. Those could hit most targets in the U.S. in 7 minutes or less. The only problem is that the depressed trajectory means that the reentry vehicle spends more time in the atmosphere, so they're less accurate. With a maneuvering reentry vehicle, you can get better accuracy.
You're welcome to test that theory of yours by flying a quadcopter into your nearest air-force base and seeing if you can hit a grounded airplane.
Or at a minimum: think about the logistics behind such an attack. Even if you get one military base, there are hundreds of them across the USA, and you're suggesting that someone has the capability to attack all of them simultaneously.
No. The alert E-6s are normally at Travis AFB and NAS Patuxent River. There are two planes you have to take out.
Now, I have seen some evidence that this vulnerability is being more acknowledged and that they're moving around the alerts more. It's not a full roving alert because of course there are a limited number of crews, they have families, and there are not that many bases that have the working alert facilities that Pax River and Travis have.
I actually happened to be driving by a random air force base on a road trip recently and happened to see an E-4 taxiing for takeoff, which was interesting to me. They may be using those more to try to increase the alert coverage.
I saw some congressional testimony from 2019 about this issue, and the general was asked why they can't move back to continuous airborne alert like they did before '91, and the answer was that the E-6s are old and they don't have very many, and that they would only be able to do this for a couple of months before maintenance requirements precluded them from launching. Sitting on the ground puts less hours on the engines and airframes and so they can maintain that alert.
Then you knock out the E-6s, E-4s, and all fixed VLF transmitters to remove VLF comms capability. Then you knock out, at minimum, the AEHF and Milstar satellites, but I've heard the SSBNs now can send up an Iridium buoy, which is good, that is a lot of satellites to take out. I don't know the feasibility of that. This buys some amount of time before a launch message can be received by the sub.
Now we would presume that before such a strike, the locations of the patrolling SSBNs are known. There are a number of new types of sensors such as green lasers, enhanced sonars, satellite wake detection, even antineutrino detection, about which some has come out in the open literature. There is also the emerging possibility of swarms of sonar equipped underwater drones that could aid in detection.
As for destroying the submarines, that could be any combination of attack submarines, underwater drones, aircraft with torpedoes, or aircraft with nuclear depth bombs.
It's also instructive to think about how a potential pause due to comms unavailability could affect deterrence as well, since an adversary could launch a first strike limited to military targets, and if the SSBNs were alive but out of communication, an adversary could threaten a follow up attack on cities if the remaining SSBNs did not surrender, and this would be an extremely difficult ultimatum to refuse.