Could it be that the inability to state the hard problem sensibly is because there is no such problem? I understand it's a somewhat unsatisfactory Dennetian response, but there is the possibility that as neuroscience untangles the softer problems of consciousness, the alleged hard problem will melt away.
A complete physical understanding of the structure and dynamics of the brain and all of its parts would never indicate some subjective experience of consciousness. We only assume that because we know from our own experience that consciousness exists (for ourselves).
Saying it's not a problem is hand wavy. Go touch a hot stovetop and tell me that consciousness does not have a quality and value all its own, beyond the electrochemical correlates of the experience of pain.
The hot stovetop is an interesting example to use, because the muscle-related reaction of your hand removing itself from the hot stovetop is often not a conscious act. But we do consciously perceive the sensation of pain.
In this very specific instance (and others like it) our consciousness might only be reacting to the world around us and comprehending the current state of ourselves and the immediate environment, as opposed to taking a conscious action.
It's the difference between watching audio waveforms on an oscilloscope and listening to Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. These are not equivalent experiences, no matter how accurately the oscilloscope reproduces the waveform.
Sensing pain is not a prerequisite for consciousness. We do not even know if having any senses is - though complete lack thereof will cause problems with detecting consciousness. Due to lack of response.
The intriguing part here is to consider if a person in a sensory deprivation apparatus is actually conscious.
Also consider a person who is day-dreaming and one who is lucid dreaming. As with sensory deprivation, both may be having complex, self-aware cognition and remember it later to talk about it.
