The proposition "the universe is a simulation" is just a form of global scepticism.

I am reasonably sure that the best explanation for the causal structure of the world is the causal structure of the world -- not some other world which, in some grand mystical paranoia, behaves as-if it were the world.

Global scepticism is another "bug" of a different kind. It is a scepticism-loop, like conspiracy theories.

In rational thought, doubt attenuates, it doesnt build. The more occurances of events occur which pertain to one hypothesis, the more confidence you should have in that hypothesis.

The problem with global scepticism is that it declares, by assertion, that every event cannot reduce doubt -- for some magical reason. And so it makes escape from doubt and explanation itself, impossible.

Magical reasoning of this kind is another error. Remove any unjustifiable extra-empirical premises that cause doubt to multiply rather than attenuate. If you spiral into doubt, you're in a loop. Delete the unjustifiable premise.

{Simulation, Cartesian Daemon, Dreaming...} is this set.. now, of "empty substances" out of which every object is meant to be made. These are buggy.

Premises of reasoning which begin, "everything is drawn from... a simulation/dream/blah" are thought-traps that cause doubt to spiral. They are, of themselves, simply made up. That they cause these spirals of doubt is nothing profound.. its in the nature of the setup.

> The problem with global scepticism is that it declares, by assertion, that every event cannot reduce doubt -- for some magical reason.

This is true, you cannot and should not be able to decrease absolute doubt. All you can do is reduce relative doubt given a certain set of premises.

> The more occurances of events occur which pertain to one hypothesis, the more confidence you should have in that hypothesis.

This is rational only given the assumption the of the Doctrine of Uniformity (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniformitarianism)

That doctrine allows us to build pretty much all of our useful knowledge systems and is the basis for most of our certainty. However, if we are epistemologically honest with our selves, all of our certainly only exists given that this doctrine is true.

Your "magical reasoning" is what allows us to accept and use unprovable premises because we find the knowledge systems we can create with them provide functional utility. This is precisely why I call it a "feature" and not a "bug".

We have some options: "uniform and reliable" or one of an infinite varieties of "non-uniform and unreliable".

Neither starting point has any effect on what makes "the earth goes around the sun" true. It is true iff there is an earth and iff it goes around the sun.

If we are all deceived then that claim is false, regardless of its utility.

Utility is a criterion for the most general starting point of our reasoning: how are we going to think. It isn't a criterion for truth, nor for the truth of particular beliefs. Nor does the fact that utility features in my methodological criteria mean that I am not entitled to reasonably infer truth from the method.

The factory is made of steel (utility) its products are made of wood (truth), that utility features in the production mechanism does not mean it features in the product.

My observation about "the simulation hypothesis" is that it isnt a hypothesis at all. It is just an alternative formulation of how to think: ie., to deny that evidence builds in support of conclusions about how the world works.

It is not mysterious then that "nothing seems to work" if we presume simulation. That's by design of the thought process. Since how I think is my choice. I can chose to use the steel factory over the playdo factory. And my products are clearly of a better quality for any person concerned for production (ie., for the making of truth-claims).

Whether they are true or not, my method reasonably entitles me to infer they are. The playdo method is a thought trap, and a pretty juvenile one at that.

This is the trick being played: simulationy people want you to think "simulation" is just like "the earth goes around the sun". They are both, meant to be, healthy products of reasoning and thus plausible. The former is a bug in this sense: it is in fact a change to the method of truth-production it isnt one among many plausible products (truths). It is broken machinery producing nonesense.

> If we are all deceived then that claim is false, regardless of its utility.

Not really, knowledge is relative: Our claim of "The earth goes around the sun" claim is equally true, regardless of whether we are in a simulation or not. If we are in a simulation, there may not be a real earth, and real gravity may function differently than our gravity. Obviously this piece of knowledge is about our own earth and our own gravity.

If we are in a simulation, then the claims we make are about the simulation and are still provable. If one of use were removed from the simulation, they would be forced to potentially learn an entirely new set of rules and facts. Their knowledge about the our simulation wouldn't be false, but it would have to qualified as about a particular simulation rather than as about reality.

> The factory is made of steel (utility) its products are made of wood (truth), that utility features in the production mechanism does not mean it features in the product.

I don't understand this metaphor.

Truth and Utility are measures we use to evaluate beliefs or claims. In your metaphor, they would be the QA process in the factory. At best they are the QA process as the factory builds itself.

The Doctrine of Uniformity, the scientific method, mathematical proof, visual proof, trust in experts, holy texts, and really the entire sum of our existing knowledge are what make up the factory that produces our beliefs and claims.

> My observation about "the simulation hypothesis" is that it isnt a hypothesis at all.

It certainly is a hypothesis, but may not be a scientific (i.e. testable) hypothesis if there are no associated testable predictions.

I don't get people like you who seem to think there is some magical set of "true claims" that somehow exist outside of any knowledge structure. To me, claims can only be made within a knowledge structure and those claims can only have meaning (let alone truth) by being evaluated within that knowledge structure. I'd be curious to hear you explain how it could be anything else.

I personally think our sense of "truth" arose as an instinctive heuristic for estimating the utility of a claim given our limited existing knowledge and experience.