Key part below. The decision does not address the general question at hand, but finds that DDC has not demonstrated facts that align with the authority they cite.
"The district court, relying on an unpublished district court decision, rejected Design Data’s argument that the SDS/2 copyright could extend to the program’s output. See Design DESIGN DATA CORP. V. UNIGATE ENTERPRISE 9 Data Corp. v. Unigate Enters. Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., No. C 88-4805 FMS, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8183, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 1993)).
Other authorities, however, suggest that the copyright protection afforded a computer program may extend to the program’s output if the program “does the lion’s share of the work” in creating the output and the user’s role is so “marginal” that the output reflects the program’s contents. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[F] (quoting Torah Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin, 136 F. Supp. 2d 276, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
Assuming, without deciding, that copyright protection
does so extend, we nonetheless conclude that Design Data did
not raise a question of material fact that the imported SDS/2-generated images and files reflected the contents of its program. Design Data did not present evidence establishing that SDS/2 “does the lion’s share of the work” in creating the steel detailing files or that the user’s input is “marginal.” Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 283. Thus, the district court correctly rejected Design Data’s argument that the SDS/2 copyright protects the images and files that UE imported and distributed.
"The district court, relying on an unpublished district court decision, rejected Design Data’s argument that the SDS/2 copyright could extend to the program’s output. See Design DESIGN DATA CORP. V. UNIGATE ENTERPRISE 9 Data Corp. v. Unigate Enters. Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., No. C 88-4805 FMS, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8183, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 1993)).
Other authorities, however, suggest that the copyright protection afforded a computer program may extend to the program’s output if the program “does the lion’s share of the work” in creating the output and the user’s role is so “marginal” that the output reflects the program’s contents. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[F] (quoting Torah Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin, 136 F. Supp. 2d 276, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
Assuming, without deciding, that copyright protection does so extend, we nonetheless conclude that Design Data did not raise a question of material fact that the imported SDS/2-generated images and files reflected the contents of its program. Design Data did not present evidence establishing that SDS/2 “does the lion’s share of the work” in creating the steel detailing files or that the user’s input is “marginal.” Torah Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 283. Thus, the district court correctly rejected Design Data’s argument that the SDS/2 copyright protects the images and files that UE imported and distributed.