I suppose you have two kinds of truth when using that word:
* That which can be rationally defended with evidence. The whole definition of a fact being a justified, true belief etc.
* That which is believed to be true on faith.
Regulating on the former with the proviso that encountering new evidence should inform our understanding of the truth seems prudent. For example the "scientific method". So for example not only can we show that anti-vax beliefs are wrong we can also show that disseminating them is actively harmful. So there is certainly a case to be made that regulating the propagation of these harmful beliefs under an evidence based regime is the prudent thing to do.
Regulating on the latter is a terrible idea and that's what you'd get if anti-vax believers were trying to prevent evidence of the efficacy of vaccination from spreading.
This is easy in examples such as anti-vax, flat-earth etc, but harder is more nuanced situations.
That's because he who counts the votes, controls the election; and He who decides what counts as evidence (or its weight) controls the empirical truth. all scientific conclusions are at least some degree theory-laden.
Then we get to the fact that scientific truth is not a priori for individuals, it must be communicated from a specific community which, if not at least self-motivated itself (as are most human groups) will be filtered through various political layers; The more privileged that community is (wrt exclusively wielding the power of truth), the more 3rd parties will interfere to acquire it.
This is why political principles exist as well as impossibly ideal empirical ones; The issue is less about the complex issue of objective truth, and more about the autonomy of individuals to choose their own actions, whatever beliefs may motivate it.
Right and regulation based on evidence would be a political principle and further we have to regulate nuanced situations all the time. Hence an entire branch of government usually set up to deal with the nuance of it.
Sure, but medicine differs from politics. Just b/c we have the mains to fairly consistently regulate one based on scientific consensus (and associated power-politics) doesn't mean it applies to all.
On that note: would you consider the decision-making process of the supreme court to be "scientific"? as opposed to, say, the FDA. If so, why, or why not?
> not only can we show that anti-vax beliefs are wrong
But can you? The CDC was supposed to publish reports every 2 years on child vaccinations, since 1986, in 2018 it came out that they never had. An independent peer-reviewed study found that the health of unvaccinated children was better than those of vaccinated [1][2]. For freedom of speech, you could argue that the studies are wrong, but you could argue that _any_ study is wrong, that's science and healthy skepticism. But then we would need to do more studies, something the CDC doesn't appear to want to do. Opposition spurs us on to find out more, to study more; science dies in unopposed silence.
The main point is-- sometimes we assume things that we really _don't_ know. We assume the evidence is all there for our side and there is none for the other side. The truth is usually more nuanced, both sides are partially right and partially wrong. The danger is attempting to silence others, even when we haven't looked at _their_ evidence. What we should do is let all sides speak, find the nuances and fuse together what is wrong. If all sides are allowed to fairly argue in the public, then there is no shame when someone is eventually found to be wrong. Otherwise we risk becoming little dictators by silencing those we "know to be wrong", but later find out that we deceived both ourselves and others, and did it by force and coercion.
We then become morally liable for the harm we have done, because we have arrogantly silenced what is true.
* That which can be rationally defended with evidence. The whole definition of a fact being a justified, true belief etc.
* That which is believed to be true on faith.
Regulating on the former with the proviso that encountering new evidence should inform our understanding of the truth seems prudent. For example the "scientific method". So for example not only can we show that anti-vax beliefs are wrong we can also show that disseminating them is actively harmful. So there is certainly a case to be made that regulating the propagation of these harmful beliefs under an evidence based regime is the prudent thing to do.
Regulating on the latter is a terrible idea and that's what you'd get if anti-vax believers were trying to prevent evidence of the efficacy of vaccination from spreading.