I'm not trying to derail the discussion by pointless complaints about etymology, I'm saying that part of the problem with the concept of hate speech is that the name given to it obscures (accidentally) the nuances of how it is applied in practice.
A better analogy would be if the critics of homophobes genuinely thought that homophobia was literally a fear of homosexuals, causing the homophobes to complain that this framing of their position made it hard for them to explain their objection to homosexuality.
By hiding the subjectivity of "hate speech", people then get surprised or angry when it does or doesn't get applied to terms like "communist bandits" or "OK, boomer", or "eat the rich". The real debate isn't about whether the terms are hateful (as the name suggests), but whether the specific groups that are targeted need the specific protections being implemented.
So you were genuinely and not merely rhetorically confused when you asked whether insulting Trump supporters would qualify as hate speech?
Sorry, it just seems like you are deliberately trying to introduce confusion about what hate speech is into this discussion.
There's nothing particularly 'subjective' about the definition of hate speech. At least, it's no more subjective than the definition of 'free speech' or 'censorship' or any of the other relevant concepts in this domain. There's a perfectly objective history of persecution targeting certain minority groups.
I was genuinely looking for a logically consistent framework for excluding "insulting Trump supporters" from being an example of hate speech. I'm sorry if it seemed like I was labouring the point too much by asking where the lines around hate speech should be drawn.
I accept that there are objective historical examples of majority groups persecuting minority groups, and I'll ignore the difficulties of constructing well-defined subsets of a population (e.g. "working class") or whether a given group is numerically a minority (e.g. "females" in many countries). What I still think is subjective, though, is how much (and what sort of) persecution is necessary before a group becomes entitled to claim that hateful language used against them is "hate speech".
Imagine a hypothetical African country that had, say, France as its colonial occupier, under an apartheid system, but then allowed free elections, leading to the native population gaining political power. If the native population had talked about "getting rid of" their French occupiers, while the apartheid system was in place, presumably your definition of "hate speech" wouldn't have applied to that speech. But would your definition also not apply to similar speech (targeted at the same French people) after the occupying minority population lost their power? Would some amount of time (and violence) have to pass before the minority was entitled to point out that the hateful speech directed towards them was this special kind of "hate speech"?
Again, I apologise if this seems like a contrived example (and it's very hard to come up with an example that people don't have instinctive pre-conceptions and biases around), but I'm trying to explore if your definition really is as neutral as you think it is. You're right, though, that terms like "free speech" can be very nebulous, while still being useful concepts.
If your point is that you can contrive edge cases then, well, duh. There are also edge cases involving free speech and just about every other legal/moral/political concept.
My point isn't that edge cases exist, but that the edge cases force us to examine the process by which we decide whether something is or isn't hate speech.
I think that for a lot of people, they are exposed to a few clear examples of hate speech, and unconsciously build a heuristic that says "Anything that makes me feel the same sense of disgust towards the speaker or sympathy towards the target, is hate speech". Fortunately that heuristic works quite well most of the time for people, but I think it can work so well that the people using it don't question it, and don't realise that their definition has some blind spots in some areas, or scope-creep in others.
So, regarding my contrived edge case, when you say "the history matters", do you mean that the majority can continue to talk about "getting rid" of the minority without it being classed as hate speech, because the minority were historically privileged?
Alternatively, perhaps you mean "speech can change from being allowed to being hate speech (and vice versa) over the course of history". I don't disagree that the meaning of (and people's sensitivities to) words can change over time, but in my example, the change in circumstances happens in a single day. If that is significant, then it means the definition of hate speech depends not solely on the words themselves, or the size of the target group relative to that of the speaker's group, but rather on some sort of determination of whether the target "deserves" to be a subject of hate because of their membership of a group that you (the arbiter of hate speech) deems to be currently or historically over-represented politically.
I really am trying not to put words into your mouth, and I appreciate you taking the time to understand my concerns. Hopefully we'll both be more clear about what we mean when we use the term "hate speech" in future.
A better analogy would be if the critics of homophobes genuinely thought that homophobia was literally a fear of homosexuals, causing the homophobes to complain that this framing of their position made it hard for them to explain their objection to homosexuality.
By hiding the subjectivity of "hate speech", people then get surprised or angry when it does or doesn't get applied to terms like "communist bandits" or "OK, boomer", or "eat the rich". The real debate isn't about whether the terms are hateful (as the name suggests), but whether the specific groups that are targeted need the specific protections being implemented.