In retrospect, it seems likely that no amount of officer genius could have won the Civil War for the South, but without it, they would have been completely crushed.
Perhaps the entirety of the European continent (or most of the world re: Germany) fighting back meant the war was essentially unwinnable no matter what, but perhaps the successes they did have were due to the process they used.
Right, but if we're going to wank poetic about the success of Auftragstaktik it's worth remembering that throwing people at the problem was repeatedly and conclusively even more successful. Should we draw deep business practice conclusions from either of those? The whole thing seems a bit silly.
Success is based on many factors, and if you're evaluating military cultures and command styles you have to control for those variables. In individual battles or campaigns with equal forces and materiel, German and Napoleonic and Israeli tactics have been very successful, it's just not enough to outweight any disparity in forces.
I do agree that trying to draw business practice conclusions from the very different military setting. This includes the quote of the OP.
Well they over extended themselves eventually, that doesn't mean they didn't dominate the battlefield early on. The Germany was very successful in the Franco Prussian war.
I could have used the US as an example too, as well as Russia by the end of world war 2, they went on to have a bit too loose of a command structure with their nuclear arsenal.
I feel like that's part of the strategy though. Arguing that the strategy was sound but they just overextended themselves seems facetious; didn't the strategy cause them to overextend themselves? Therefore, wouldn't it be fair to argue the strategy was doomed from the start?
I don't know that I agree with any of this argument trying to relate business practices to military practices -- civilians and soldiers have some fundamental differences -- just trying to imagine it philosophically.
