> it isn’t fundamentally based on measuring empirical evidence of a natural process.
What leads you to say this? If computation is in some sense the construction of certain forms of mathematics, is computer science not then the empirical study of computers (the objects which instantiate the math) and computation (the process of instantiation)? Of course there is abstract theory as well, but that's just as true in physics
Newell and Simon had some thoughts: "We build computers and programs for many reasons.
We build them to serve society and as tools for carrying out the economic tasks of society. But as basic scientists we build machines and programs as a way of discovering new phenomena and analyzing phenomena we already know about... the phenomena surrounding computers are deep and obscure, requiring much experimentation to assess their nature."[0]
The fact that digital computation is a new process doesn't make it "unnatural", it might be argued; some also contend computation takes place not merely in digital computers but much more generally, in which case distinctions between computer science/cognitive science/physics blur
Agree with your broader point, though. I'm not aware of any consensus on the epistemological or ontological status of computer science, or on its relation to the other sciences. It seems (to me) subject to many of the same philosophical questions that dog mathematicians, re: discovery vs. invention, the uncertain reality of various abstractions, generalizability, etc
Likewise agree that consideration of the methods employed in computer science can be fruitful, in particular if the goal is not so much to establish once and for all which category CS falls most naturally into, but simply to stimulate critical thought about the fundamental questions
I meant natural in the sense of originating from nature, specifically as opposed to something built by people. The fact that digital computation is a synthetic construction of humans is what makes it “unnatural”, that it’s new is just a byproduct humans having invented it recently.
I’d agree there are ways that we can observe computation as a scientist and form hypotheses and perform experiments, especially if, for example, I write a program I don’t fully understand and don’t know how to predict the behavior of, or more maybe much more commonly when I observe software written by other people.
Thinking about the analogy to telescopes, the implication is that computers are an instrument for measuring something. Telescopes measure things about planets and stars, physical things that occur in nature. But what exactly do computers measure if they’re to be considered a measuring device? It’s fun to think of a computer being a physical device that measures pure logic; we can physically observe something that doesn’t occur in nature.
On the other hand, I’m hesitant to not draw some kind of line between CS and the hard sciences like physics, chemistry, biology, because there seem to be real differences between them. (I was going to point out examples, but realized it’s fundamentally tricky to nail down and I’d be setting a trap for myself. ;)) Yes I agree the philosophy of where CS lands, and what CS really is, does land in the same ambiguous camp as mathematics (probably because CS and math both truly are in the same category of abstract logic, not directly tied to physical observations.) Maybe more useful and abstract tools are more difficult to categorize precisely because they are used as part of all the sciences and arts...
What leads you to say this? If computation is in some sense the construction of certain forms of mathematics, is computer science not then the empirical study of computers (the objects which instantiate the math) and computation (the process of instantiation)? Of course there is abstract theory as well, but that's just as true in physics
Newell and Simon had some thoughts: "We build computers and programs for many reasons. We build them to serve society and as tools for carrying out the economic tasks of society. But as basic scientists we build machines and programs as a way of discovering new phenomena and analyzing phenomena we already know about... the phenomena surrounding computers are deep and obscure, requiring much experimentation to assess their nature."[0]
The fact that digital computation is a new process doesn't make it "unnatural", it might be argued; some also contend computation takes place not merely in digital computers but much more generally, in which case distinctions between computer science/cognitive science/physics blur
Agree with your broader point, though. I'm not aware of any consensus on the epistemological or ontological status of computer science, or on its relation to the other sciences. It seems (to me) subject to many of the same philosophical questions that dog mathematicians, re: discovery vs. invention, the uncertain reality of various abstractions, generalizability, etc
Likewise agree that consideration of the methods employed in computer science can be fruitful, in particular if the goal is not so much to establish once and for all which category CS falls most naturally into, but simply to stimulate critical thought about the fundamental questions
[0]: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/360018.360022