An excerpt is below; what I can say from my understanding is that upper echelons of officers are deliberately understaffed, and superiors are encouraged to give general objectives (or sometimes even just areas of operation) to their subordinates rather than detailed orders; and much planning and communication is done peer-to-peer among officers of the same rank.
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Among the many lessons that can be taken from the history of the Israeli Defense
Force (IDF) in combat, one key issue is the high degree of officer casualties, often
proportionally up to three times higher than enlisted casualty rates. Hence, leaders in the
IDF regard initiative as not just a point of pride, but an absolute necessity to overcome
leader casualties during battle. IDF Officer Candidates undergo training designed to force
them to develop initiative (some of these training techniques will be recommended in the
final chapter). In training, it is also emphasized that the commander will accomplish his
mission according to the general spirit of the command. Additionally, IDF standing
orders promote initiative (as well as aggressiveness an ' offensive spirit):
1. When orders can't get through, assume what the orders would be.
2. When in doubt, hit out. The short route to safety is the road to the enemy
hill.
The stat about 3x officers casualty rate is surprising, I would have imagined the enlisted would generally become cannon-fodder (for lack of a less demeaning word). I guess that's what makes the Israeli forces unique.
It's more common than you'd think actually. Another surprising one is the English army in WW1 where the officers mostly came from posh private schools, statistically they died in larger numbers than normal soldiers. It's intuitive to think it would be the reverse in that meat grinder.
Not so surprising. Same as how elite forces usually have higher casualty rates in wars - because they always go to where things are worst. No guarding a quiet front for the 101st Airborne or the Golani Brigade, and no hunkering down in a foxhole with a machine gun for the platoon lieutenant.
An excerpt is below; what I can say from my understanding is that upper echelons of officers are deliberately understaffed, and superiors are encouraged to give general objectives (or sometimes even just areas of operation) to their subordinates rather than detailed orders; and much planning and communication is done peer-to-peer among officers of the same rank.
========
Among the many lessons that can be taken from the history of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in combat, one key issue is the high degree of officer casualties, often proportionally up to three times higher than enlisted casualty rates. Hence, leaders in the IDF regard initiative as not just a point of pride, but an absolute necessity to overcome leader casualties during battle. IDF Officer Candidates undergo training designed to force them to develop initiative (some of these training techniques will be recommended in the final chapter). In training, it is also emphasized that the commander will accomplish his mission according to the general spirit of the command. Additionally, IDF standing orders promote initiative (as well as aggressiveness an ' offensive spirit):
1. When orders can't get through, assume what the orders would be.
2. When in doubt, hit out. The short route to safety is the road to the enemy hill.