I fear that at the end of the day, capabilities will have the same fate as other sandboxing mechanisms: nobody will use them. And, just so that their application works and avoid support burden, developers will tell people to use a setup that enables access to everything.
pledge(2) and unveil(2) learned from the past and are way simpler. I really wish WebAssembly had adopted similar mechanisms.
Agreed, and there are a lot of UX questions to sort out. Many security concepts took many attempts to figure out in full (or to the extent that they have been figured out :))
One important aspect here is that this doesn't just target whole apps. It also targets developers using dependencies: while it's desirable to restrict an application's capabilities, there's a lot of value in developers only giving packages they depend on very limited sets of capabilities. And that seems much more tractable, given that kitchen-sink packages aren't what most people want to use anyway.
I fear that at the end of the day, capabilities will have the same fate as other sandboxing mechanisms: nobody will use them. And, just so that their application works and avoid support burden, developers will tell people to use a setup that enables access to everything.
pledge(2) and unveil(2) learned from the past and are way simpler. I really wish WebAssembly had adopted similar mechanisms.