Not just RMS -- the RFID trusted traveler pass I used to use (a NEXUS card to be specific) came with a foil storage envelope that DHS/customs recommended you use whenever the card wasn't in use.
Hmmm, how effective is aluminum foil in blocking the RFID? Despite having "RF" in the name, the signal is primarily magnetic induction.
One google hit says "helps a lot, but doesn't prevent": http://www.omniscienceisbliss.org/rfid.html Note that the picture of the reader and the unshielded read distance (18") indications it is the long distance version.
Electromagnetic signals are attenuated exponentially in metals with a frequency dependent decay constant called the skin depth. The formula is given in this wikipedia page :
Looks like typical aluminum foil is thicker than that. The box in our kitchen doesn't say how thick it is, but the Wikipedia page indicates it is likely thicker than 0.025mm since it needs to be thicker than that to be impermeable to oxygen and water.
Hmm, one of us is off by an order of magnitude, I get 0.24 mm.
For Al foil thickness I'm seeing conflicting numbers from 0.2 to 1.1 mm. If my cheap digital micrometer hadn't died I'd measure some.
If my skin depth is right then the attentuation probably won't be complete, if yours is then it might nearly be. Of course that's only the case if the receiver and/or transmitter is completely wrapped. Although at low frequencies like that you could probably tolerate quite a large gap.
It can't be 0.24mm, that would be too thick. On the wikipedia page there's a picture that says: A roll of aluminium foil, with micrometer showing a thickness of 0.013 mm (0.00051 in)
You are right, 0.24mm. I did the m->mm conversion in my head (d'oh).
My cheap digital micrometer only has two digits of precision in mm mode. Measuring my cheap (not "heavy duty") aluminum foil is at the limits of its resolution, 0.01mm.
I folded a sheet of heavy duty foil into 16 sheets and tried to measure the thickness and it was still << 1mm, so I think your estimate of about 0.01mm is reasonable.
In that case I would predict that a single sheet would have little affect on an RFID device operating at 125kHz. Note however that RFID devices appear to span a very large frequency range :
Experimental evidence, sample size of 1: a single layer of ordinary aluminum foil completely enclosing the card prevents a "normal distance" (4" square) reader from reading my card.
Another thought: is it possible there's exposed circuitry on the card that the foil is shorting out ? You could try wrapping it with a plastic bag before enclosing it with foil.
No, I'm not sure, but it does physically match the cards and readers in the article.
With no foil, the badge is read at 3-4".
With a single slice of foil ~18"x12" held in front of the sensor, the badge is read at ~1" (a noticeable reduction in signal).
With the foil folded in half and the badge in the fold so that it forms a single layer on both sides of the card, it was effective (could not read the badge).
With the badge in an aluminumized mylar antistatic bag, there was no evidence of a signal reduction (read at full distance).
I would theorize that Maxwell hasn't failed us, but the signal is weak enough that the foil attenuated the signal sufficiently to disrupt reading. The RFID reader works by modulating the sensor tuned loop by detuning on/off, which is going to be a pretty weak signal.
The read range you're seeing also seems compatible with a low frequency device.
I'm quite perplexed. I don't think the foil could be attenuating the signal directly. It might be reflecting it/altering the field pattern so as to reduce the effective gain between the transmitter and receiver antennas.
Regarding 'contactless smart cards' which use a similar radio protocol to RFID:
One example being MIFARE used in the London underground, where they found a vulnerability in the encryption algorithm being used on the card (the cards are 'intelligent' in that they have a processor on board to perform the cryptography etc.). Once you can break the encryption, you can then set about making a clone.
With contactless bank cards, (which in the UK you can use to pay for the M6 toll), you could imagine people electronically picking your pocket, by relaying the signal from a transceiver near a cash point over RF to another transceiver which communicates with the card in your pocket.
(hopefully they use distance bounding protocols to prevent this!)
Karsten Nohl (http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~kn5f/) has some fascinating papers on how they broke Crypto1 (the algorithm used by MIFARE). They took photos of the chip in the card using an optical microscope, after dissolving the card in acetone (They had to sand off each layer of the chip to get to the next)
They then applied image recognition to identify logic gates from their constituent transistors. And then looked for XOR gates, as they mention they're rarely used for anything other than crypto on this type of chip. Once they had found the area of the chip involved in cryptography, they converted the logic gates into the actual algorithm used, and then picked apart weaknesses with it.
RFID tags are not smart cards, they basically just have a small amount of data on them which can be read off. So yes, having a bit for bit copy is exactly the same as having the original tag.
Not for a key, no. But it's a great design when what you want is low cost ID tags which don't require their own power source and which essentially work like barcodes that you can scan without line of sight.
These chips aren't supposed to be used for secure applications (though no doubt some people do use them that way). They are intended to be used more like a UPC code.
http://slashdot.org/articles/05/11/19/149242.shtml?tid=133&#...