While I agree that the specific charges against Sachs should be proven first, it's hard to deny the questionable behavior and dealings that Goldman has been involved in since the bailout began, not the least of which was the ex.Chairman and CEO being the Treasury Secretary and billions of dollars disappearing as part of the initial TARP program.

It seems Buffett really wants Goldman to be a pioneering American investment bank with a solid ethical reputation, but unfortunately for him the reality is less rosy.

Besides, the guy probably isn't to throw his integrity--from which a large part of his $200 billion business derives its value--for a mere $5 billion in warrants. I mean, stranger things have happened, but I'd be very surprised if such a turn of events came to pass.

Implying, as he seems to, that it's okay to knowingly sell junk to clients ("It's a little hard for me to get terribly sympathetic for a bank [customer of Goldman Sachs] that made a bad credit deal") doesn't seem to fit the definition of integrity.

"Caveat emptor" is usually a bad principle with which to run an economy, but when it comes to financial people buying, selling, and trading assets, "caveat emptor" is the way things are done and many respectable people think this is probably the only correct way to do things, at least on the micro and meso scales. Whining about clients getting screwed is like whining about people showing up to Fight Club and getting punched. And Buffett and Munger even express a degree of distaste for the deals in question, lawful or not, which is more than most financial people would allow themselves.

Your quote doesn't even imply Buffett thinks it's "OK", merely that it's difficult to feel sympathy for those on the wrong end of the deal. Those clients aren't random consumers, they were financial guys who were supposed to know better.

To continue the analogy, the "whining" is really about some using brass knuckles against others when it is supposed to be a fair fight.

The thing is, the securities were designed to fail so they could short them. That would be like McDonald's deliberately selling lethal food and taking life insurance out on its customers.

Society bears the costs of fallout from commerce that is damaging to society. The fraud of Goldman Sachs, and other companies engaged in, resulted in the bailouts. If a business model is dependent on incurring significant social costs then a society which allows it won't be sustainable.

So their clients walked in and requested securities made up of crappy mortgages?

Everything, even crap, has a price at which it makes sense.

Every purchase occurs because the buyer and seller have different beliefs about the worth of the thing being sold to them.

If you think that the housing market is doomed, you'll have a very different opinion of a mortgage pool than a seller who thinks that the market is sound.

Of course nobody comes in asking for "crappy mortgages". Pension funds, endowments, etc. have certain investing goals. These are typically set based on future obligations to their investors. Let's say for example that you are a portfolio manager at one of these institutions whose job is to achieve a 7.5% annual return because teachers, firemen, and police officers actually expect to get paid in retirement. Well, the first thing to note is that this isn't easy. The investors diversify their investments among stocks, hedge funds, fixed income (bonds), and yes - mortgage backed securities, based on where they think the best relative risk-reward is.

Along the entire spectrum of assets, investors expect a much higher yield for what the market perceives to be a crappy asset as compared to a good asset. You can loan money to the US government at a 1% yield or you can load money to high grade corporate companies in the US for 5%. Why would you choose the "safe" US government vs. the relatively "crappy" high grade corporate securities? Well, it all depends on what yield (interest rate) you seek versus what risk you are willing to take.

The investors who bought these securities were looking for a specific risk (and for the interest rate that they'd get for taking it) which was detailed very clearly in the offering memorandum (http://bit.ly/9zwBqB). Some specific lines I'll cite are as follows:

-----Prior to making an investment decision, prospective investors should ensure that they have sufficient knowledge, experience and access to professional advisors to make their own legal, tax, accounting and financial evaluation of the merits and risks of investment in the Notes and should carefully consider the nature of the Notes, the matters set forth elsewhere in this Offering Circular and the extent of their exposure to the risks described in "Risk Factors". -----Concentration Risk. The concentration of the Reference Obligations in the Reference Portfolio in any one particular type of Structured Product Security subjects the Notes to a greater degree of risk with respect to credit defaults within such type of Structured Product Security. Investors should review the list of Reference Obligations set forth herein and conduct their own investigation and analysis with regard to each Reference Obligation. See "The Credit Default Swap—The Reference Portfolio". ----- The Collateral Securities may include Commercial Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities. Mortgage-Backed Securities. CMBS bear various risks, including credit, market, interest rate, structural and legal risks. CMBS are securities backed by obligations (including certificates of participation in obligations) that are principally secured by mortgages on real property or interests therein having a multifamily or commercial use, such as regional malls, other retail space, office buildings, industrial or warehouse properties, hotels, rental apartments, self-storage, nursing homes and senior living centers. Risks affecting real estate investments include general economic conditions, the condition of financial markets, political events, developments or trends in any particular industry and changes in prevailing interest rates. The cyclicality and leverage associated with real estate-related investments have historically resulted in periods, including significant periods, of adverse performance, including performance that may be materially more adverse than the performance associated with other investments. In addition, commercial mortgage loans generally lack standardized terms, tend to have shorter maturities than residential mortgage loans and may provide for the payment of all or substantially all of the principal only at maturity. Additional risks may be presented by the type and use of a particular commercial property. For instance, commercial properties that operate as hospitals and nursing homes may present special risks to lenders due to the significant governmental regulation of the ownership, operation, maintenance and financing of health care institutions. Hotel and motel properties are often operated pursuant to franchise, management or operating agreements which may be terminable by the franchisor or operator; and the transferability of a hotel's operating, liquor and other licenses upon a transfer of the hotel, whether through purchase or foreclosure, is subject to local law requirements. All of these factors increase the risks involved with commercial real estate lending. Commercial lending is generally viewed as exposing a lender to a greater risk of loss than residential one-to-four family lending since it typically involves larger loans to a single borrower than residential one-to-four family lending. Commercial mortgage lenders typically look to the debt service coverage ratio of a loan secured by income-producing property as an important measure of the risk of default on such a loan. Commercial property values and net operating income are subject to volatility, and net operating income may be sufficient or insufficient to cover debt service on the related mortgage loan at any given time. The repayment of loans secured by income-producing properties is typically dependent upon the successful operation of the related real estate project rather than upon the liquidation value of the underlying real 26 estate. Furthermore, the net operating income from and value of any commercial property may be adversely affected by risks generally incident to interests in real property, including events which the borrower or manager of the property, or the issuer or servicer of the related issuance of commercial mortgage-backed securities, may be unable to predict or control, such as changes in general or local economic conditions and/or specific industry segments; declines in real estate values; declines in rental or occupancy rates; increases in interest rates, real estate tax rates and other operating expenses; changes in governmental rules, regulations and fiscal policies; acts of God; and social unrest and civil disturbances. The value of commercial real estate is also subject to a number of laws, such as laws regarding environmental clean-up and limitations on remedies imposed by bankruptcy laws and state laws regarding foreclosures and rights of redemption. Any decrease in income or value of the commercial real estate underlying an issue of CMBS could result in cash flow delays and losses on the related issue of CMBS. A commercial property may not readily be converted to an alternative use in the event that the operation of such commercial property for its original purpose becomes unprofitable. In such cases, the conversion of the commercial property to an alternative use would generally require substantial capital expenditures. Thus, if the borrower becomes unable to meet its obligations under the related commercial mortgage loan, the liquidation value of any such commercial property may be substantially less, relative to the amount outstanding on the related commercial mortgage loan, than would be the case if such commercial property were readily adaptable to other uses. The exercise of remedies and successful realization of liquidation proceeds may be highly dependent on the performance of CMBS servicers or special servicers, of which there may be a limited number and which may have conflicts of interest in any given situation. The failure of the performance of such CMBS servicers or special servicers could result in cash flow delays and losses on the related issue of CMBS. At any one time, a portfolio of CMBS may be backed by commercial mortgage loans with disproportionately large aggregate principal amounts secured by properties in only a few states or regions. As a result, the commercial mortgage loans may be more susceptible to geographic risks relating to such areas, such as adverse economic conditions, adverse events affecting industries located in such areas and natural hazards affecting such areas, than would be the case for a pool of mortgage loans having more diverse property locations. Mortgage loans underlying a CMBS issue may provide for no amortization of principal or may provide for amortization based on a schedule substantially longer than the maturity of the mortgage loan, resulting in a "balloon" payment due at maturity. If the underlying mortgage borrower experiences business problems, or other factors limit refinancing alternatives, such balloon payment mortgages are likely to experience payment delays or even default. As a result, the related issue of CMBS could experience delays in cash flow and losses. In addition, interest payments on CMBS may be subject to an available funds-cap and/or a weighted average coupon cap (which cap will, in each case, have the practical effect of deferring part or all of such interest payments) if interest rate rises substantially. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities. The Reference Obligations will include and the Collateral Securities may include Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities. RMBS bear various risks, including credit, market, interest rate, structural and legal risks. RMBS represent interests in pools of residential mortgage loans secured by one- to four-family residential mortgage loans. Such loans may be prepaid at any time. Residential mortgage loans are obligations of the borrowers thereunder only and are not typically insured or guaranteed by any other person or entity, although such loans may be securitized by Agencies and the securities issued are guaranteed. The rate of defaults and losses on residential mortgage loans will be affected by a number of factors, including general economic conditions and those in the area where the related mortgaged property is located, the borrower's equity in the mortgaged property and the financial circumstances of the borrower. If a 27 residential mortgage loan is in default, foreclosure of such residential mortgage loan may be a lengthy and difficult process, and may involve significant expenses. Furthermore, the market for defaulted residential mortgage loans or foreclosed properties may be very limited. At any one time, a portfolio of RMBS may be backed by residential mortgage loans with disproportionately large aggregate principal amounts secured by properties in only a few states or regions. As a result, the residential mortgage loans may be more susceptible to geographic risks relating to such areas, such as adverse economic conditions, adverse events affecting industries located in such areas and natural hazards affecting such areas, than would be the case for a pool of mortgage loans having more diverse property locations. In addition, the residential mortgage loans may include so-called "jumbo" mortgage loans, having original principal balances that are higher than is generally the case for residential mortgage loans. As a result, such portfolio of RMBS may experience increased losses. Each underlying residential mortgage loan in an issue of RMBS may have a balloon payment due on its maturity date. Balloon residential mortgage loans involve a greater risk to a lender than self- amortizing loans, because the ability of a borrower to pay such amount will normally depend on its ability to obtain refinancing of the related mortgage loan or sell the related mortgaged property at a price sufficient to permit the borrower to make the balloon payment, which will depend on a number of factors prevailing at the time such refinancing or sale is required, including, without limitation, the strength of the residential real estate markets, tax laws, the financial situation and operating history of the underlying property, interest rates and general economic conditions. If the borrower is unable to make such balloon payment, the related issue of RMBS may experience losses. In addition, interest payments on RMBS may be subject to an available funds-cap and/or a weighted average coupon cap (which cap will, in each case, have the practical effect of deferring part or all of such interest payments) if interest rate rises substantially.

Note also Schedule A which LISTS EVERY SECURITY IN THE CDO. With a document like this (which is required), it is very difficult for someone to make a credible claim that GS did not forward appropriate info as to to what the buyer was actually investing in. These investors took a risk. They knew they were taking a risk and they knew the risk they were taking - these weren't mom and pop retail investors, but some of the most professional in the business. The simple fact is that they did a poor job of assessing risk versus reward and lost a ton of money as a result.

Again, when you go into a McDonalds, nobody says, "please give me unhealthy food", but instead they say, "give me a double quarter-pounder with cheese". This person is taking the risk of heart disease versus the "reward" of enjoying a calorific sandwich. They know the risk they're taking and have free will to take that risk. It was the same with these investors, only now it's as if they're suing McDonalds after having a heart attack.

Can we apply this metaphor to the Goldman mortgage backed securities? Well, how many mortgages were wrapped up in those securities? Was there anyway to be sure what the security would be worth under various scenarios? I saw an article that Python was being considered as a language for specifying derivatives, so you could just run the program and know what the payouts would be under various scenarios with no ambiguity. Was there an expectation that Goldman was doing the work of picking securities with a certain risk profile, when in actuality they were picking securities with a higher risk profile?

It seems to me that a general principle of the law should be that a seller who intentionally misrepresents what they are selling has some measure of liability. Do you disagree, or do you feel that no misrepresentation occurred in this case?

The point is, I don't think they really knew the risk. In other words, if the risk was so obvious and you claim that these are smart professionals, then how come so many bought the securities? It seems either the risks were not disclosed properly or these so called "the most professional in business" were really "mom and pop" type amateurs. So which one is it?

> The simple fact is that they did a poor job of assessing risk versus reward and lost a ton of money as a result.

Perhaps true, but if they didn't have the appropriate information to assess the risk because they were deceived, then that would be a serious problem. I am not arguing that's what happened, but rather, that it is hard to assess risk if you are provided with misleading data in general.

To use the McDonalds analogy, it is like them putting false nutritional information, or not disclosing important parts of the nutritional information to their buyers.

> Again, when you go into a McDonalds, nobody says, "please give me unhealthy food", but instead they say, "give me a double quarter-pounder with cheese". This person is taking the risk of heart disease versus the "reward" of enjoying a calorific sandwich.

Again, if you don't know about the amount of calories in a McDonalds, you don't really think you are taking the risk. You just think you are eating a yummy lunch.

The pension fund, didn't think it was taking a risk, it thought those securities were AAA rated. You need access to available and truthful information in order to make an informed decision about risk. I agree that investors were professional and the fact that so many didn't assess the real risk correctly, it means that something was hidden from them. That's the gist of the problem.

Even today, there are an awful lot of fund managers and traders who got their jobs because they showed up to the interview wearing the "right" tie, i.e. through the Old Boys network.

Goldman Sachs, despite what it might look like from the outside, isn't really a part of this network. They started out as scrappy Jews competing with old-money white-shoe WASPs, they were the outsiders that everyone looked down on once. It's baked into their corporate DNA that these guys are prey.

You mean like advocating taxes that he won't pay, that he makes money from?

I'm referring to inheritance taxes. His estate is set up so it will never be taxed. He makes a lot of money from his companies that sell insurance to pay inheritance taxes.

> If it came to light that Goldman is provably guilty of fraud, you can bet

The above suggests that you have some relevant knowledge of Buffet. How about sharing it?

No = his "repuation" isn't an answer. How he earned that reputation is.

In general, I tend to have a problem with cult figures. Buffett has acquired a large following of worshipers who are willing to defend what he says or does based on lofty pronouncements such as "he is ethical" or "he has integrity" and so on. One thing is obvious, and that is he is one of the wealthiest and best businessman in the world. Whether he is ethical or has integrity is probably independent of the fact that he has acquired all this wealth.

    "if Goldman comes out looking bad"

Aside from this cult followers claiming that, I only see a one of the most successful businessman in the world. One could equally have a psychopathic, dishonest, thief as the most successful businessman in the world.

I guess, I would be more convinced of his "integrity" if he actually criticized GS or Moody's, while he still holds large investments in those firms.

He did go to great lengths to explain how he interpreted the goings on at Goldman. He even compared it to a recent blind bond insurance deal that Berkshire had made. And in his opinion, according to the information he had available, it didn't seem like there was any wrong doing on the part of Goldman.

However, he was very clear that if the ACCUSATION of impropriety became proof of wrong doing that he would have a different stance on the matter.

I'm just reporting what I heard him say. Interpret as you wish. As for the side that says he has a conflict of interest in this matter, he also said his investment in Goldman is paying $15 a second. I know that would be a conflict of interest for me, but I am not Warren Buffett.

Awesome book - long, but has much more detail than anything else I've read about him.