No, not at all. I'm arguing that the new system is good for people who already want to leak things to the WSJ. If you don't trust the WSJ to protect your identity then you obviously should not leak to them, period.
It's different from emailing tips@wsj.com because there's an explicit promise to minimize identifiable information and to limit access to messages. It's also tough to send large files by email.
Is there a gray area between this project and normal source protection by reporters? I'd say on the face of it that the WSJ Fakeyleaks is less protective than contacting a reporter directly, since the investigative reporter's reputation hinges on not burning their sources.
So, if you already want to leak things to the WSJ, that mechanism already existed. If anything this is probably just Rupert being butthurt over his loss of control over the mass-media news landscape and "me too!"'ing on WL. Nice try, old man.
I just posted a comment about that elsewhere on this thread -- that's what disturbs me so much about this. It's creating a separate level of protection that people won't understand (journalism ethics proscribe that you don't give up your source, ever). The WSJ needs to stay out of this unless its going to protect these submitters to the same level as any other source (and you don't give people up because you're being sued).
It's different from emailing tips@wsj.com because there's an explicit promise to minimize identifiable information and to limit access to messages. It's also tough to send large files by email.