That sounds like you're trying to propose a solution that's as far as possible from addressing the root cause and any "human error". NASA didn't need a shuttle that would refuse to take off in cold weather. They needed engineering assessments that realistically quantified and clearly communicated the risks of launching in cold weather. Given accurate information about the capabilities of the shuttle, mission control would have waited for warmer weather or implemented countermeasures.
The Challenger explosion was entirely political. It was the result of the structure of human relationships and not any engineering discipline.
Had the social structure been politically different on that day they would have acted on the available engineering information by refusing to launch. It was the political environment that goaded them into taking more risk than they had previously decided was acceptable.
Then I think you're still missing the point of the comment you replied to. Chalking something up to "human error" is not a particularly useful conclusion to come to; it doesn't really solve or prevent any problems. The takeaway should be that a system did indeed fail from a design flaw. That system was not the space shuttle as a mechanical device. The system that failed and needed to be re-designed was the process of spacecraft engineering: NASA was lacking in structural incentives and protections necessary to ensure that predictable catastrophes would actually be predicted, and that such predictions would be communicated through the organization before anyone got killed.
That certainly seems like a reasonable thing to me, now that we know that to be an issue. Why wouldn't you design a system that prevents it from taking off in conditions that are known to cause a crash?
Obviously they may not know these conditions ahead of time. But preventing user error for known problems seems obvious.
